Double Standards: The Suppression of Abortion Protesters\u27 Free Speech Rights by Keleher, Christopher P.
DePaul Law Review 
Volume 51 
Issue 3 Spring 2002: Symposium - The End of 
Adolescence 
Article 8 
Double Standards: The Suppression of Abortion Protesters' Free 
Speech Rights 
Christopher P. Keleher 
Follow this and additional works at: https://via.library.depaul.edu/law-review 
Recommended Citation 
Christopher P. Keleher, Double Standards: The Suppression of Abortion Protesters' Free Speech Rights, 51 
DePaul L. Rev. 825 (2002) 
Available at: https://via.library.depaul.edu/law-review/vol51/iss3/8 
This Comments is brought to you for free and open access by the College of Law at Via Sapientiae. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in DePaul Law Review by an authorized editor of Via Sapientiae. For more information, 
please contact digitalservices@depaul.edu. 
DOUBLE STANDARDS:
THE SUPPRESSION OF ABORTION PROTESTERS'
FREE SPEECH RIGHTS
"We should be eternally vigilant against attempts to check the ex-
pression of opinions that we loathe."'
"A function of free speech ...is to invite dispute. It may indeed
best serve its high purpose when it induces ... unrest ... or even
stirs people to anger." 2
INTRODUCTION
Free speech is necessary for a democracy. It prevents government
oppression and tyranny while permitting ideas to flow freely and unin-
hibited. It is important to keep free speech, from whatever source,
unencumbered. Stifling free speech has resulted in devastating effects
in other countries, eventually leading to their demise.3 This issue
takes on even greater importance in the United States because this
country was founded on the principles of freedom of speech, press,
and religion. 4
Most Americans would agree that free speech is a fundamental
right that deserves protection.5 However, throughout this country's
history, many issues have tested the boundaries of free speech, one of
the most controversial being abortion. Abortion remains one of the
most divisive issues our nation has ever faced. Both sides of the abor-
tion debate firmly believe their position is correct. Further, the sub-
ject of abortion has permeated many aspects of our culture, including
politics, medicine, law, women's liberation, and religion.6
Whether an individual is a staunch supporter of abortion rights, an
advocate of the pro-life movement, or one who is oblivious to the is-
sue, it is important to consider the implications of the United States
Supreme Court's recent limitations on the free speech of abortion
1. Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
2. Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 4 (1949) (Douglas, J.).
3. See HARRISON E. SALISBURY, RUSSIA 39-43 (1965).
4. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
5. RODNEY A. SMOLLA, SMOLLA & NIMMER ON FREEDOM OF SPEECH - A TREATISE ON THE
FIRST AMENDMENT 1-2 (1994).
6. See generally ABORTION, MEDICINE, & THE LAW (J. Douglas Butler & David F. Walbert
eds., 4th ed. 1992) (examining the various legal, political, ethical, religious, and medical aspects
surrounding abortion).
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protesters. The Court has gradually limited free speech over a period
of six years through three separate cases. 7 In each consecutive case,
the Court seemed to go one step further than before, as if it were
attempting not to suppress too much free speech at once. The Court's
willingness to severely limit the speech of the pro-life movement
serves as a warning to any protest group that may one day find itself
on the wrong side of the Court.
Part II of this Comment will explore the history of free speech from
its origin to the present, as well as the Supreme Court's role in shaping
that right. 8 This section will also examine the history of the pro-life
movement and abortion clinic violence.9 In addition, Part II will ex-
amine free speech cases concerning several contexts, such as the issues
of abortion and civil rights. 10 Part III will analyze the Court's treat-
ment of free speech in the context of abortion, comparing it to the
treatment of non-abortion free speech cases.1 Part IV will discuss the
actual impact this line of cases has had on lower courts throughout the
country and whether these restrictions are warranted. 12 Part IV will
then discuss the potential impact this line of abortion protest cases
might have, not only for the pro-life protesters, but also on the First
Amendment itself.13
II. BACKGROUND
A. The History of Free Speech
"Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion
or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of
speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assem-
ble, and to petition the court for redress of grievances. ' 14 With these
words, the First Amendment to the Constitution of the United States
defined several principles upon which this nation was founded. The
First Amendment protects many of the rights Americans value most,
such as freedom of speech, press, religion, assembly, and petition.15
While these freedoms are highly valued, the amount of protection ac-
7. See Madsen v. Women's Health Ctr., 512 U.S. 753 (1994); Schenck v. Pro-Choice Network
of W. N.Y., 519 U.S. 357 (1997): Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703 (2000).
8. See infra notes 14-85 and accompanying text.
9. See infra notes 86-214 and accompanying text.
10. See infra notes 215-343 and accompanying text.
11. See infra notes 344-504 and accompanying text.
12. See infra notes 505-596 and accompanying text.
13. See infra notes 597-623 and accompanying text.
14. U.S. CONST. amend. 1.
15. SMOLLA, supra note 5, at 1-2. See, e.g., Frederick Schauer, The Second-Best First Amend-
ment, 31 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1 (1989) (discussing the importance and reasoning behind the
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corded to these rights has become controversial because of issues such
as hate speech, 16 pornography,' 7 and other offensive speech.' 8
1. The Early Years
The First Amendment to the Constitution has been a controversial
principle throughout the history of this country. 19 In fact, before the
writing of the Constitution, many states refused to ratify the Constitu-
tion without a Bill of Rights. 20 The states did not ratify the Bill of
Rights until 1791, fifteen years after the signing of the Constitution.
2 1
While the enactment of the First Amendment granted the right of
free speech, it did not define what speech was included or the limita-
tions upon it.22 Thus, since the inception of the Bill of Rights, there
have been different interpretations 23 as to exactly how far this right
extends.24 Most of the debate about the First Amendment and the
breadth of its protection revolves around the history of the First
Amendment.25
First Amendment and the background justification for it); Kent Greenawalt, Free Speech Justifi-
cations, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 119 (1989).
16. Charles R. Lawrence III, Frontiers Of Legal Thought I1, The New First Amendment: If He
Hollers Let Him Go: Regulating Racist Speech On Campus, 1990 DUKE L.J. 431 (1990) (discuss-
ing racist speech on college campuses and the regulation of such speech).
17. Compare, CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, ONLY WORDS 25 (1993) (arguing that pornogra-
phy should not be considered in light of the First Amendment, but rather through the Four-
teenth Amendment), with NADINE STROSSEN, DEFENDING PORNOGRAPHY: FREE SPEECH, SEX,
AND THE FIGHT FOR WOMEN'S RIGHTS 14 (1995) (stating that "we adamantly oppose any effort
to restrict sexual speech not only because it would violate our cherished First Amendment free-
doms . . . but also because it would undermine our equality, our status, our dignity, and our
autonomy").
18. SMOLLA, supra note 5, at 1-2. See also Alan C. Kors & Harvey A. Silverglate, Codes of
Silence, Who's Gagging Free Speech on Campus-And Why, REASON, Nov. 1998, at 22 (observ-
ing First Amendment infringements at universities across the country); Nadine Strossen, Political
Correctness: Avoiding Extremism in the PC Controversy, in VISIONS OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT
FOR A NEW MILLENNIUM 14, 14 (Fred H. Cate ed., 1992) (considering free expression in light of
the political correctness phenomena).
19. 0. JOHN ROGGE, THE FIRST & THE FIFTH 12 (1971).
20. Id. It was argued that since the federal government had enumerated powers, a Bill of
Rights was not necessary; many also felt the state governments would protect individual rights.
Id.
21. NAT HENTOFF, THE FIRST FREEDOM: THE TUMULTUOUS HISTORY OF FREE SPEECH IN
AMERICA 74 (1980).
22. DANIEL A. FARBER, THE FIRST AMENDMENT 9 (1998). The legislative history surround-
ing the Amendment is incomplete and answers very little. Id. at 9-10.
23. Some argue that the words 'no law' contained within the First Amendment mean exactly
that. See generally TINSLEY E. YARBROUGH, MR. JUSTICE BLACK AND HIS CRITICS (1988)
(evaluating Justice Black's judicial and constitutional philosophy, along with the arguments
raised by his critics).
24. SMOLLA, supra note 5, at 1-2. For the history regarding free speech prior to enactment of
First Amendment, see VINCENT BURANELLI, TIlE TRIAL OF PETER ZENGER (1957).
25. FARBER, supra note 22, at 9-10.
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One of the first tests of the interpretation of the First Amendment
came only a few years after the adoption of the Bill of Rights. 26 In
1798, Congress passed the Sedition Act,27 which prohibited certain
speech against the United States government.2 8 The Act was ex-
tremely oppressive to free speech, severely limiting all citizens' right
to free speech. 29 While debates surrounding the Act are unreliable as
evidence, some view the passing of the Sedition Act as an indication
that the Framers wanted to maintain the English Common Law 30 no-
tions of freedom of the press and speech.31 Despite this argument,
others claim that the Sedition Act had no bearing on the meaning of
the First Amendment. 32 This dispute concerning the appropriate in-
terpretation of the First Amendment continues because there is still
no consensus on the issue.
After the Sedition Act expired in 1801, 33 the debate over freedom
of speech quieted. 34 The courts paid little attention to the First
Amendment between the Act's expiration and the mid-1850s. 35 It was
not until the approach of the Civil War that the scope of First Amend-
ment protection again became an issue.36 During this time, there were
widespread efforts by slavery supporters to suppress the free speech
of abolitionists. 37 Both in the South and in the North, members of the
26. SMOLLA, supra note 5, at 1-3. For the history leading up to the inception of the Bill of
Rights, see ROBERT ALLEN RUTLAND, THE BIRTH OF THE BILL OF RIGHTS 1776-1791 (1955).
27. The Sedition Act "punished false, scandalous, and malicious writings against the govern-
ment, either House of Congress, or the President, if published with intent to defame any of the
them, or to excite against them the hatred of the people, or to stir up sedition or to excite
resistance of law . . . " ZECHARIAH CHAFEE JR., FREE SPEECH IN THE UNITED STATES 27
(1969).
28. ELDER WITT, THE SUPREME COURT AND INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS 24 (2d ed. 1988). For a
history of free speech and state regulation, see ROGGE, supra note 19, at 35-53.
29. WITT, supra note 28.
30. The major authority on common law, William Blackstone, stated that there could be no
previous restraints on speech by the government, but once something was disseminated, the
government could restrict it. SMOLLA, supra note 5, at 1-7.
31. SMOLLA, supra note 5, at 1-3-1-4. See also LEONARD W. LEVY, LEGACY OF SUPPRESSION:
FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND PRESS IN EARLY AMERICAN HISTORY 249-309 (1960) (explaining that
these debates are unreliable as evidence).
32. SMOLLA, supra note 5, at 1-4.
33. In 1801, when Thomas Jefferson became President, he pardoned the ten people convicted
under the Act, and Congress later paid back the fines they were charged, with interest. WITr,
supra note 28, at 24.
34. FARBER, supra note 22, at 10-11.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. See Michael Kent Curtis, The Curious History of Attempts to Suppress Antislavery Speech,
Press, and Petition in 1835-37, 89 Nw. U. L. REV. 785, 798 (1995). For example, "Louisiana made
it a capital offense to use language in any public discourse, from the bar, the bench, the stage, the
pulpit, or in any place whatsoever" that might produce "insubordination among the slaves."
[Vol. 51:825
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abolitionist movement were often silenced by the court system, public
mobs, and police arrests.38
Most of the southern states' legislatures were also involved in the
suppression of speech.39 For example, the Georgia legislature passed
an act awarding five thousand dollars to anyone who arrested the edi-
tor of the abolitionist newspaper, The Boston Liberator.40 Further,
grand juries in many states also played a role in suppressing abolition-
ist speech by indicting publishers of abolitionist newspapers, ministers
who spoke out against slavery, and anyone else opposed to their point
of view. 4' While there were violations of the First Amendment during
this time, the Supreme Court never addressed the constitutionality of
these events. 42 After the Civil War, there was very little serious judi-
cial attention paid to the First Amendment until the 1920s. 4
3
2. World War I
As the United States prepared to enter World War I, the right to
free speech again became a public issue, but this time the highest
court in the country became deeply involved. 44 With the country in
the throes of war, Congress, worried about the dangerous voices of
dissenters to the war effort, enacted statutes to address this concern.45
The Espionage Act of 1917 was one of these statutes.46 The Act made
KENNETH M. STAMPP, Chattels Personal, in AMERICAN LAW AND THE CONSTITUTIONAL ORDER
203, 209 (Lawrence M. Friedman & Harry N. Scheiber eds., 1988).
38. See, e.g., Lynn D. Wardle, The Quandary Of Pro-Life Free Speech: A Lesson From The
Abolitionists, 62 ALB. L. REV. 853, 922-24 (1999); Katherine Hessler, Early Efforts to Suppress
Protest: Unwanted Abolitionist Speech, 7 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 185 (1998).
39. Wardle, supra note 38, at 916-21. Every slave state made it a felony to say anything that
could cause discontent among slaves. Id. However, border states and northern states were also
guilty of serious free speech suppression of abolitionists. Id.
40. WILLIAM GOODELL, SLAVERY AND ANTI-SLAVERY; A HISTORY OF THE GREAT STRUG-
OLE IN BOTH HEMISPHERES: WITH A VIEW OF THE SLAVERY QUESTION IN THE UNITED STATES
410 (Negro Univ. Press 1968) (1852).
41. Wardle, supra note 38, at 916-25. See also Curtis, supra note 37, at 805 (noting that an
Alabama grand jury indicted the publisher of the New York newspaper, The Emancipator);
DWIGHT LOWELL DUMOND, ANTISLAVERY: THE CRUSADE FOR FREEDOM IN AMERICA 142
(1961) (noting that a Maryland county grand jury indicted a Methodist minister for speaking out
against slavery during a sermon).
42. WIT, supra note 28, at 24. The main reason there was little national attention was be-
cause at the time, the First Amendment did not apply to state and local governments. FARBER,
supra note 22, at 62.
43. FARBER, supra note 22, at 12. But see David M. Rabban, The First Amendment in the
Forgotten Years, 90 YALE L.J. 514 (1981).
44. FARBER, supra note 22, at 12.
45. See HENTOFF, supra note 21, at 108-09. These new laws were in addition to a growing
number of state sedition laws. Id.
46. Id. at 109. During World War I, there were more than two thousand convictions under the
Espionage Act. See GERALD GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1018 n.3 (12th ed. 1991).
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it a crime to cause disloyalty, mutiny, or insubordination in the armed
forces.47 Congress went even further a year later by enacting the Sedi-
tion Act of 1918, which made it a crime to speak or write anything
against the United States government, the Constitution, or the flag.48
Challenges to these laws eventually reached the United States Su-
preme Court.49 Six major cases between 1919 and 1920 dealt with
these Acts of Congress, presenting the Court with its first opportuni-
ties to define the limits of protection afforded to speech by the First
Amendment. 50
In these cases, a majority of the Court believed that preserving the
government policies at issue deserved more recognition than the First
Amendment rights of Americans. 5' However, a minority of justices,
most notably Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes and Justice Louis Bran-
deis, grew concerned over the course of these cases, becoming staunch
defenders of the First Amendment and consistently chiding the major-
ity for its willingness to restrict speech. 52 These cases represented the
first time that the Supreme Court explored the boundaries of free
speech, and it has continued to wrestle with this issue ever since.53
3. The Later Years
In the series of early free speech cases, the Court developed the
"clear and present danger" test.54 Yet, as the Court progressed, to the
dismay of Justice Holmes, it expanded the test to restrict more speech
47. Wirr, supra note 28, at 24. The punishment was a twenty-five year jail term or a $10,000
fine. HENTOFF, supra note 21, at 109.
48. Wri r, supra note 28, at 24-25. This Act was an amendment to the Espionage Act. Id.
This Act along with the Sedition Act, according to Hentoff "clearly reflected the will of the
majority of Americans." HENrOFF, supra note 21, at 110.
49. Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919) (affirming the conviction of a socialist party
leader for obstructing enlistment after printing leaflets opposing the draft); Frohwerk v. United
States, 249 U.S. 204 (1919) (affirming the conviction of a newspaper publisher whose articles
allegedly caused disloyalty and insubordination among the armed forces); Debs v. United States,
249 U.S. 211 (1919) (affirming the conviction of Socialist Eugene V. Debs for violating the Espi-
onage Act after a speech he gave about socialism); Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616 (1919)
(affirming the conviction of five Russian immigrants for writing two allegedly seditious pam-
phlets critical of the United States Government); Schaefer v. United States, 251 U.S. 466 (1920)
(affirming the conviction of an officer of a German language newspaper which published articles
unfavorable to the war effort); Pierce v. United States, 252 U.S. 239 (1920) (upholding the con-
victions of Socialist party members after distributing pamphlets critical of the armed forces and
the war effort).
50. Wi vr, supra note 28, at 24-27, 30.
51. Id. at 24.
52. Id.
53. The First Amendment, as a legal doctrine is only around eighty years old. FARBER, supra
note 22, at 12.
54. Wrrr, supra note 28, at 25.
830 [Vol. 51:825
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than originally intended. 55 The dissenting opinions of Justices Holmes
and Brandeis, which expressed concerns about being too willing to
restrict speech, initially had little impact.56 It was only as time passed
that the Court began to shift its stance on free speech.57
This shift began in the 1925 case Gitlow v. New York, 58 which con-
cerned the publication of The Left Wing Manifesto.59 In upholding the
conviction, the Court made it clear for the first time that the First
Amendment applied to the states through the Due Process Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment.60 Throughout the 1930s, the Court be-
gan taking a more temperate look at the right of free speech, render-
ing decisions protecting free speech but also taking into consideration
extreme speech such as "fighting words. '61
This reversal of the Court's theory of First Amendment protection
was short-lived. 62 In the 1950s, it was the "Red Scare" 63 which caused
the Supreme Court to narrow its interpretation once again.64 The
threat of communism permeated the American psyche in the early
1950s and resulted in political witch-hunts, loyalty oaths, and other
restrictions on the freedom of expression. 65 These cases surrounding
McCarthyism 66 revived the debate over the scope of First Amend-
ment protection.67 In this debate two disparate sides emerged, one
arguing for a balancing test, the other lobbying for an absolutist ap-
55. Id.
56. FARBER, supra note 22, at 12.
57. Id. at 13.
58. 268 U.S. 652 (1925).
59. The Left Wing Section of the Socialist Party published the book, which advocated revolu-
tionary mass action. Id. at 658-59.
60. Id. at 666.
61. FARBER, supra note 22, at 62. Fighting words are "those which by their very utterance
inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace." Chaplinsky v. New Hamp-
shire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942). See, e.g., CHAFEE, supra note 27, at 357-493 (examining the right
of free speech in the 1930s); David Yassky, Eras of the First Amendment, 91 COLUM. L. REV.
1699, 1729-34 (1991).
62. FARBER, supra note 22, at 63.
63. For further reading on the suppression of rights during this time, see BURT HIRSCHFELD,
FREEDOM IN JEOPARDY: THE STORY OF THE MCCARTHY YEARS (1969); R. CONRAD STEIN, THE
GREAT RED SCARE (1998).
64. FARBER, supra note 22, at 63. See, e.g., Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951)
(upholding the conviction of Communist party leaders who advocated the overthrow of the gov-
ernment); Garner v. Bd. of Pub. Works of Los Angeles, 341 U.S. 716 (1951) (upholding the
requirement of a loyalty oath for public employees).
65. HENRY J. ABRAHAM & BARBARA A. PERRY, FREEDOM AND THE COURT: Civic RIGHTS
AND LIBERTIES IN THE UNITED STATES 190-92 (7th ed. 1998).
66. See generally ELLEN SCHRECKER, MANY ARE THE CRIMES (1998) (explaining how the
McCarthy era is considered one of the most widespread episodes of political repression in the
history of the United States).
67. FARBER, supra note 22, at 66-68.
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proach.68 Although there was no clear resolution to the debate, com-
mentators decided the relevant points of both sides must be
considered. 69
During this period of renewed suppression of speech, Justices Hugo
Black and William Douglas argued that the Court's application of the
clear and present danger test made it too easy to restrict speech. 70
Both Justices Black and Douglas had an extensive view of the First
Amendment and believed the Court should regulate speech only if it
was mixed with conduct. 71 Following in the tradition of the spirited
dissents of Justices Holmes and Brandeis, the dissents of Justices
Black and Douglas in the 1950s would also prove to make a lasting
impression on the Court's jurisprudence. 72
However, in the late 1950s, with Earl Warren taking over as Chief
Justice of the Supreme Court, the Court again began to change its
treatment of free speech, expanding First Amendment protection to
the press 73 and protesters.74 One of the Warren Court's most impor-
tant free speech cases was Brandenburg v. Ohio75 in which a unani-
mous Court reversed the conviction of a Ku Klux Klan leader.76 The
Court indicated that because the statute punished the mere advocacy
of violence, it fell within "condemnation" of the First Amendment. 77
Thus, while the Court fought segregation and protected civil rights, it
still recognized the free speech rights of its own enemies. 78 While the
Warren Court consistently protected freedom of speech and laid out
several free speech doctrines, it often dealt with cases according to
their specific facts.79
68. Id. at 68. Justice Black was a renowned absolutist. See YARBROUOH, supra note 23, at
133-34. See generally Patricia R. Stembridge, Note, Adjusting Absolutism: First Amendment Pro-
tection For The Fringe, 80 B.U. L. REV. 907 (2000) (considering the fringe protection theory in
light of the absolutist view of free speech).
69. FARBER, supra note 22, at 68.
70. Id. at 66-67.
7t. Id.
72. FARBER, supra note 22, at 13. See, e.g., Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298, 339-44 (1957);
Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 267-87 (1952); Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 579-91
(1951).
73. New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971).
74. Id. See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969). (holding that one could not be
punished for advocating unlawful actions unless the speech actually incited the unlawful
activity).
75. 395 U.S. 444 (1969).
76. Id. at 449. The man was convicted under an Ohio criminal syndicalism statute for advocat-
ing violence. Id. at 444-45.
77. Id. at 449.
78. FARBER, supra note 22, at 68.
79. Id. at 13.
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4. The Modern Era
The modern era of First Amendment cases began in 1969 with the
replacement of Chief Justice Warren with Chief Justice Warren Bur-
ger and has continued to the present day.80 The Burger Court picked
up where the Warren Court left off, further expanding the protections
given to the First Amendment.8 ' Unlike the cases from the 1960s,
however, the Court developed a set of rules to deal with free speech
cases.82 The Burger Court's most important contribution to the free
speech jurisprudence was the distinction between content-based and
content-neutral regulations.8 3 While the concept actually dated back
to the 1930s, the Court did not actively distinguish between the re-
strictions until the 1970s. 84
Since 1917, the Supreme Court has decided many free speech cases.
These cases constitute some of the most controversial decisions
handed down by the Court. The combination of free speech, a divi-
sive issue in and of itself, and the subject of abortion, an even more
controversial issue, creates emotionally charged Court decisions. The
Supreme Court did not decide any free speech cases concerning the
issue of abortion protest until the late 1980s. 85 Like the First Amend-
ment itself however, once the Court began considering abortion pro-
test cases, it never stopped.
B. History of the Pro-Life Movement
The pro-life movement, like any other protest group, relies on the
First Amendment to pursue its goals and survive.8 6 For democracy to
function, it requires that protest not only be allowed to flourish, but
also that it be protected from prohibition by both those holding op-
80. Id.
81. Id. But for a criticism of the Burger Court's treatment of other Constitutional rights, see
JOHN F. DECKER, REVOLUTION TO THE RIGHT: CRIMINAL PROCEDURE JURISPRU)ENCE DUR-
ING THE BURGER-REHNQUIST COURT ERA (1993).
82. FARBER, supra note 22, at 13.
83. Geoffrey R. Stone, Content Regulation and the First Amendment, 25 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 189 (1983). "Content-neutral restrictions limit communication without regard to the mes-
sage conveyed .... Content-based restrictions, on the other hand, limit communication because
of the message conveyed" Id. at 189-90. See, e.g., Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981); Carey
v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455 (1980); Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205 (1975).
84. Stone, supra note 83, at 189. For a more in depth analysis, see Paul B. Stephan I1, The
First Amendment and Content Discrimination, 68 VA. L. REV. 203, 214-31 (1982).
85. The first abortion protest case the Supreme Court heard was Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S.
474 (1988).
86. See Sidney Hook, Social Protest and Civil Obedience, in CIVIL DISOBEDIENCE & VIO-
LEN CE 54-55 (Jeffrie G. Murphy ed., 1971). "[Tlhe Bill of Rights was adopted not only to make
protest possible but to encourage it." Id.
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posing views, as well as the government. 87 Thus, pro-life advocates
who are opposing a government-backed position must be aware of
efforts to suppress their speech, 88 which have also occurred against
others in conflict with the government.89
1. Early Opposition to Abortion
Opposition to abortion dates back to colonial times. 90 At common
law, the act of abortion was considered homicide, but over time the
severity of the crime lessened. 91 By the early 1800s, many states had
officially made abortion illegal, due to the medical industry's concern
about abortions performed by unlicensed abortionists.92 During this
time, the government was also concerned about the dangerous risks
women were taking to perform self-abortions, such as ingesting poison
or sticking sharp objects into the uterus. 93 The number of illegal abor-
tions that occurred during the nineteenth century remains disputed;
different studies estimate the number of illegal abortions at anywhere
from 200,000 to 1.2 million per year. 94
During the late 1840s, The American Medical Association (AMA)
voiced its concern about abortion, not only because of the danger to
women, but also because of the possibility of a woman "overlooking
the duties imposed on her by the marriage contract. '95 As a result, by
the middle of the century, abortion was illegal in almost every state.96
Correspondingly, in 1873, Congress passed the Comstock Law, which
made it a criminal offense to import, mail, or transport any item used
87. Id.
88. See generally Steven G. Gey, The Nuremberg Files and the First Amendment Value of
Threats, 78 TEX. L. REV. 541 (2000) (considering whether a website that approved taking the life
of abortion doctors constituted threats).
89. For example, civil rights and anti-war demonstrators.
90. For information on the history of abortion in the United States, see JAMES C. MOHR,
ABORTION IN AMERICA: THE ORIGINS AND EVOLUTION OF NATIONAL POLICY, 1800-1900
(1978). See also LESLIE J. REAGAN, WHEN ABORTION WAS A CRIME: WOMEN, MEDICINE, AND
LAW IN THE UNITED STATES 1867-1973 (1997).
91. Lynn D. Wardle, The Quandary of Pro-Life Speech: A Lesson from the Abolitionists, 62
ALB. L. REV. 853 (1999). See also Mark S. Scott, Note, Quickening in the Common Law: The
Legal Precedent Roe Attempted and Failed to Use, 1 MICH. L. & POLICY REV. 199, 224-30 (1996)
(examining in great detail the abortion laws in the common law).
92. CATHERINE WHITNEY, WHOSE LIFE?: A BALANCED, COMPREHENSIVE VIEW OF ABOR-
TION FROM 1-Ir HISTORICAL CONTENT TO THE CURRENT DEBATE 44 (1991).
93. Id.
94. EVA A. RUBIN, ABORTION, POLITICS, ANT) THE COURTS; ROE V. WADE AND ITS AFTER-
MATH 17 (Robert H. Walker ed., Rev. ed. 1987). There was also a study that reported five
thousand women died each year because of abortions. Id.
95. Id.
96. Note, The Evolution Of The Right To Privacy After Roe v. Wade, 13 AM. J. L. & MED.
368, 370 (1987).
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for contraception or abortion. 97 Further, by the end of the nineteenth
century, the Catholic Church also began to voice its opposition to
abortion. 98 Along with the medical establishment and government,
the Church publicly condemned the performance of abortions, going
so far as to call it "the evil of the ages."99 Thus, this early opposition
to abortion arose from a combination of concerns about morality,
safety, and the emancipation of women. 100
Abortion laws in the United States remained relatively stable until
the late 1950s when Planned Parenthood and the postwar population
control movement began to lobby for changes.10 1 In 1955, Planned
Parenthood held a conference titled "Abortion in the U.S.," which
addressed the dangers and problems surrounding illegal abortions.10 2
The conference subsequently influenced the American Law Institute
(ALI) to consider reforming abortion laws for its model legislation. 0 3
These factors were influential in shifting Americans' attitudes toward
the liberalization of abortion laws.10 4
The ALI legislation, 10 5 coupled with the AMA's new stance on
abortion 0 6 and the women's liberation movement, 0 7 prompted
97. WHITNEY, supra note 92, at 46. The Comstock Law was named after Henry Comstock,
head of the New York Society for the Suppression of Vice who personally enforced the law. Id.
98. Id. at 45.
99. Id. The press also condemned abortion; in an 1871 article entitled "The Evil of the Age,"
a newspaper stated that "thousands of human beings are ... murdered before they have seen the
light of this world." The Evil of the Age, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 23, 1871, at 6.
100. WHITNEY, supra note 92, at 45.
101. JAMES RISEN & JUDY L. THOMAS, WRATH OF ANGELS: THE AMERICAN ABORTION WAR
10 (1998). The American Birth Control League, founded by Margaret Sanger in 1921, was the
forerunner to Planned Parenthood. Id. at 10.
102. Id. One important issue discussed was illegal abortions. Id. While there was no hard
evidence about the exact number of illegal abortions performed, the conference estimated there
were between 200,000 and 1.2 million performed per year. Id. at 11. Organizers and speakers at
the conference included Alan Guttmacher, one of the first physicians to support abortion, Alfred
Kinsey, the sex researcher, and G. Lotrell Timanus, a retired abortionist. Id.
103. RISEN & THOMAS, supra note 101, at 10-11. The 1959 legislation approved an abortion if
two doctors agreed it was necessary because a woman's health was in danger, or in cases of rape,
incest, or fetal abnormalities. Id. at 10-11.
104. Id. at 11. For a look at the impact of feminist activism on the repeal of abortion laws
during the 1960s, see Katha Pollitt, Abortion History 101, THE NAION, May 2000, at 10.
105. The ALl had revised the Model Penal Code to include three defenses to abortion: fetal
abnormality, rape or incest, and danger to the physical or mental health of the woman. KERRY
N. JACOBY, SouLs, BODIES, SPIRITS: THE DRIVE TO ABOLISH ABORTION SINCE 1973 3 (1998).
106. In June of 1967, the AMA endorsed "less restrictive state abortion laws in its first policy
change on the subject since 1871." CARL N. FLANDERS, ABORTION 38 (1991).
107. For a thorough look at socialist feminism and its relation to reproductive rights, see Les-
ley Hoggart, Socialist Feminism, Reproductive Rights and Political Action, CAPITAL & CLASS,
Spring 2000, at 95.
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twelve states to begin to liberalize their abortion laws.10 8 By March of
1970, Hawaii, New York, and Alaska had become the first states to
make serious inroads in repealing their abortion laws, with New York
becoming the first state to legalize abortion without exception.10 9
As the number of states reforming abortion laws increased, the op-
position, generated mainly from Catholic doctors and lawyers, re-
mained scattered. 10 By the mid-1960s, however, the Catholic Church
began to actively oppose abortion law reform."' This opposition was
nothing new; it dated back centuries to the early Christian era. 12 For
example, in 1679, Pope Innocent XI ruled that abortion was wrong in
all circumstances, even when it was necessary to save the life of a
mother. 13 The underlying basis for the Church's stance was that en-
soulment, God's granting of a soul, occurred at the moment of con-
ception. 1 4 While the Catholic Church had historically opposed
abortion, it had never been an outspoken activist on the issue; how-
ever with the reformation of abortion laws, this attitude changed. 115
As the Church attempted to influence state legislatures, reports of
scattered public protests began to appear. 116 For example, in early
1970, a group of University of Dallas students conducted a six hour
sit-in at a Planned Parenthood office in Dallas, which served as an
abortion referral service. 1 7 The protest ended without any arrests
and went virtually unnoticed, except by Brent Bozell, the editor of the
108. RISEN & THOMAS, supra note 101, at 14-15. By November of 1969, a Gallup poll survey
showed that forty percent of adults supported first trimester abortions. FLANDERS, supra note
106, at 38.
109. RISEN & THOMAS, supra note 101, at 15. Behind much of these states' legislation was the
AMA, the National Organization for Women, and the National Association for Repeal of Abor-
tion Laws. Id. at 14-15. In New York, the National Association for Repeal of Abortion Laws,
cofounded by obstetrician Bernard Nathanson, played a critical role in legalizing abortion in
New York. WHITNEY, supra note 92, at 81.
110. RISEN & THOMAS, supra note 101, at 16. See also Note, Safety Valve Closed: The Re-
moval of Nonviolent Outlets for Dissent and the Onset of Anti-Abortion Violence, 113 HARV. L.
REV. 1210, 1214 (2000) ("[W]hile abortion was the subject of considerable legislative action,
historical records again indicate no anti-abortion violence.").
Il1. JACOBY, supra note 105, at 38-39.
112. Id. See also MARVIN OLASKY, ABORTION RITES: A SOCIAL HISTORY OF ABORTION IN
AMERICA 40-41 (1992) (surveying abortion in the United States from Colonial times through the
early 1960s and concluding abortion was rare and considered immoral). But see MOHR, supra
note 90, at 75 (examining history of abortion in early America and concluding abortion was
common and not considered immoral).
113. RISEN & THOMAS, supra note 101, at 16.
114. Id.
115. But see BARBARA FERRARO, PATRICIA HUSSEY & JANE O'REILLY, No TURNING BACK
(1990) (featuring Catholic women explaining their opposition to their church's stand on
abortion).
116. RISEN & THOMAS, supra note 101, at 20-21.
117. Id. at 21.
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Catholic magazine Triumph.'1 8 Mr. Bozell's interest, sparked by the
Dallas incident, prompted him to plan a protest in Washington D.C., a
city with a high abortion rate. 119
In June 1970, Mr. Bozell and 250 other abortion protesters staged a
peaceful protest at George Washington University Health Clinic. 120
During the protest, Mr. Bozell and four others entered the clinic and
engaged in a sit-in.12' The police arrived quickly and arrested the five
demonstrators. 122 This was the first time that protesters were arrested
in connection with the movement against abortion. 123 The Catholic
press, including the conservative newspaper The Wanderer, shocked at
these actions, denounced the manner of the protest.124 Despite the
publicity, these early sit-ins were isolated incidents that were quickly
forgotten. 125 However, it was during this time, when more states were
considering possible amendments to their abortion laws, that the Su-
preme Court stepped into the controversy.126
2. Roe v. Wade 127
On January 22, 1973, the Supreme Court decided the seminal abor-
tion case, Roe v. Wade. In Roe, the Court considered whether the
right to choose to have an abortion was a fundamental right protected
by the Constitution. 28 The Court acknowledged that the right to pri-
vacy existed in part in the First, Fourth, and Fifth Amendments, along
with its recognition in the concept of liberty guaranteed in the Four-
teenth Amendment. 29 The Court then noted that the right of privacy
is "broad enough to encompass a woman's decision whether or not to
terminate her pregnancy" by abortion. 130 The Court limited this right
to the first trimester, noting that for the stage subsequent to viability,
the state may regulate abortion, thus legalizing abortion in all fifty
states.' 3'
118. PHILIP F. LAWLER, OPERATION RESCUE: A CHALLENGE TO THE NATION'S CONSCIENCE
16 (1992).
119. Id. at 16-17.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 17.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. LAWLER, supra note 118, at 17.
125. Id.
126. See BARBARA HINKSON CRAIG & DAVID M. O'BRIEN, A13ORTION AND AMERICAN
POLITICS 75 (1993) (presenting a table of state abortion laws before Roe v. Wade).
127. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
128. FLANDERS, supra note 106, at 8. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
129. Roe, 410 U.S. at 152.
130. Id. at 153-54.
131. Id. at 164.
2002]
DEPAUL LAW REVIEW
Although many considered Roe v. Wade a victory for those who
supported the right to choose, the decision actually galvanized the
pro-life movement.' 32 Opponents of Roe v. Wade raised money, held
rallies, wrote books, and lobbied legislators. 33 Shortly after Roe, the
Catholic Church increased its pressure against legislatures and over
the next twelve months alone, the Church spent over four million dol-
lars in lobbying against abortion. 134
Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, reflecting on the Roe opinion, said,
"it invited no dialogue with legislators. Instead, it seemed entirely to
remove the ball from the legislator's court . . . . Around that ex-
traordinary decision, a well-organized and vocal right to life ral-
lied."'135 Thus, the strong opposition, which sent protesters into the
streets, was the inevitable consequence of Roe; furthermore, "Roe's
recognition of a constitutionally protected right ... shut the door to
direct political action to restrict abortion .... ,,136
With abortion legal in all fifty states, the pro-life movement needed
to shift its goals and methods of protest. After Roe, the abortion op-
ponents had only two options to eliminate legalized abortion, either
ratification of a constitutional amendment to overturn Roe or election
of political candidates who would attempt to have pro-life justices ap-
pointed to the Supreme Court. 37 In the wake of Roe, abortion slowly
became a mainstream political issue and a fundamental part of the
political process. 38
In 1976, the pro-life movement received an unexpected boost from
an unlikely source. 139 Dr. Bernard Nathanson, a doctor who had led
the drive to liberalize abortion laws in New York, began to have seri-
ous doubts about his stance on abortion and later became a staunch
132. RISEN & THOMAS, supra note 101, at 39. See also ABORTION: FREEDOM OF CHOICE &
i-HE RIGHT TO LIFE 23-38 (Lauren R. Sass ed., 1978) (summarizing the newspaper articles
printed the week after the Court handed down its decision in Roe).
133. LAWLER, supra note 118, at 17.
134. WHITNEY, supra note 92, at 78.
135. Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Speaking in a Judicial Voice, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1185, 1205 (1992).
136. LAURENCE H. TRIBE, A3ORION: THE CLASH OF ABSOLUTES 16 (2d ed. 1992). But see
Michael W. McConnell, Review, How Not 7b Promote Serious Deliberation About Abortion, 58
U. C-Il. L. REV. 1181 (1991) (criticizing Clash of Absolutes and stating that Tribe did not give
enough serious attention to the pro-life side).
137. RISEN & THOMAS, supra note 101, at 39. See also Wardle, supra note 38, at 876 ("Persons
subject to Roe had no opportunity in 1973 to help create or modify the law, and they have had
no realistic opportunity since .... Public policy on such a fundamental and controversial ques-
tion affecting the whole of society ought to be established through democratic processes.").
138. KAREN O'CONNOR, No NEUTRAL GROUND: ABOR-1-ION POLITICS IN AN AGE OF ABso-
LUTES 72 (1996).
139. WHITNEY, supra note 92, at 81.
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opponent of abortion. 140 Dr. Nathanson's change of position on the
issue, coupled with the passage of the 1976 Hyde Amendment, which
cut off federal funds for abortions, gave the right to life movement
new impetus.14' As a result, by the late 1970s, the pro-life movement
began to attract other religious denominations. 42 Catholics knew
they could not win the fight alone, and soon, large numbers of Evan-
gelical Protestants, Orthodox Jews, and Mormons joined the
movement. t
43
The pro-life movement became even stronger in 1980 with the elec-
tion of President Ronald Reagan, a strong opponent of abortion. 144
Reagan used an abortion litmus test not only for judicial appoint-
ments, but also for members of his cabinet. 145 Reagan went on to
appoint three justices to the Supreme Court, heavily changing the
makeup of the Court with the hope of reversing Roe. 146 Despite his
attempts to end legalized abortion, Reagan's actions yielded few
short-term gains and, in the long run, proved to accomplish very lit-
tle.147 Eventually, the mainstream pro-life movement revised its focus
and began concentrating on smaller steps such as eliminating federal
funds for abortion, 148 requiring parental notifications for minors seek-
ing abortions, 149 and placing restrictions on the promotion of abortion
by government programs, such as the military and federal employees'
health plans.150
The slow progress and minimal gains of the movement eventually
caused some in the pro-life movement to consider "direct action,"
140. Id. Doctor Nathanson explains his change in BERNARD NATHANSON, THE HAND OF
GOD: A JOURNEY FROM DEATH TO LIFE BY THE ABORTION DOCTOR WHO CHANGED His MIND
125-39 (1996).
141. WHITNEY, supra note 92, at 78-82. By 1976, Medicaid was funding almost 300,000 abor-
tions a year. Pro-Life Responses to Roe: Federal Legislation, NATIONAL RIGHT TO LIFE NEWS,
Jan. 1998, at 12.
142. JACOBY, supra note 105, at 37.
143. RISEN & THOMAS, supra note 101, at 39-40. For a look at abortion and different religious
denominations, see Christian Smith, Abortion and Religious Beliefs, CHRISTIANITY TODAY,
April 28, 1997, at 84.
144. O'CONNOR, supra note 138, at 88.
145. Id. at 90-91.
146. Id. at 94-95, 100-101. President Reagan's appointees to the Supreme Court included Jus-
tice Sandra Day O'Connor (1981), Justice Antonin Scalia (1986), and Justice Anthony Kennedy
(1988).
147. RISEN & THOMAS, supra note 101, at 131.
148. See Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980).
149. See H.L. v. Matheson, 450 U.S. 398 (1981).
150. Pro-Life Responses to Roe: Federal Legislation, NATIONAL RIGHT TO LIFE NEWS, Jan.
1998, at 12.
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rather than just marches and lobbying.151 Those activists who grew
impatient with the mainstream efforts began looking for more radical
ways to protest abortion. Catholic leftists, using their experience from
the civil rights and anti-war demonstrations, initially led the activ-
ists,152 and later militant Christians, to interfere with abortion clinics
through mass demonstrations and sit-ins. 53
As the early 1980s passed, some members within the National Right
to Life Committee also became dissatisfied with the slow pace of the
fight against abortion. 54 As a result, some members splintered off to
form more militant groups.1 55 These groups increased activism by
staging blockades, participating in sit-ins, and in some cases, provok-
ing arrest.1 56 Despite the "direct action" taken by these more militant
groups, the number of abortions per year did not decline.1 57 In fact,
the number remained consistent; there were approximately 1.5 million
abortions each year throughout the 1980s and into the mid-1990s. 158
In 1987, many pro-life supporters met with Pope John Paul II during
his visit to various cities across the United States.' 59 Calling the cam-
paign "We Will Stand Up," the pro-life activists succeeded in closing
down abortion clinics in many cities through mass protests and sit-
ins. 160 As a result of their activities, the members of the campaign
received media attention and caused some discomfort in the more
mainstream pro-life groups. 16' Accordingly, the leaders of the Na-
tional Right to Life Committee "took great pains to distance them-
selves from anyone who refused to work within the system."'1 62
151. RISEN &THOMAS, supra note 101, at 39. See also ALDON D. MORRIS, THE ORIGINS OF
TIHE CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT: BLACK COMMUNITIES ORGANIZING FOR CHANGE 17-39, 128-30
(1984).
152. RISEN & THOMAS, supra note 101, at 49-51.
153. Id.
154. Id. at 240.
155. Id. at 241. For example, Joseph Scheidler organized the Pro-Life Action League in Chi-
cago. Id. For more on the inner workings of Joseph Scheidler and the Pro-Life Action League,
see JOSEPH M. SCHEIDLER, CLOSED: 99 WAYS TO STOP ABORTION (1993). In St. Louis, John
Ryan started the Pro-Life Direct Action League and John O'Keefe founded the Pro-Life Non-
Violent Action Project. RISEN & THOMAS, supra note 101, at 164, 168. John O'Keefe was
greatly influenced by Thomas Merton and Daniel Berrigan, two anti-war activists who preached
civil disobedience. Id. at 49.
156. By 1985 almost half of all abortion providers had experienced some form of protest by
pro-life groups. Id. at 241.
157. Id. at 240.
158. O'CONNOR, supra note 138, at 93.
159. LAWLER, supra note 118, at 21.
160. Id.
161. Id. at 23.
162. Id.
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In response to the success and exposure of these more aggressive
abortion protesters, other groups began to organize. In February of
1987, Randall Terry, a young Protestant fundamentalist, began plans
for a new pro-life organization called Operation Rescue. 163 The or-
ganization's main activity was to participate in nonviolent sit-ins
outside abortion clinics. 164 Mr. Terry and Operation Rescue burst
onto the national scene soon after participating in successful sit-ins in
New Jersey and New York. 165 They gained further national attention
in 1988 at the Democratic National Convention in Atlanta.
166
Spurred by these successes, local affiliates of Operation Rescue
spread across the country, staging even more protests. 167 However, a
power struggle between Randall Terry and other leaders of the group
began to take its toll on Operation Rescue. 168 As quickly as it had
burst onto the scene, Operation Rescue faded away due to these inter-
nal problems along with mounting lawsuits and jail terms.' 69
3. Planned Parenthood v. Casey 170
By the beginning of the 1990s, it was clear that the long-term goals
of President Reagan concerning legalized abortion would never reach
fruition, highlighted by the 1992 case Planned Parenthood v. Casey.'
71
In Casey, the Court considered the Pennsylvania Abortion Control
Act of 1982, which had been amended in 1988 and 1989 to include five
new provisions, each of which were challenged by various abortion
clinics and physicians as facially unconstitutional. 72
In a plurality opinion, the Court noted the privacy of the decision to
obtain an abortion and that the Constitution protects personal deci-
163. RISEN & THOMAS, supra note 101, at 258. For more insight into the methods and beliefs
of Operation Rescue, see John Whitehead, Civil Disobedience and Operation Rescue: A Histori-
cal and Theoretical Analysis, 48 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 77 (1991).
164. RISEN & THOMAS, supra note 101, at 260. See also O'CONNOR, supra note 138, at 118
(containing a copy of an Operation Rescue pledge for non-violence).
165. RISEN & THOMAS, supra note 101, at 262-70. Both sit-ins resulted in closing down those
abortion clinics for the day. Id.
166. Id. at 271.
167. Id. at 294. The most notable Operation Rescue protest took place during the summer of
1991 in Wichita, Kansas. See Jon D. Hull, Whose Side Are You On?, TIME, Sept. 9, 1991, at 19.
168. RISEN & THOMAS, supra note 101, at 317-38.
169. Id. at 314. See John Kendall, Operation Rescue, in Debt Will Close National Office, L.A.
TIMES, Feb. 1, 1990, at A24.
170. 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
171. Three years earlier in Webster v. Reproductive Health Serv., the Court approved of some
state restrictions on abortions. 492 U.S. 490 (1989).
172. Casey, 505 U.S. at 844-45; 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. §§ 3203-3220 (1990).
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sions relating to procreation.1 73 The Court upheld four out of the five
provisions, but it reaffirmed Roe v. Wade, basing its decision on the
protection of personal liberty and stare decisis. 174 Many in the pro-life
movement had hoped Casey would provide the answers to their
prayers. Unfortunately for them, the Roe decision was left standing in
the wake of the Casey decision. While this was a substantial setback
to pro-life groups, the fact that the Court permitted state limitations
on abortion gave the movement some hope. 175 Either way, most com-
mentators would agree that Casey set the framework for a flurry of
legislative action concerning abortion. 76 Before Casey, the main fo-
cus of pro-life groups had been to overturn Roe.177 In the aftermath
of Casey, many of these groups realized that this goal was out of reach
and that their energies would be better utilized if they focused on
passing restrictions on abortion. 178
After Casey, the pro-life movement staggered through the early
1990s with minimal gains, yet it did garner enough support to help
defeat the Freedom of Choice Act. 179 This bill would have preserved
the holding in Roe as codified law, even if the Supreme Court eventu-
ally watered down Roe.180 However, in National Organization for
Women v. Scheidler,181 a unanimous Court held that abortion protes-
ters were liable under the Federal Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt
Organizations Act (RICO). 182 The Court reasoned that a financial
173. Casey, 505 U.S. at 851 (citing Carey v. Population Services Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 685
(1977)).
174. Casey, 505 U.S. at 853.
175. See, e.g., Nadine Strossen & Ronald K. L. Collins, The Future of an Illusion: Reconstitut-
ing Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 16 CONST. COMMENT. 587, 591 (1999) (noting that Casey pro-
vided "for such real-world threats and restrictions on reproductive freedom"); Kelly Sue Henry,
Note, Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey: The Reaffirmation of Roe or
the Beginning of the End?, 32 J. FAM. L. 93 (1993/1994).
176. Christopher Swope, Abortion: Chapter II, GOVERNING, May 1998 at 44. See also Mark
H. Woltz, Note, A Bold Reaffirmation? Planned Parenthood v. Casey Opens the Door for States
to Enact New Laws to Discourage Abortion, 71 N.C. L. REV. 1787 (1993).
177. Swope, supra note 176, at 44.
178. Id. at 44, 46.
179. S.25, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993). See Peggy S. McClard, Comment, The Freedom of
Choice Act: Will the Constitution Allow It?, 30 Hous. L. REV. 2041 (1994) (explaining that Con-
gress, under the Commerce Clause and the Fourteenth Amendment has constitutional authority
to enact the Freedom of Choice Act).
180. Pro-Life Responses to Roe: Federal Legislation, NATIONAL RIGHT TO LIFE NEWS, Jan.
1998, at 13. Another victory for the movement was the 1993 defeat of an attempt to repeal the
Hyde Amendment. Id.
181. 510 U.S. 249 (1994).
182. Id. at 262.
[Vol. 51:825
2002] DOUBLE STANDARDS 843
motive was not required in proving a pattern of racketeering
activity. ' 8 3
On the heels of this decision, pro-life advocates suffered yet another
loss with the passing of the Freedom of Access to Clinics Entrances
Act of 1994 (FACE). 184 This Act provided for criminal penalties
against anyone who "by force or threat of force or by physical ob-
struction, intentionally injure[s], intimidate[s] or interfere[s]" with an-
yone who was obtaining or providing abortion services.t8 5 FACE also
provided for civil remedies such as injunctive relief and civil penalties
against those who violated the Act. 186 Despite this series of defeats,
the pro-life movement continued to focus on lobbying, and its efforts
began to pay off in the 1994 elections when many pro-life candidates
won seats in both the United States Senate and House of
Representatives. 18 7
In the late 1990s, the focus of pro-life groups shifted to a new goal:
the abolition of partial-birth abortions.' 8 8 Pro-life advocates began a
campaign to abolish this procedure with a bill passed by a large major-
ity in Congress; however, President Clinton vetoed it twice. 189
Throughout the 1990s, while mainstream groups such as The National
Right to Life Committee and American Life League made strides in
getting the pro-life message to the public, a few violent individuals
began resorting to even more drastic methods of stopping abortion.
183. Id. at 258. For criticism of the Court's reading of RICO, see Neil Feldman, Spiraling Out
of Control: Ramifications of Reading RICO Broadly, 65 DEF. COUNS. J. 116 (1998); Lawrence
Criner, Rein in RICO Before it Rewrites the Constitution, INSIGHT ON THE NEWS, June 1998, at
28.
184. 18 U.S.C. 248 (2000). For criticism of this Act, see Freedom of Access to Clinic En-
trances, AMERICA, June 11, 1994, at 3. But see Joy Hollingsworth McMurtry & Patti S. Pennock,
Ending the Violence: Applying the Ku Klux Klan Act, RICO, and FACE to the Abortion Contro-
versy, 30 LAND & WArER L. REV. 203, 221-24 (1995) (explaining that FACE is viewpoint neu-
tral, does not violate the overbreadth doctrine, and does not violate one's freedom of religion).
185. 18 U.S.C. § 248 (2000).
186. Id.
187. See Shrinking Choice, THE NATION, May 29, 1995, at 743 (considering the effects of the
1996 elections on the issue of abortion). See also Terry Sollom, State Actions on Reproductive
Health Issues in 1996, FAMILY PLANNING PERSPECTIVES, March/April 1995, at 83.
188. See Ruth Padawer, The Facts on Partial-Birth Abortion, THE RECORD. Sept. 15, 1996, at
R01.
189. H.R. 1833, 104th Cong. (2nd Sess. 1996); H.R 1122, 105th Cong. (1st Sess. 1997). Com-
pare LaShunda R. Lowe, Note, An Inside Look At Partial Birth Abortion, 24 T. MARSHALL. L.
REV. 327 (1999) (questioning the constitutional validity of the partial-birth abortions and calling
for an end to partial-birth abortions), with Nadine Strossen & Caitlin Borgmann, The Carefully
Orchestrated Campaign, 3 NEXUS 3 (1998) (arguing that a ban on partial-birth abortions is
unconstitutional).
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C. Abortion Clinic Violence
In the late 1970s, violent incidents at abortion clinics were scattered
and limited to property fires that caused little damage. 190 Yet, by the
early 1980s, clinic violence, including arson and bombings, escalated
both in severity and in occurrences.19' Between 1977 and 1983, there
were eight clinic bombings, while in 1984, the number jumped to eigh-
teen. 92 This escalation continued in 1985 and 1986 with over 130 inci-
dents of clinic violence reported in each year. 193 This disturbing trend
began to decrease by 1988 when the number of violent incidents plum-
meted by almost seventy percent. 194
This decrease in violent incidents stemmed in part from the popu-
larity and success of Randall Terry and Operation Rescue.195 Peaceful
civil disobedience became the trend within the movement. As a re-
sult, many of the violent extremists began to reconsider their tactics,
eventually participating in sit-ins and other forms of nonviolent pro-
test.1 96 As National Abortion Federation figures illustrated, the drop
in the number of violent incidents correlated with the increase in the
number of nonviolent protests. 197 Although clinic violence had actu-
ally decreased in 1988, there were more than eleven thousand protes-
ters arrested at abortion clinics that year. 98
While nonviolent protests increased, Congress, courts, and state leg-
islatures began to express concern over the mass nonviolent civil diso-
bedience. 99 This concern prompted stricter clinic access laws, larger
court fines, and the 1994 Freedom of Access to Clinic Entrances Act
190. RISEN & THOMAS, supra note 101, at 74. The first reported act of clinic violence oc-
curred in March of 1976 in Oregon, where a man was sentenced for five years after setting fire to
a Planned Parenthood office. Id.
191. Id. at 75. In January of 1983, Dan B. Anderson was sentenced to thirty years in prison
after kidnapping an abortion doctor. FLANDERS, supra note 106, at 49. For other theories on
abortion clinic violence, see Joni Scott, From Hate Rhetoric to Hate Crime: A Link Acknowl-
edged Too Late, THE HUMANIST, Jan. 1999, at 8.
192. O'CONNOR, supra note 138, at 108-09.
193. National Abortion Federation: Incidents of Violence and Disruption Against Abortion
Providers, at http://www.prochoice.org/default7.htm (last visited Nov. 1, 2001).
194. Id.
195. Note, Safety Valve Closed: The Removal of Non-Violent Outlets for Dissent and the Onset
of Anti-Abortion Violence, 113 HARV. L. REV. 1210, 1217-18 (2000). See also DALLAS A.
BLANCHARD, THE ANTI-ABORTION MOVEMENT AND THE RISE OF THE RELIGIOUS RIGHT:
FROM POLITE TO FIERY PROTEsr 54 (1994) (noting that Operation Rescue emerged at the same
time as a "leveling off of bombings and arsons" occurred).
196. BLANCHARD, supra note 195, at 54.
197. National Abortion Federation: Incidents of Violence and Disruption Against Abortion
Providers, at http://www.prochoice.org/default7.htm (last visited Nov. 1, 2001).
198. Id. In 1989, there was more of the same: high numbers of clinic blockades with a reduc-
tion in the number of violent incidents. Id.
199. Note, Safety Valve, supra note 195, at 1217-19.
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(FACE).200 These led to a dramatic decline in the number of clinic
blockades.20'
After a steady drop in clinic violence in the late 1980s, there was a
slow but steady increase in the early 1990s. 20 2 With the disbanding of
Operation Rescue, there was a further splintering of groups, which
some insiders believe led to the increase in violence. 203 For instance,
in 1992, the number of violent incidents more than doubled from that
of the previous year. 20 4 Despite this alarming statistic, the worst was
yet to come.
In 1993, violent incidents rose to a startling 437, a far cry from the
fifty-three incidents reported in 1988.205 Not only had the number of
violent incidents skyrocketed but the level of violence was also far
more intense. 206 An illustration of the seriousness of the violence was
the March 1993 murder of David Gunn, a doctor who performed
abortions.207 A few months later, Shelly Shannon shot and wounded
Dr. George Tiller outside of his abortion clinic in Wichita, Kansas.20 8
Since these shootings, there have been seven other abortion clinic em-
ployees murdered, including Dr. Barnett Slepian in 1999.209 The
1990s also included various firebombings of clinics throughout the
country, from Newport Beach, California to Lancaster, Penn-
sylvania. 210 Damages from these and other related crimes range from
hundreds of thousands of dollars to 1.4 million dollars.211
Due to the rise in the number of violent outbursts by some individu-
als, the bargaining power of mainstream abortion opponents has been
greatly compromised. 212 Along with this loss of power, pro-life groups
200. 18 U.S.C. § 248. See generally Regina R. Campbell, Comment, "FACE"ing the Facts:
Does the Freedom of Access to Clinic Entrances Act Violate Freedom of Speech?, 64 U. CIN. L.
REv. 947 (1996) (arguing that due to the violence of abortion protest, FACE is necessary, and
does not violate the First Amendment freedom of speech).
201. See Note, Safety Valve, supra note 195, at 1219. Since the 1994 passing of The Freedom of
Access to Clinic Entrance Act, clinic blockades have been less than ten in almost every year. Id.
202. Id. at 1219-20.
203. RISEN & THOMAS, supra note 101, at 314.
204. Note, Safety Valve, supra note 195, at 1220-21.
205. Id.
206. Id.
207. Scott, supra note 191, at 11.
208. Id.
209. Note, Safety Valve, supra note 195, at 1210-11.
210. See Greg Hernandez & Eric Young, Bombing Hits Newport Beach Abortion Clinic, L.A.
TIMES, Sept. 11, 1993, at Al, and Tamar Lewin, Clinic Firebombed in Pennsylvania, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 30, 1993, at A16.
211. See Jo Ann Zuniga, Arson Attacks on Abortion Clinic Show Pattern, Landlord Says,
HousrON CHRONICLE, March 8, 1993, at A9, and California City's Abortion Clinic Burns, and
Police Suspect Arson, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 21, 1993, at A19.
212. SCHEIOLER, supra note 155, at 300-01.
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have suffered a decline in sympathy, credibility, and legislative influ-
ence.21 3 Simultaneously, courts throughout the United States have
treated nonviolent protesters more harshly, often handing down the
stiffest penalties possible. 214 Thus, abortion opponents have not fared
well in the United States court system, including the highest court in
the country. These results must be considered in light of how other
protest groups and their First Amendment rights have fared with the
Supreme Court.
D. Non-Abortion Protest Cases and the Court
This section examines three separate free speech cases that involve
other protest movements and how the Supreme Court has treated
their free speech rights. These cases illustrate the serious commitment
of the Court with regard to the free speech rights of these protesters.
1. NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co. 215
In 1966, the Claiborne County Branch of the National Association
for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) formed a Human
Relations committee that petitioned elected officials with twenty-one
specific demands.216 The community did not meet these demands and
consequently, on April 1, 1966, the County Branch instituted a boy-
cott of the white merchants in the area.217 During this meeting, the
field secretary, Charles Evers, warned those in attendance that "any
,uncle toms' who broke the boycott would 'have their necks broken'
by their own people. ''218
The boycott continued throughout 1968 with the assassination of
Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. and the shooting of a young black man,
Roosevelt Jackson, giving it further strength.2 19 In the meantime,
213. Wardle, supra note 38, at 882. "The violent fringe ... discredits the entire pro-life cause
because they are not pro-life, but are violent, dysfunctional, dangerous hypocrites whose acts are
not representative of pro-life values." Id.
214. See, e.g., Opinion of the Justices to the Senate, No. SJC-08145, 2000 WL 108886 (Mass.,
Jan. 24, 2000) (considering a proposed Massachusetts bill which would have stiffer penalties for
protesting within twenty-five feet of an abortion clinic).
215. 458 U.S. 886 (1982).
216. Claiborne Hardware, 458 U.S. at 899-900. Some of those demands included hiring blacks
for employment, desegregation of public schools, and integration of bus stations. Id. at 898-99.
217. Id. at 900.
218. Id. Sheriff Don McKay, present at the speech reported this information. Similar state-
ments were recorded at later meetings; also, the local NAACP secretary testified that Charles
Evers had made threatening statements. Id. at 900-02, 925.
219. Id. at 901-02. This shooting occurred on April 18, 1969 during an encounter with two
Port Gibson police officers. Claiborne Hardware, 458 U.S. at 902. The assassination of Dr. King
occurred on April 4, 1968. Id. at 901.
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some of those who had been patronizing white merchants were pun-
ished in various ways. 220 There were ten reported incidents of vio-
lence against those who ignored the boycott, including gunshots fired
into homes, broken windows, and beatings.221
Seventeen white merchants filed a complaint in Chancery Court
that named two corporations and 146 people as defendants and sought
injunctive relief and damages.2 22 In August of 1976, the chancellor
found the defendants liable for malicious interference, as well as vio-
lating both a statute prohibiting secondary boycotts and a state anti-
trust statute.2 23 The chancellor awarded over 1.25 million dollars plus
interest to twelve merchants who had sustained lost profits and
goodwill. 224
In December of 1980, the Mississippi Supreme Court reversed most
of the trial court's ruling, but upheld the imposition of liability, re-
jecting the First Amendment claims of the petitioners. 225 The United
States Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider whether the First
Amendment protected the petitioners' actions.2 26 The Court ex-
amined the diverse nature of the boycott, all aspects of which were a
form of free speech.227 Justice John Paul Stevens, writing for a unani-
mous Court, made two important points.228 First, Justice Stevens
stated that the fact that members of a group have acted violently in
the past does not mean the right to associate with them has no consti-
tutional protection. 22 9 Second, Justice Stevens noted that members of
the boycott used speech to attain its goals through social pressure,
persuasion, and by threat of noncompliance. 230 The Court, in examin-
220. Id. at 903. A group called the "Black Hats" or "Deacons" often inflicted the punish-
ments. Id.
221. Id. at 904. James Gilmore, whose home had been shot at, apprehended the shooters, who
were supporters of the boycott. Id. One beating occurred between four men and a fisherman
who had ignored the boycott. Claiborne Hardware, 458 U.S. at 905.
222. Id. at 889-90. Included as defendants were the NAACP, Charles Evers, and others who
had participated in the boycott. Id. at 889-90.
223. Id. at 890-92.
224. Id. The chancellor also entered a permanent injunction against the defendants. Id. Of
the original seventeen merchants, five failed to offer any showing of losses. Claiborne Hardware,
458 U.S. at 893.
225. Id. at 894-95. The Mississippi Supreme Court remanded for recomputation of the dam-
ages. Claiborne Hardware, 458 U.S. at 893.
226. Id. at 896. The Court noted that their jurisdiction was limited to the federal questions
and that the remand of the Mississippi Supreme Court was final in terms of their jurisdiction. Id.
at 907.
227. Id. It involved speeches, picketing, and meetings with civic and business leaders. Clai-
borne Hardware, 458 U.S. at 907.
228. Id. at 908.
229. Id.
230. Id. at 909-10.
20021
DEPAUL LAW REVIEW
ing the First Amendment principles at stake, stressed that "speech
does not lose its protected character.., simply because it may embar-
rass others or coerce them into action. '231
The Court held that because the merchants did not demonstrate
that their losses resulted from the acts of violence, the petitioners
were not liable for the consequences of their nonviolent actions.232
The Court found that the First Amendment protected the nonviolent
activities and that "through exercise of those First Amendment rights,
petitioners sought to bring about political/social/economic change. '2 33
Thus, the Court was adamant in its view that past misconduct does not
necessarily nullify one's right to free speech.
2. Organization for a Better Austin v. Keefe2 34
In the 1971 case Organization for a Better Austin v. Keefe, the plain-
tiff, Jerome Keefe, was a real estate broker who had an office in the
Austin neighborhood of Chicago and lived in Westchester, a suburb of
Chicago. 235 The defendant, Organization for a Better Austin
(OBA),2 36 accused Keefe of actions known as "blockbusting" or
"panic peddling," which consisted of scaring white residents into sell-
ing their property to an agent who would subsequently sell the homes
to black buyers.237
In response to these alleged tactics, OBA began distributing leaflets
in the town of Westchester, specifically to Keefe's neighbors and the
fellow members of his church.2 38 Keefe sought and won a temporary
injunction enjoining OBA from handing out leaflets or literature in
the town of Westchester.239 On appeal, the Appellate Court of Illinois
affirmed the granting of the injunction, noting that the First Amend-
ment did not protect OBA's actions because they were coercive and
intimidating, rather than informative. 240
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari and, with only
Justice John Marshall Harlan in dissent, recognized that distributing
leaflets was a form of expression protected by the First Amend-
231. Id.
232. Id. at 923.
233. Claiborne Hardware, 458 U.S. at 911, 915.
234. 402 U.S. 415 (1971).
235. Id. at 415-16.
236. OBA was a racially integrated community group in the Austin neighborhood of Chicago.
Id. Their stated purpose was to "stabilize the racial ratio in Austin." Id.
237. Id. at 416.
238. Id. at 417. Keefe met with the organization, but denied the allegations and refused to
agree to refrain from soliciting property in Austin. Keefe, 402 U.S. at 416.
239. Id. at 417.
240. 253 N.E.2d 76 (Il. App. Ct. 1969).
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ment.241 The Court noted that the fact that the leaflets had a coercive
effect was not relevant with regard to the First Amendment analy-
sis. 242 Specifically, the Court stated that speech "intended to influence
a coercive impact on [listeners] does not remove them from the reach
of the First Amendment. ' 243 The Court then noted, "[A]ny prior re-
straint of expression comes to this Court with a 'heavy presumption'
against its constitutional validity. '244 The Court also found that the
one challenging the speech must carry the "heavy burden" of showing
the necessity of such a restraint, and because Keefe did not, his claim
failed. 245 The Court concluded that the basis of the injunction, the
right to privacy, was not enough for an injunction.246
3. Boos v. Barry247
In the 1988 case Boos v. Barry, three individuals had planned to
demonstrate on public sidewalks in front of the Soviet Union and Nic-
araguan embassies in Washington D.C.248 However, a District of Co-
lumbia statute prohibited them from protesting within five hundred
feet of the embassies. 2 49 In response to the prohibition, the demon-
strators brought a First Amendment challenge against the provi-
sion.250 The United States District Court for the District of Columbia
granted the government's motion for summary judgment, a decision
affirmed by the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia.25' The
Court of Appeals held that the statute was constitutional due to the
compelling governmental interest of foreign relations.252
Granting certiorari, the Supreme Court reversed in part and af-
firmed in part the Court of Appeals' decision.25 3 The Court first con-
241. Keefe, 402 U.S. at 418. Justice Harlan's dissent was based on procedural grounds of ap-
pellate jurisdiction. Id. at 420.
242. Id. at 419.
243. Id.
244. Id.
245. Id.
246. Keefe, 402 U.S. at 420.
247. 485 U.S. 312 (1988).
248. Finzer v. Barry, 798 F.2d 1450 (D.C. Cir. 1986).
249. D.C. Code 22-1115 (1981). The pertinent part of the statute states:
It shall be unlawful to display any flag, banner, placard, or device designed or adapted
to intimidate, coerce, or bring into public odium any foreign government, party, or
organization,... within five hundred feet of any building or premises within the Dis-
trict of Columbia used or occupied by any foreign government . . . or to congregate
within five hundred feet of any such building or premises.
Finzer, 798 F.2d at 1452.
250. Id.
251. Id. at 1453.
252. Id. at 1455.
253. Boos, 485 U.S. at 318.
2002]
DEPAUL LAW REVIEW
sidered the provision that outlawed the display of anything coercive
within five hundred feet of an embassy. 254 The Court then focused on
three important factors when analyzing the provision; it prohibited
political speech, it barred such speech on public sidewalks, and it was
content-based because it regulated speech due to its primary im-
pact.2 55 The Court further found that the provision was not view-
point-based because it determined which viewpoint was acceptable in
a neutral way.2 56 The Court noted that content-based restrictions on
political speech in a public forum must be examined under "the most
exacting scrutiny. '257
The government argued that the reason for the statute was the sec-
ondary effect of offending the dignity of diplomats. 258 The Court con-
sidered this argument, coupled with the long tradition of protecting
international relations, 259 "compelling," yet still found that the provi-
sion violated the First Amendment.2 60 The Court stated that "in pub-
lic debate, our own citizens must tolerate insulting, and even
outrageous, speech in order to provide adequate breathing space to
the freedoms protected by the First Amendment" and that no differ-
ence should be drawn between American citizens and foreign offi-
cials. 261 Thus, in Claiborne Hardware, Keefe, and Boos, the Court was
very protective of the First Amendment and skeptical of government
restrictions on speech.
E. Abortion Protests and the United States Supreme Court
The Supreme Court has addressed the issue of abortion many times
since it legalized the procedure in 1973.262 In fact, the Court has
heard no less than forty abortion-related cases, 263 with the two most
254. Id. at 316-18.
255. Id. at 318-19.
256. Id. at 319.
257. Id. at 321.
258. Id. at 320. The government relied on Renton v. Playtime Theatres, 475 U.S. 41 (1986).
Boos, 485 U.S. at 318.
259. This tradition dated back to the Federalist Papers and the Continental Congress. Id.
260. Id. at 322-23.
261. Id. at 322 (citing Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 56 (1987)).
262. In the federal courts, Roe opened up the floodgates for abortion cases, as there were only
eighteen abortion related cases heard before Roe, but over two hundred in the decade after it.
Legal Ramifications of the Human Life Amendment: Hearings on S.J. Res. 3 Before the Sub-
comm. on the Constitution of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 98th CONG. 47, 55 (1983). For a
look at abortion as a constitutional issue, see MARK TuSHNEr, ABORTION 1-29 (1996).
263. See Wardle, supra note 38, at 959-60 (listing the major Supreme Court cases involving the
issue of abortion).
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recent cases decided in the October 2000 term.264 Since abortion re-
mains such a controversial topic, the abortion cases themselves have
been among the most closely watched in the last twenty years. In ad-
dition to cases concerning abortion, the "abortion litmus test" is often
used on potential nominations to the United States Supreme Court.
Months before a presidential election, candidates are scrutinized as to
what role the issue of abortion will play when they appoint a justice. 265
No other single issue has a more divisive effect on the Court today
than abortion.
1. Madsen v. Women's Health Center266
In September of 1992, a Florida state trial court permanently en-
joined certain pro-life protesters from engaging in blockades at an
abortion clinic.267 Soon after the court granted the injunction, clinic
owners saw that the initial injunction had not produced the desired
effect, forcing them to request an amended injunction.268 Accord-
ingly, the court granted an amended permanent injunction prohibiting
protesters from entering a thirty-six foot buffer zone surrounding the
clinic, along with other restrictions. 269 The protesters appealed the
decision. 270
On appeal, the Florida Supreme Court certified the injunction for
immediate review and subsequently affirmed the district court's opin-
ion, declaring the injunction constitutional. 271 The United States Su-
preme Court granted certiorari to the case and held that the thirty-six
foot buffer zone and noise restrictions were constitutional, while the
other provisions within the injunction were unconstitutional. 272
264. Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703 (2000); Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914 (2000); infra
notes 363-383 and accompanying text.
265. See Julie Mason, Abortion Issue May Sway Crucial, Undecided Voters, HousION CHRON-
ICLE, Oct. 16, 2000, at A4.
266. 512 U.S. 753 (1994).
267. Madsen, 512 U.S. at 758. For a more in depth look at the facts leading up to the Madsen
case, see John W. Bencivenga, Comment, Constitutional Law-When Rights Collide: Buffer Zones
and Abortion Clinics-Madsen v. Women's Health Ctr., Inc., 22 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 695, 696-706
(1995).
268. Madsen, 512 U.S. at 758.
269. Id. at 757. The other restrictions prohibited petitioners from interfering with access to
the building or the parking lot. Id. at 758. Also, during specified hours, there could be no
singing, chanting, whistling, shouting, bullhorns, or other sounds or images observable to or
within earshot of the patients. Id. at 760-61.
270. Id. at 761.
271. Operation Rescue v. Women's Health Center, 626 So.2d 664 (Fla. 1993). Meanwhile, the
United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit heard a separate challenge to the same
injunction and held it unconstitutional. Cheffer v. McGregor, 6 F.3d 705 (llth Cir. 1993). The
Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve the conflict.
272. Madsen, 512 U.S. 753 (1994).
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Chief Justice William Rehnquist, writing for the majority, reasoned
that an injunction restricting speech was not a prior restraint and strict
scrutiny was unnecessary. 273 He supported this by noting that the in-
junction was by nature applied specifically to certain individuals who
in the past had acted contrary to the law.2 74 In place of strict scrutiny,
the Court relied on general First Amendment principles along with
the conclusion that the injunction did not burden more speech than
necessary.2 75 The Court held that since the noise restrictions and the
thirty-six foot buffer zone burdened no more speech than necessary,
they were constitutional. 276
Despite its holding concerning the noise restrictions and thirty-six
foot buffer zone, the Court struck down the three other provisions in
the injunction because they burdened more speech than necessary.2 77
The first provision, the "images observable provision," was a blanket
ban on all "images observable" from the clinic.2 78 The Court noted
that because the clinic merely had to draw the curtains to avoid seeing
signs and placards that they found disturbing, the provision consti-
tuted an unconstitutional restriction on speech. 279 The Court found
the second provision, a restriction on all uninvited approaches of
women within three hundred feet of the clinic, was unconstitutional
based on First Amendment principles. 280 The Court found that
prohibiting contact, even if it was peaceful, in order to prevent intimi-
dation burdened more speech than necessary.281
The third provision held unconstitutional under the First Amend-
ment dealt with a prohibition on picketing within three hundred feet
of the homes of clinic employees.2 82 The Court noted that while the
home has a "unique character, '283 it struck down the three hundred
foot zone surrounding the home because it was too broad and would
even prohibit marches through a residential neighborhood. 284 Justice
John Paul Stevens, in concurrence, stated that the test used for injunc-
273. Id. at 762.
274. Id.
275. Id. at 765.
276. Id. at 769-71.
277. Id. at 776.
278. Madsen, 512 U.S. at 773.
279. Id.
280. Id. at 774.
281. Id.
282. Id. Petitioners had protested in front of clinic workers' houses and distributed anti-abor-
tion leaflets to their neighbors. Id. at 759.
283. See Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 484 (1988) (prohibiting a picket at a residential home
and stating the home is the "last citadel of the tired, the weary, and the sick").
284. Madsen, 512 U.S. at 775.
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tions should be judged by a "more lenient standard than legislation"
because injunctions are based on a person's illegal conduct. 285
Justice Antonin Scalia, concurring as to the provisions struck down
and dissenting to those that were upheld, charged that the Court had
gone astray from its normal jurisprudence simply because the case in-
volved abortion.286 He noted that "[t]oday the ad hoc nullification
machine claims its latest, greatest... victim: the First Amendment. '287
Justice Scalia argued that at the least, strict scrutiny should have been
applied to the provisions. 288 He based the strict scrutiny argument on
the possibility that content-based injunctions might be used to sup-
press a particular group's ideas. 28 9 He further noted that injunctions
are more powerful than legislation and are usually the product of a
single judge. 290 Justice Scalia's final point was that even in cases in-
volving violence, the Court had used a much stricter test than the one
used in this case. 291 In situations involving violence, the Court used
"the precision of regulation" test because peaceful individuals of a
group should not lose their constitutional protections simply because
others in the group have acted illegally or violently.292
2. Schenck v. Pro-Choice Network of Western New York 293
Although the Court had already decided the issue of buffer zones
and other restrictions on pro-life protesters, the controversy contin-
ued. With the issue of abortion at the center of media attention and
touching many people's lives, it was virtually inevitable that the Court
would have to confront the issue of abortion protest once again. The
Court's next consideration of the matter occurred in the 1997 case of
Schenck v. Pro-Choice Network of Western New York. 294
In Schenck, three abortion doctors and four abortion clinics had
filed a complaint requesting a temporary restraining order (TRO) to
stop a planned blockade by abortion protesters, as well as a perma-
nent injunction and monetary damages from three pro-life organiza-
285. Id. at 778 (Stevens, J., concurring).
286. Id. at 785 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
287. Id.
288. Id. at 792.
289. Id.
290. Madsen, 512 U.S. at 793.
291. Id. at 798. Justice Scalia also noted that the videotape shot by the clinic showed neither
violence nor attempts by protesters to block access to the clinic. Id. at 790.
292. Madsen, 512 U.S. at 798-99. See generally NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S.
886 (1982).
293. 519 U.S. 357 (1997).
294. Id. For a more detailed look at the facts leading up to the case and the lower courts'
treatment of the case, see Michael L. Utz, Recent Decisions, 36 Duo. L. REV. 229 (1997).
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tions.295 The abortion clinics had been the subject of massive
demonstrations and large-scale blockades. 296 The day before the
scheduled blockades, the United States District Court for the Western
District of New York issued a TRO that prevented protesters from
"demonstrating within fifteen feet of any person" who was entering or
leaving the clinics. 297 The TRO did permit two sidewalk counselors to
go within the fifteen-foot zone to attempt to speak with people who
were entering or leaving the clinic. 298 However, these counselors were
limited in what they could do; the injunction required that they refrain
from speaking immediately if the individuals indicated they did not
want the counseling.299
After the court issued the TRO, the protesters stopped the physical
blockades, but continued to demonstrate, sidewalk counsel, and con-
gregate in the driveway entrances of the clinic.300 Based on these
facts, the district court issued a permanent injunction five months af-
ter it had handed down the TRO.30 The permanent injunction was
similar to the TRO, but it also banned demonstrations within "fifteen
feet around people and vehicles seeking access to or leaving such facil-
ities. ' 302 In other words, it established floating buffer zones. The
court held that the injunction was necessary because the buffer zones
prevented protesters from "crowding patients and invading their per-
sonal space. '30 3 Yet, the court upheld the two-person exception to the
floating buffer zone as "an attempt to accommodate fully the defend-
ants' First Amendment rights." 3°14
On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Cir-
cuit applied Madsen v. Women's Health Center305 in reversing the dis-
trict court's decision. 306 The case was then reheard en banc, and the
court affirmed the district court by a divided vote, using reasoning
295. Pro-Choice Network of W. N.Y. v. Project Rescue W. N.Y., 799 F. Supp. 1417, 1422
(W.D.N.Y. 1992).
296. Id.
297. Id. at 1440.
298. Id. at 1437.
299. Id. at 1440.
300. Pro-Choice Network of W. N.Y. v. Project Rescue W. N.Y., 828 F. Supp. 1018
(W.D.N.Y. 1993).
301. Id. at 1032.
302. 799 F. Supp. at 1434.
3(03. Id.
304. Id.
305. 512 U.S. 753 (1994).
306. Pro-Choice Network of W. N.Y. v. Schenck, 67 F.3d 359 (2d Cir. 1994) (reversing the
fifteen-foot buffer zone and cease and desist order to sidewalk counselors).
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similar to the district court.30 7 Before the United States Supreme
Court, the protesters challenged three parts of the injunction: the fif-
teen-foot floating buffer zone, the fixed fifteen-foot buffer zone, and
the cease and desist provision.308 The Court applied the reasoning of
Madsen30 9 to the three challenged provisions of the injunction, look-
ing to see whether each burdened more speech than necessary to
serve a significant government interest.310
The Court held that the fifteen-foot floating buffer zones were un-
constitutional under the First Amendment because they burdened
more speech than necessary.311 Chief Justice Rehnquist noted that
"leafleting and commenting on matters of public concern are classic
forms of speech that lie at the heart of the First Amendment, and
speech in public areas is at its most protected on public sidewalks, a
prototypical example of a traditional public forum. '3 12 The Court also
noted that because it struck down the floating buffer zones, the cease
and desist provision need not be addressed.313 The Court then consid-
ered the fixed buffer zone provision, which encompassed fifteen feet
around the doorways and driveways of the clinic. 314 The Court upheld
these zones as constitutional based on the conduct of protesters who
purposely blocked the entrances of clinics, making this buffer zone the
only way to ensure access to the clinic.315
Justice Scalia, joined by Justice Thomas and Justice Kennedy, con-
curred in the decision as to the fifteen-foot floating buffer zone, but
dissented as to the fifteen-foot fixed buffer zone, as well as the cease
and desist provision.3 16 Justice Scalia, as he did in Madsen, chided the
Court for its treatment of the pro-life protesters' free speech rights.317
He argued that it was a mistake to think that one has a right to be free
of unwanted speech.3 18 Justice Scalia then stated that the reasoning
307. Pro-Choice Network of W. N.Y. v. Schenck, 67 F.3d 377, 388-92 (2d. Cir. 1995). The
court affirmed, using reasoning similar to the district court. Id. at 388-92.
308. Schenck v. Pro-Choice Network of W. N.Y., 519 U.S. 357, 371 (1997).
309. For an analysis and critique of the application of the Madsen case to Schenck, see Amber
M. Pang, Comment, Speech, Conduct, and Regulation of Abortion Protest by Court Injunction:
From Madsen v. Women's Health Center to Schenck v. Pro-Choice Network, 34 GONz. L. REV.
201 (1998/1999).
310. Schenck, 519 U.S. at 371.
311. Id. at 377.
312. Id.
313, Id. at 379.
314. Id. at 380-85.
315. Id. at 381.
316. Schenck, 519 U.S. at 385-95 (Scalia, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
317. Id. at 386.
318. Id.
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behind the injunction's cease and desist provision was "the right to be
left alone. '319
According to the dissent, the majority had taken new and unwar-
ranted steps in its decision.320 The dissent further stated that the
Court should not decide as to what the trial court "might reasonably
have found as to necessity, rather than on the basis of what it in fact
found." 321 Justice Scalia further admonished that the district court, in
granting the injunction, cited to an interest, "not listed anywhere in
respondents' complaint." 322 However, despite the concerns of the dis-
sent, the Court upheld even greater restrictions on speech three years
later.
3. Hill v. Colorado 323
The 2000 case Hill v. Colorado represents the Court's latest foray
into abortion jurisprudence. 324 Hill involved a Colorado statute
prohibiting anyone within one hundred feet of a health care facility's
entrance to "knowingly approach" within eight feet of another person
in order to pass "a leaflet or handbill, to displa[y] a sign to, or en-
gag[e] in oral protest, education, or counseling with [that] person... "
without that person's consent.325 A group of individuals challenged
the statute, claiming it was facially unconstitutional under the First
Amendment. 326
The District Court of Jefferson County granted summary judgement
to the state, holding that the statute's restrictions were content-neu-
tral; moreover, as a time, place, and manner restriction, it was suffi-
ciently tailored to serve a significant government interest. 327 The
Colorado Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the statute served a
compelling state interest of ensuring the safety of women entering
health clinics and that it did not burden more speech than neces-
sary.328 The Supreme Court of Colorado subsequently affirmed the
lower courts' rulings based on the same reasoning. 329 The United
319. Id. at 387.
320. Id. at 390.
321. Id. at 394.
322. Schenck, 519 U.S. at 392.
323. 530 U.S. 703 (2000).
324. See also Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914 (2000) (striking down a Nebraska statute ban-
ning partial-birth abortions as unconstitutional). The Stenberg and Hill opinions were issued on
the same day.
325. Hill, 530 U.S. at 703 (citing CoLo. REV. STAT. 18-9-122 (3) (1993)).
326. Hill v. City of Lakewood, 911 P.2d 670, 673 (Colo Ct. App. 1995).
327. Id. at 674.
328. Id.
329. Hill v. Thomas, 973 P.2d 1246, 1248 (Colo. 1999).
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States Supreme Court granted certiorari and found the Colorado stat-
ute constitutional, affirming the Colorado Supreme Court's ruling.330
Justice Stevens, writing the majority opinion, phrased the issue as
"whether the First Amendment rights of the speaker are abridged by
the protection the statute provides for the unwilling listener. ' 331 The
majority focused on the listener's "right to be let alone" and held that
this right extended to access to a medical facility.332
The Court then moved on to consider whether the statute was con-
tent-neutral in time, place, or manner, using the test derived from
Ward v. Rock Against Racism333 of "whether the government has
adopted a regulation of speech because of disagreement with the mes-
sage it conveys. ' 334 The Court held that the statute passed the test
because it was a regulation of places where speech could occur, apply-
ing equally to protesters of all viewpoints and protecting the states'
interests in privacy. 335 The Court concluded by stating that there must
be an "opportunity to win their attention" and that the Colorado stat-
ute enabled one to do so through signs, pictures, or voice, all of which
can cross an eight-foot gap. 336
In dissent, Justice Scalia, joined by Justice Thomas, again accused
the Court of using an "ad hoc nullification machine. ' 337 Further, the
dissent argued that the standards used by the majority were in "stark
contradiction" of those used in other cases.338 Justice Scalia believed
that there was a double standard because the protesters before the
Court were pro-life. 339 He underlined his accusation by first focusing
on the Court's assertion that the statute was not content-based be-
cause it did not discriminate among viewpoints nor place restrictions
on "any subject matter that may be discussed by a speaker. '340 Justice
Scalia noted that the Court had never previously held that content-
based restrictions are limited to these two categories, and he called
this limitation "absurd."' 341 He also claimed that in no other free
330. Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 735 (2000).
331. Id. at 708. See Steven Chapman, Turning the Right to be Left Alone into a Muzzle, CHI.
TRIB., July 2, 2000, at 15C (criticizing the majority opinion for being contrary to earlier Supreme
Court opinions).
332. Hill, 530 U.S. at 716-17.
333. 491 U.S. 781 (1989).
334. Hill, 530 U.S. at 719.
335. Id. at 719-20.
336. Id. at 728-30.
337. Id. at 741 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
338. Id. at 742.
339. Id.
340. Hill, 530 U.S. at 742.
341. Id. at 743.
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speech case had the Court relied on the governmental interest of pro-
tecting its citizens' right to be left alone. 342 Finally, Justice Scalia ar-
gued that as applied in other free speech cases, there was a
presumption "that speakers, not the government, know best both
what they want to say and how to say it.''343
Madsen, Schenck, and Hill have been crushing defeats for the pro-
life movement, not only in their campaign to end abortion but also in
their attempt to dissuade women from getting abortions. The rulings
of these three cases gradually encompassed greater restrictions on the
First Amendment activities of pro-life protesters outside abortion
clinics.
III. ANALYSIS
Abortion protest cases have become a recurrent theme in the
Court's docket over the last decade. With the recent rash of abortion
clinic violence, many state legislatures and courts have supported laws
that curtail pro-life protesters.344 Thus, with the rise in the number of
restrictions on free speech, the Supreme Court, as a standard bearer,
must not ignore the controversial, yet protected First Amendment
rights of pro-life protesters.
The First Amendment applies equally to all citizens, and it cannot
be disregarded when it does not fit the needs of certain individuals.
The rights protected by the First Amendment remain the very founda-
tion of this country.345 Accordingly, these rights cannot be swept
aside by the waves of political expediency and controversy. While it is
understandable for legislators and judges to use caution when con-
fronted with issues arising from abortion protests, one would hope the
United States Supreme Court would look beyond the emotional as-
pects of this issue and evaluate it simply on the First Amendment mer-
its. Instead, the Court has quietly avoided decades of precedent in
upholding these restrictions on speech.
The reasoning the Court has used in deciding the abortion protest
line of cases contains several flaws that have resulted in a dangerous
infringement of free speech rights. The Court's groundbreaking inter-
pretation of the First Amendment is also troublesome. The double
342. Id. at 750.
343. Id. at 756.
344. See, e.g., Northeast Women's Ctr., Inc. v. McMonagle, 939 F.2d 57 (3d Cir. 1991) (limiting
the number and location of pro-life demonstrators); Portland Feminist Women's Health Ctr. v.
Advocates for Life, Inc., 859 F.2d 681 (9th Cir. 1988) (sustaining 121/ foot 'free zone' around
abortion clinic).
345. See supra notes 3-5 and accompanying text.
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standard used by the Court when cases involve pro-life protesters is
not only disturbing, but unconstitutional.
One prevalent characteristic found in the Court's decisions in Mad-
sen, Schenck, and Hill was a sense of urgency. The Court seemed un-
comfortable with the cases, trying to decide them as expediently as
possible. Gone are the days of rigorous scrutiny and the presumption
that laws curtailing speech are unconstitutional. Instead, the Court
has created a new set of tests to quell the facts at hand. The Court is
too quick and too willing to uphold statutes restricting the speech of
pro-life activists. The possible reasons for this willingness to restrict
speech and whether they are justified will be considered next.
A. Taking Violence into Consideration
While the Court has never explicitly discussed abortion clinic vio-
lence, the issue seems to underlie much of its reasoning. Of the three
abortion protest cases, only in Schenck did the protesters commit any
lawlessness. 346 In Madsen, for example, videotape shot by clinic em-
ployees showed peaceful picketing.347 While in these instances, the
protesters had likely caused discomfort and anxiety to both clinic em-
ployees and patients, they had not violated any laws. Of course, this
will not always be the case. A few extremists have chosen to take a
different route, using death to advance "life. ' 348 This, however, is a
contradiction in terms. To the extent that this violence continues, pro-
life groups, no matter how far attenuated from these extremists, will
suffer immeasurably. 349 This violence prevents those who waver on
the abortion issue from aligning with the pro-life movement. For
every violent incident, pro-life groups must defend their reputation
and distance themselves from fanatics who are diametrically opposed
to their message of life. 350
This notwithstanding, a comparison of the pro-life movement with
other protest groups clearly indicates that many social movements
have ties with violence, whether close knit or attenuated.3 51 For ex-
ample, extremists of the civil rights, anti-war, and labor movements
created tension, but did not detrimentally affect or seriously taint the
346. Schenck, 519 U.S. at 365.
347. Madsen, 512 U.S. at 785-90.
348. See supra notes 202-211 and accompanying text.
349. See John Leo, Not the Way to Stop Abortions, U.S. NEWS & WORLD RElPowr, March 29,
1993, at 17.
350. See JOHN W. WHITEHEAD, ET AL., ARRESTING ABORTION: PRACTICAL WAYS TO SAVE
UNBORN CHILDREN 40-42 (John W. Whitehead ed., 1985) (arguing that violence is wrong and
counterproductive).
351. See infra notes 565-596 and accompanying text.
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outcome of their missions. 352 As the Court made clear in Claiborne
Hardware, simply because an organization has extreme elements does
not mean that the whole group should be judged accordingly. 353
While the Court, in this abortion line of cases, only upholds legisla-
tion suppressing speech at certain times and places, it further extends
these times and places in each subsequent case. In no other free
speech context have the Court's rulings been so draconian. Some ar-
gue that these rulings are necessary in light of the past violence and
threats of violence to abortion providers. 354 Despite this valid point, it
is clear that violent extremists do not worry about floating buffer
zones or fret about whether they are standing too close to a clinic
driveway. A bullet or fire knows no boundaries and has no problems
with trespassing. If someone wants to kill a person or to destroy a
building, getting caught for trespassing or violating an injunction will
do little to deter him from his ultimate goal. While what the Court
may be trying to do is understandable, it remains oblivious to the real
effects these restrictions will have on free speech. Another dangerous
consequence of the increase in the number of restrictions is the rise in
violent incidents at clinics.3 55 During the early 1990s, the increase in
restrictive laws paralleled an increase in the number of violent inci-
dents. 356 While there is no clear answer to this phenomenon, legisla-
tors and courts should not ignore it. 7
Another argument exists that, at the least, these restrictions on
speech will stop the harassment of women entering the clinic. 358 This
point, although valid, ignores the fact that people bent on harassing a
woman or clinic employee can still succeed in their goal, notwithstand-
ing these buffer zones. These restrictions will not deter anyone with a
loud voice or an amplifying device. Those more likely affected by
these restrictions are sidewalk counselors or those hoping to influence
a woman by giving her a pamphlet. While most of the sidewalk coun-
selors use peaceful and polite methods, it is clear that this will not
always be the situation. But someone who is trying to get another
person to listen or consider her viewpoint does not do so through
352. See infra notes 565-575 and accompanying text.
353. Claiborne Hardware, 458 U.S. at 908-09.
354. Deborah A. Ellis & Yolanda S. Wu, Of Buffer Zones And Broken Bones: Balancing
Access To Abortion And Antiabortion Protesters' First Amendment Rights In Schenck v. Pro-
Choice Network, 62 BROOK. L. REV. 547, 548-50 (1996).
355. See supra notes 190-211 and accompanying text.
356. See supra notes 202-211 and accompanying text.
357. For more on this phenomenon, see Note, Safety Valve, supra note 195, at 1221-27.
358. Amy E. Miller, Note, The Collapse and Fall of Floating Buffer Zones: The Court Clarifies
Analysis for Reviewing Speech-Restrictive Injunctions in Schenck v. Pro-Choice Network, 32 U.
RICH. L. REV. 275, 275-76 (1998).
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screaming and harassing. Sidewalk counselors trying to convince a
woman to consider other options than abortion do so through a calm
and kind voice, not through insults and bullhorns.
B. Possible Viewpoint Differences Behind the Restrictions
A second point to consider as to why the Court has been so willing
to restrict speech is the controversial message of the pro-life protes-
ters. The fact that someone disagrees with the views expressed by
pro-life activists or is disturbed by them does not mean that a court
can restrict protesters' rights. One constitutional scholar points out
that "outside the home, the burden is generally on the observer or
listener to avert his eyes or plug his ears against the verbal assaults,
lurid advertisements, tawdry books and magazines, and other 'offen-
sive' intrusions which increasingly attend urban life."'359 Entering an
abortion clinic is vastly different from walking down the street and
seeing a lurid advertisement because when someone enters a health
clinic for an abortion, as with any medical procedure, it involves a
degree of risk and uncertainty. Thus, protesters outside an abortion
clinic can make an already stressful situation even worse.
While there is little doubt that it is more difficult for a woman en-
tering the clinic to ignore abortion protesters, this recognition is ex-
actly what protesters against perceived misconduct want. Whether
demonstrating for a pro-life group, a union, a civil rights group, or for
any other issue, the demonstrator wants the listener to hear and rec-
ognize her. A protester wants those people who she thinks are doing
something wrong to recognize her and to consider, at least for a brief
moment, that the protesters might be right. In the wake of the Su-
preme Court decisions concerning abortion protests, people can still
demonstrate and inform others of their viewpoint, but where they can
do so has changed. Location is of the utmost importance because the
farther the distance, the more ineffective a protester's message be-
comes. For instance, a one hundred-foot buffer zone presents a seri-
ous obstacle to any protest group by restricting the location of the
protest and proximity to the audience. However, when the issue is
abortion, the Court has become less concerned with the effectiveness
of a protester getting her message out and more concerned with the
feelings of the listener.
Historically, the Court has been the guardian of free speech
rights. 360 Over time, the Court has developed a doctrine that has
359. LAURENCE TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 948 (2d ed. 1988).
360. See supra notes 57-84 and accompanying text.
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slowly evolved into a standard that makes it very difficult to constitu-
tionally restrict speech. Yet, the Court has chosen to abandon this
doctrine as applied to abortion protesters.361 In the face of other
more extreme and unpopular cases such as flag burning,362 cross burn-
ing,363 and pornography, 364 the Court has consistently protected these
activities. 365 While most disagreed with the actions in question, the
Court took the route of protecting controversial speech by ignoring
public pressure and showing the importance of being an unelected
governmental body. Immune, for the most part, to the popular senti-
ment of the time, the Court chose to follow the letter and spirit of the
Constitution and protect the controversial First Amendment rights of
these citizens.
However, when legislators dealt with issues like flag burning or por-
nography, they went with popular opinion and suppressed these forms
of speech through legislation. Similarly, responding to the justified
uproar over the extreme acts of violence against abortion providers,
many legislators have cracked down on abortion protesters. County
and statewide restrictions exist in a majority of jurisdictions through-
out the country. Yet contrary to its stance on similarly unpopular po-
sitions, the Court did not come to the rescue.
Civil rights activists, anti-war protesters, and the women's liberation
movement were all fighting for a change, wanting to be heard. They
were heard and they got their message across, helping to change his-
tory forever. If the Court had been more willing to restrict these
views, these movements may not have attained what they did. The
Court's more protective stance regarding the rights of these groups
helped them greatly, while the Court's less protective approach for
abortion protesters' free speech rights has made it more difficult for
people to effectively protest against abortion. Analyzing cases involv-
ing other protest movements and those cases concerning pro-life
groups reveals a blatantly inconsistent approach by the Supreme
Court.
361. See infra Part IV and accompanying text.
362. See Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989).
363. See R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992).
364. See Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205 (1975).
365. For a look at the Court's protections of symbolic speech, see Christopher LaVigne, Com-
ment, Bloods, Crips, and Christians: Fighting Gangs or Fighting the First Amendment?, 51 BAY-
LOR L. REV. 389, 391-93 (1999).
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C. Comparing Abortion and Non-Abortion Protest Cases
The line of cases previously examined illustrates the stark contra-
diction of how the Court applied free speech principles and public
policy to the facts at hand. In Boos, Claiborne Hardware, and Keefe,
the Court took a very protective stance toward free speech. The
Court's analysis in each of the three non-abortion cases will be com-
pared with the three abortion protest cases.
1. Organization for a Better Austin v. Keefe
a. The Coercive Impact of Speech
In Keefe, decided in 1971, the Supreme Court responded to lower
courts that had restricted the right to distribute literature deemed "co-
ercive" with an eight to one reversal. 366 The Court noted that al-
though the speech had "a coercive impact" on people, it did not mean
that the speech lost First Amendment protection.367 The literature it-
self, advocating the stabilization of the racial makeup of the town, was
considered offensive, but was still not restricted. 368
In contrast, in the abortion cases, the Court never reached the ques-
tion of whether the pamphlets that pro-life protesters distributed were
offensive, because the restrictions prevent the protesters from distrib-
uting them. In Keefe, the Court did not even consider whether the
right to distribute a leaflet could be restricted because the First
Amendment protected it. Rather, the Court was concerned about in-
timidating literature that might influence someone.369 Thus, the distri-
bution of racist pamphlets was protected in Keefe, while in the three
abortion protest cases, the Court heavily restricted the right to hand
out informational leaflets against abortion. The Court explained in
Keefe that even though the pamphlets had a coercive impact, they
could not restrict the protesters from distributing them.370 Yet, in the
abortion cases, the impact of speech or its disturbing nature is pre-
cisely the subtle, and sometimes not so subtle, reasoning behind the
Court's upholding of restrictions on pro-life speech. The content and
the materials used by the pro-life protesters often include plastic repli-
cas of unborn babies, pictures of aborted fetuses, and references to
abortion as the equivalent of murder.371 This speech undoubtedly af-
fects the listener. While the Court in Keefe had little trouble finding
366. Keefe, 402 U.S. at 419-20. See supra notes 234-246 and accompanying text.
367. Keefe, 402 U.S. at 419.
368. Id. at 416.
369. Id. at 419.
370. Id.
371. SCHEIDLER, supra note 155, at 18, 23-24.
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that the impact of the speech was not a valid reason to suppress
speech, in the abortion cases it focused heavily on the impact speech
has on the listener.
b. The Prior Restraint Doctrine
In Keefe, the Court relied on the doctrine of prior restraint to pro-
tect the speech, however, this same standard seems to have disap-
peared in the abortion protest cases. 372 The Court explained in Keefe
that anyone who brought an action to restrict speech carried a "heavy
burden" of proving the necessity of the statute when there had been a
prior restraint. 373 Yet, in the three abortion protest cases, the Court
does not even accept the prior restraint argument.
In Madsen, for example, the Court found that the court-ordered in-
junction limiting future protests was not a prior restraint. 374 Now
compare this holding to Keefe, in which the Court invalidated the per-
manent injunction as a restraint on future speech. Indeed, the Court
has noted that "a court order limiting speech in the future ...is a
classic form of prior restraint. '375 This comparison is disturbing, pre-
cisely because the acceptance of a prior restraint argument depends
upon the message the speaker is advocating. While prior restraint is
an elusive concept applied by the Court in an inconsistent manner, 376
it is clear that in light of the narrow free speech protections this Court
has given when dealing with abortion protest, it would not give pro-
life protesters the benefit of a prior restraint argument. This approach
is a perfect example of the Court making it easier to restrict speech.
In Keefe, the respondents did not come close to meeting the "heavy
burden" of showing the need for a speech restriction.377 Yet, in the
abortion cases, the Court made it easier for the government to carry
its burden in restricting speech by never accepting the prior restraint
concept.3 78 This is understandable because once the regulation has
overcome the litmus test of content neutrality, the remaining obstacles
to restricting speech are much easier to pass.
372. Keefe, 402 U.S. at 418-19.
373. Id. at 419.
374. Madsen, 512 U.S. at 761-63. See supra note 273 and accompanying text.
375. Alexander v. United States, 509 U.S. 544, 550 (1993).
376. ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 770-71 (1997).
377. Keefe, 402 U.S. at 419.
378. See, e.g., Madsen, 512 U.S. at 764 n.2; Schenck, 519 U.S. at 374; Hill, 530 U.S. at 733.
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2. Claiborne Hardware v. NAACP
The unanimous decision of the Court in Claiborne Hardware offers
an insight into the willingness of the Court to protect free speech and
how far the Court has distanced itself from this principle when dealing
with pro-life protesters. 379 In Claiborne Hardware, there were reports
of shootings, beatings, and threats, all with the approval of the boycott
leader. 380 Yet, the Court did not hold this eight thousand-member
boycott responsible for the trouble caused by a handful of people.381
a. Violence Within the Protests
Given the policy considerations, the Court's treatment of the
protesters in Claiborne Hardware was understandable, even in light of
the violence, yet the three abortion protest cases before the Court did
not involve acts remotely close to the lawlessness reported in Clai-
borne Hardware.38 2 Of the three abortion cases, only in Schenck were
any laws broken, and the only criminal activities were the civil disobe-
dience tactics of sit-ins, blockades, and pushing and shoving.383 How-
ever, in Claiborne Hardware there were shootings, beatings, and
threats of bodily injury.384 While the NAACP as an organization did
not advocate or promote violence in Claiborne Hardware, certain
members took it upon themselves to incite injury and cause dam-
age.385 The Court recognized this principle and did not restrict the
free speech rights of the organization and its peaceful members. 38 6 In
contrast, with abortion protest cases, the Court seemed to automati-
cally consider that anyone with a pro-life view is a dangerous extrem-
ist who will stop at nothing to shut down an abortion clinic. Because
certain people who oppose abortion have acted violently in the past,
the Court, in a sense, punished the rest of those who oppose abortion
by limiting their First Amendment rights.
b. Comparing the Court's Analyses in Claiborne Hardware and the
Abortion Protest Cases
The Court in Claiborne Hardware began its analysis with the recog-
nition of the rights of assembly, association, and petition and their
379. See supra notes 215-233 and accompanying text.
380. Claiborne Hardware, 458 U.S. at 903-05.
381. Id. at 918-19.
382. Id. at 903-05.
383. Schenck, 519 U.S. at 363.
384. Claiborne Hardware, 458 U.S. at 903-06.
385. Id. at 923, 931.
386. Id. at 918-19.
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connection to free speech. 38 7 In none of the three abortion cases,
however, did the Court dwell on or even mention these additional
rights and their importance. The author of the Claiborne Hardware
opinion, Justice John Paul Stevens, made scant references to the rights
of threatened blacks or white storeowners, and when he did, it was not
until the end of the opinion. 388 This same Justice, the author of the
Hill opinion, could not even finish the first paragraph of his analysis
before recognizing "the interests of unwilling listeners. '389 This ob-
servation does not suggest that the woman's interest is neither valid
nor important. Rather, it addresses the fact that Justice Stevens' First
Amendment analysis depends on at whom the speaker is directing the
speech. This would not be troublesome if it were not for the conclu-
sion that he reaches. It would make more sense if the case involving
the threats and the violent activity began with and focused on the rec-
ognition and importance of the listeners' rights, and the case without
violence or threats emphasized the speaker's First Amendment rights.
However, Justice Stevens declined to follow this approach and instead
focused on the protesters' rights when violence was involved in Clai-
borne Hardware and ignored the protesters' rights when no violence
was involved in Hill.390 There is no justifiable defense for this incon-
sistent approach.
Another problem with the comparison between Claiborne Hard-
ware and the abortion protest cases is the difference in how the Court
views the protesters' conduct. In cases such as Madsen, where no laws
were broken and protesters only obstructed access to the driveway,
and Schenck, where there were blockades, pushing, and yelling at
women, the Court focused almost exclusively on these actions of the
protesters. In Claiborne Hardware, the Court focused almost entirely
on the constitutionally protected actions of the protesters; it admitted,
"there is no question that acts of violence occurred. '391 Yet one sen-
tence later, the Court noted that because violence was mixed with free
speech, "precision of regulation" was necessary and that because
there was constitutionally protected activity, it "imposes restraints on
the grounds that may give rise to damages liability .... ,,392 Instead of
taking the Claiborne Hardware approach, the Court, in the three abor-
tion cases, magnified the abortion protesters' conduct that offended
387. Id. at 911-12.
388. Id. at 921.
389. Hill, 530 U.S. at 714.
390. See supra notes 228-233, 325-343 and accompanying text.
391. Claiborne Hardware, 458 U.S. at 916.
392. Id. at 916-17.
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the women entering the clinic and never came close to making a con-
cession to the constitutionally protected activity as it did with Clai-
borne Hardware, even though there was no actual violence by the
abortion protesters.
The Claiborne Hardware Court continued its concern for those in
the boycott who had not engaged in violence, noting that the First
Amendment does not enable the government "to impose liability on
an individual solely because of his association with another. '393 To
punish a person because of his association with a group, it must be
clear that the person intends to achieve that group's goals through
illegal means. 394 However, this person's intent must be analyzed "ac-
cording to the strictest law. ' 395 While the Claiborne Hardware Court
was concerned about holding individuals accountable for mere sympa-
thy or association with a group, in Madsen, the Court upheld an in-
junction which not only applied to those who were members of the
named pro-life groups but also to anyone who had the same beliefs. 396
Thus, as the trial transcripts show, those who were within the thirty-six
foot buffer zone were arrested even though they had no association
with the groups who were the target of the injunction. 397 Hence, in
Madsen, where no laws had been broken and no violence had been
committed, the Court upheld an injunction aimed at restraining peo-
ple not just associated with the targeted groups but anyone with the
same viewpoint.398 In Claiborne Hardware however, the Court did
not hold other members of the NAACP responsible for violence and
vandalism even though members of that same group had committed
the crimes.399
In Claiborne Hardware, the protesters were engaging in actions
more violent than anything occurring in the three abortion cases. As
the Court noted in Claiborne Hardware, members of the boycott used
"social pressure and the 'threat' of social ostracism '40 0 to persuade
blacks to not patronize the white merchants. The boycott leader
would often threaten those who did not follow the boycott, warning
they "would have their necks broken."'4 0  Apparently, the Court be-
393. Id. at 918-19.
394. Id. at 920.
395. Id. at 919 (quoting Noto v. United States, 367 U.S. 290, 299 (1961)).
396. Madsen, 512 U.S. at 775, 795-97.
397. Id. at 795-96 (quoting transcript of Tr. 104-05 Appearance Hearings held before Judge
McGregor, Eighteenth Judicial Circuit, Seminole County, Florida).
398. Madsen, 512 U.S. at 770.
399. Claiborne Hardware, 458 U.S. at 925-26.
400. Id. at 910.
401. Id. at 927.
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lieved having one's neck broken is merely "social pressure. '40 2 There
were not just verbal threats though; numerous instances of assaults,
vandalism, and beatings occurred pursuant to the boycott. 40 3 Yet the
Court still referred to these actions as "'threat[s]' of social ostra-
cism. ' 40 4 It is doubtful that the Court would couch similarly worded
threats from pro-life protesters in such polite terms as "social pres-
sure" or "social ostracism." Thus, this is another example of the
Court bending the rules and throwing out First Amendment doctrine
when it does not fit its agenda.
Comparing these facts and the Court's analysis to the Madsen facts
and its analysis again reveals a troubling pattern. The Court in Mad-
sen decided that protesters, who had engaged in no illegalities while
congregating at the driveway leading to an abortion clinic, warranted
a thirty-six foot buffer zone.40 5 However, in Claiborne Hardware, not-
withstanding various acts of violence and vandalism, the Court found
that those participating in the boycott were merely exercising their
First Amendment freedoms. 406 Again, this contradiction is difficult, if
not impossible, to reconcile.
The final issue examined in considering the Court's analysis in Clai-
borne Hardware is the state interest behind the free speech restric-
tions. In Claiborne Hardware, the Court considered the government
interest of economic regulation, but decided that it was not compelling
enough to restrict free speech. 40 7 The Court cited a number of cases
that dealt with the interest of economic regulation and prohibiting
speech.40 8 In Hill, however, the Court relied upon the state interest of
protecting a person's "right to be let alone. ' 40 9 Yet the precedent for
this government interest was a single case, Olmstead v. United
States,4t ° where as Justice Scalia noted, the right which Justice Bran-
deis was speaking of was the right to be left alone "as against the
government. ' '41 1 Thus, the state interest in Claiborne Hardware was
402. Id. at 910.
403. Id. at 903-06.
404. Id. at 910.
405. Madsen, 512 U.S. at 770.
406. Claiborne Hardware, 458 U.S. at 928.
407. Id. at 912-13.
408. Id. at 912. See e.g., Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co., 336 U.S. 490 (1949); NLRB v.
Retail Store Employees Union, 447 U.S. 607 (1980); Int'l Longshoremen's Ass'n. v. Allied Int'l,
Inc., 456 U.S. 212 (1982).
409. Hill, 530 U.S. at 716.
41(0. 277 U.S. 438 (1928) (holding that wire tapping of telephone conversations did not
amount to a search or seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment).
411. Hill, 530 U.S. at 751 (quoting Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478, (1928) (Bran-
deis, J., dissenting)).
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an uncontested government interest that had substantial precedent,
however, it was not compelling enough, even in the face of speech
mixed with violence.412 Whereas in Hill, the governmental interest in
protecting one's "right to be let alone," cited in no previous case law,
was compelling enough to withstand a facial challenge to a statute that
made it unlawful to approach a person closer than eight feet when
within one hundred feet of a health care facility. Comparing Clai-
borne Hardware with Hill, Schenck, and Madsen reveals some stagger-
ing holes in the Court's First Amendment jurisprudence and
disappointment in the Court's notion of equality under the law.
3. Boos v. Barry413
The final non-abortion case considered in light of the abortion pro-
test cases is the 1988 case Boos v. Barry. One of the first considera-
tions the Court made in Boos was that the statute prohibited
protesters from engaging in "classically political speech" on public
streets and sidewalks, a location in which the "government's ability to
restrict expressive activity is 'very limited.' 414 In none of the abor-
tion cases does the Court stress the relevance that the restrictions on
abortion protesters occur on public streets and sidewalks. The fact
that all three abortion protest cases concerned speech occurring in
public forums make the decisions all the more dangerous. As the
Court in Boos noted, the government's power to restrict speech is the
least strong in a public forum. But the Court fails to emphasize the
importance of this element because doing this would hinder the
Court's ability to reach its desired end of suppressing the free speech
rights of pro-life protesters. It appears that the Court, in these abor-
tion protest cases, understands the principle of the path of least
resistance.
In Boos, the Court noted that prohibiting speech that "does not
favor either side of a political controversy is nonetheless impermissi-
ble" because the First Amendment does not permit restrictions on an
entire subject. 415 Yet in defending the content neutrality of the stat-
utes and injunctions in the abortion cases, the Court notes that it does
not favor one side over the other, but rather treats all abortion protes-
ters the same by restricting any speech about abortion.416 Assuming
arguendo that these restrictions treated pro-life and pro-choice groups
412. Claiborne Hardware, 458 U.S. at 912-14.
413. See supra notes 247-261 and accompanying text.
414. Boos, 485 U.S. at 318 (quoting United States v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171, 177 (1983)).
415. Id. at 319.
416. Hill, 530 U.S. at 719-20.
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equally, a big leap of faith itself, this violates the principle in Boos
about prohibiting discussions on an entire issue.
In examining the content neutrality of the statute in Boos, the
Court considered the government's argument that the real concern
behind the restriction was the "secondary effects" of protecting diplo-
mats from offensive speech. 417 The Court disagreed, stating that this
justification behind the statute "focuses only on the content of the
speech and the direct impact that speech has on its listeners. ' 418 Thus,
since the statute restricted speech because of its primary impact, the
Court deemed it content-based. 41 9
This conclusion in Boos was in sharp contrast to the abortion pro-
test cases. In all three cases, the Court was adamant about the content
neutrality of each of the restrictions. Yet in Schenck and Hill, the jus-
tifications for these prohibitions were the emotional impact and dis-
tress caused by the pro-life protesters.420 Thus, these restrictions were
regulating speech based on its primary impact of causing anxiety and
discomfort to the female patients. There is little doubt that the protes-
ters, whether intending to or not, made the situation extremely stress-
ful for women entering the clinic. To remedy this problem, a state
legislature enacted a restriction to shield women from speech critical
of their right to have an abortion. However, according to the analysis
in Boos, "[t]his justification focuses only on the content of the speech
and the direct impact that speech has on its listeners. '421 Therefore,
because the reasoning behind the restriction concerns the content of
the speech and the restriction regulates speech due to its primary im-
pact on the women, these restrictions on abortion protesters are con-
tent-based.
Finally, in Boos, the Court concluded that the statute was content-
based and that a content-based restriction on political speech in a pub-
lic forum had to be held to the most exacting scrutiny. If the Court
had used a similar approach in determining if the restrictions were
content-based in the abortion protest cases, it would have likely found
them to be content-based. The content-based restrictions on political
speech in a public forum in the three abortion cases would likely not
stand under the most exacting scrutiny. The Court avoids this conclu-
sion, however, by using an approach hostile to free speech in that it
determines a statute to be content-neutral no matter what the lan-
417. Boos, 485 U.S. at 321.
418. Id. (emphasis in original).
419. Id.
420. Hill, 530 U.S. at 710, 729; Schenck, 519 U.S. at 363.
421. Boos, 485 U.S. at 321 (emphasis in original).
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guage of the statute states or its effects on free speech.422 This point
will be considered more fully as each of the three abortion protest
cases is examined in greater depth.
D. Madsen v. Women's Health Center
In Madsen, the Court held that a thirty-six foot buffer zone sur-
rounding the entrances to an abortion clinic and its driveway was con-
stitutional.423  Because the Claiborne Hardware Court had
acknowledged that commenting on public issues remained the most
important First Amendment value, it seemed logical to expect that the
Court would do everything in its power to prevent restrictions on such
expression.424 Indeed, this had been the case, as decades of precedent
would attest. Using the strictest form of scrutiny within reason, the
Court has followed through on its promise of being committed to the
ideal that "debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and
wide-open .... "425
1. The Creation of a New Test
Unfortunately, the Madsen Court applied a new, less rigorous stan-
dard when considering content-neutral injunctions.426 The strict scru-
tiny test, used in many other cases, required the Court to determine
"whether a restriction is 'necessary to serve a compelling state interest
and [is] narrowly drawn to achieve that end."' 427 In contrast, the test
used in Madsen required that the restriction "burden no more speech
than necessary to serve a significant government interest. ' 428 This
change is an unfortunate turn that the Court could have avoided but
did not. 429 This test makes it even easier for the government to curtail
free speech rights by watering down the standards that the govern-
ment must meet.
One hypothesis for this change in the test is the Court's concern
with the rash of clinic violence that increased during 1994.430 How-
422. Hill, 530 U.S. at 719-20.
423. Madsen, 512 U.S. at 776.
424. Claiborne Hardware, 458 U.S. at 908.
425. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964).
426. Madsen, 512 U.S. at 765.
427. Id. at 766 (quoting Perry Educ. Ass'n. v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n., 460 U.S. 37, 45
(1983)).
428. Madsen, 512 U.S. at 765.
429. For a contrary view of this case, see William C. Plouffe, Jr., Note, Free Speech v. Abor-
tion: Has The First Amendment Been Expanded, Limited, Or Blurred?, 31 TuLSA L.J. 203, 225
(1995) (noting that Madsen was a "weak decision by the Court 'protecting' women seeking abor-
tions" and that it illustrates that the right to abortion is eroding).
430. See supra notes 202-211 and accompanying text.
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ever, the Court has never specifically stated this, possibly because it
has addressed this issue in other cases and it was never bothered by
the mix of violence and speech. Claiborne Hardware illustrates the
Court's willingness to accept the fact that some violence cannot be
prevented and to deny that violence automatically allows the govern-
ment to restrict a group's right of free speech.431 In past cases, the
Court has taken the exact opposite approach of that used when deal-
ing with abortion protest cases. Thus, the Court has taken an even
more protective stance of a group's First Amendment rights when
there is violence involved. The reasoning for this approach is quite
simple; the government and people in opposition to the speech will be
even more adamant about restricting the speech because it is inter-
twined with lawlessness. But if there is closer scrutiny by the courts,
the illegal activity may be separated and punished, while preserving
the right of free speech.
Very often, the Court has gone out of its way to protect speech
mixed with violence. 432 In fact, the Court stated that "when such [vio-
lence and threats of violence occur] in the context of constitutionally
protected activity, . . . 'precision of regulation' is demanded. '433
Somehow, Chief Justice Rehnquist believes that "precision of regula-
tion" is a matter of mere semantics, exemplified by his statement that
it should "burden no more speech than necessary. ' 434 Consider the
fact that Chief Justice Rehnquist did not explain how the protesters'
violent actions in Claiborne Hardware were protected by the First
Amendment under the "precision of regulation" test, yet the protes-
ters' peaceful actions in Madsen were not protected under the stan-
dard of "burden no more speech than necessary. '435
2. The Use of Permanent Injunctions
Another example of the Court's more narrow view of free speech
when abortion protesters are involved is the continued use of perma-
431. See supra notes 229-231 and accompanying text.
432. See supra notes 364-367 and accompanying text. See, e.g., Claiborne Hardware, 485 U.S.
at 916 (1982); United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 729 (1966); San Diego Bldg. Trades
Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 248 n.6 (1959); Youngdahl v. Rainfair, Inc., 355 U.S. 131, 139
(1957). One could also make an argument that the Court's protection of pornography in cases
such as Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844 (1997) or Erznoznik v. Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205 (1975), is
in a sense protecting speech mixed with violence. See Attorney General's Comm'n on Pornogra-
phy, U.S. Dept. of Justice, Final Report 326 (1986) (concluding that "substantial exposure to
sexually violent materials as described here bears a causal relationship to antisocial acts of sexual
violence and, for some subgroups, possibly to unlawful acts of sexual violence").
433. Claiborne Hardware, 458 U.S. at 916 (quoting NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. at 438 (1963)).
434. Madsen, 512 U.S. at 767.
435. See, e.g., Id. at 776.
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nent injunctions.436 In other situations, the Court has stated that per-
manent injunctions are "classic examples" 437 of prior restraints.
Further, the Court even concluded in Organization for a Better Austin
v. Keefe that "prior restraint[s] on expression come to this Court with
a 'heavy presumption' against [their] constitutional validity. ' 438 Yet in
Madsen, the Court refused to consider this analysis and instead
claimed that injunctions were not prior restraints. 439 As a result, the
Court did not examine the injunctions at a level of heightened scru-
tiny.440 As in other abortion protest cases, the Court in Madsen was
eager to take shortcuts and apply watered down standards, even
though First Amendment rights were at stake. What the Court was
doing is quite clear, for under the less rigorous tests, it was much eas-
ier for the Court to find the restrictions on the speech
constitutional. 44'
3. Justice Stevens' Dissent
Possibly the most disturbing element in the Madsen case, from a
free speech perspective, was the position taken by Justice Stevens,
who concurred in part and dissented in part. Justice Stevens believed
that the Court should have upheld the three hundred-foot buffer
zone. 442 This is a perfect example of how an alleged time, place, and
manner restriction is so great that it becomes a suppression of speech
in and of itself. Justice Stevens believed the three hundred-foot buffer
zone was warranted despite the fact that no incidents of violence were
ever cited.443 His basis for upholding this zone was that some patients
felt higher levels of anxiety.444 Using this reasoning as the basis for a
restriction of this magnitude leaves little doubt about Justice Stevens'
disagreement with the pro-life message. In no other First Amend-
ment case has he supported such a blatant suppression of one our
436. Id. at 763-65.
437. Alexander v. United States, 509 U.S. 544, 550 (1996) (quoting M. NIMMER, NIMMER ON
FREEDOM OF SPEECH 4.03, 4-14, 4-16 (1984)).
438. Madsen, 512 U.S. at 797-98 (quoting Keefe, 402 U.S. at 419).
439. Madsen, 512 U.S. at 763-64.
440. Id. at 764.
441. For a more thorough analysis and criticism of the current Court's application of the con-
tent-neutral and content-based distinctions in four recent free speech cases, including Madsen,
see Clay Calvert, Free Speech and Content-Neutrality: Inconsistent Applications of an Increas-
ingly Malleable Doctrine, 29 McGEOROE L. REV. 69 (1997).
442. Madsen, 512 U.S. at 782 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
443. Id. at 781-82.
444. Id. at 782 n.5.
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most basic civil liberties.445 But everything is upside down when the
issue is abortion.
E. Schenck v. Pro-Choice Network of Western N.Y.
In the next abortion protest case considered, Schenck, the Court
upheld the fixed buffer zone provision of the injunction, struck down
the floating buffer zone provision, and avoided the constitutionality of
the cease and desist provision. 446 The Court, while not considering
the cease and desist aspect itself, addressed some of the petitioners'
arguments concerning the provision.447 The Court was not concerned
that the basis behind the cease and desist provision was the right of
someone entering the abortion clinic to be left alone. 448 Correspond-
ingly, it seems that an abortion clinic has an elevated status beyond
anything else, save for a personal residence. In case after case dating
back to the dissents of Justice Holmes, the Court has realized that at
times, people may find speech, literature, or actions offensive or im-
moral, yet the Court has counseled that the constitutional response is
to ignore it and walk away. 449
In deciding Schenck, the first thing the Court should have consid-
ered troublesome was the lower courts' cavalier attitude towards the
protesters' free speech rights. For example, the district court stated it
was "bending over backwards to accommodate" the First Amendment
rights of the protesters.450 This accommodation has never been, nor
should it be viewed as a goodwill gesture, for it remains the job of the
courts to uphold and defend the rights ensured by the Constitution.
In recent times, the Supreme Court has been the sole bastion of the
rights and liberties of all people, regardless of race, creed, or view-
point. After installing floating and fixed buffer zones surrounding
abortion clinics and instituting other numerous regulations, the belief
445. See, e.g., Claiborne Hardware, 458 U.S. at 886; City of Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41, 54
(1999) (In striking down a Chicago loitering ordinance, Justice Stevens noted "that an individ-
ual's decision to remain in a public place of his choice is as much a part of his liberty as the
freedom of movement inside [this country]."); Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 872 (1997) (In
striking down the Communications Decency Act, Justice Stevens noted that "the severity of
criminal sanctions may well cause speakers to remain silent rather than communicate even ar-
guably unlawful words,.ideas, and images.").
446. Schenck, 519 U.S. at 379.
447. Id. at 383.
448. Id. at 383-84.
449. See e.g., Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 322 (1988); Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485
U.S. 46, 56 (1988); FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 745 (1978); Street v. New York, 394 U.S.
576, 592 (1969); New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964); Cantwell v. Connecti-
cut, 310 U.S. 296, 310 (1940).
450. Pro-Choice Network of W. N.Y. v. Project Rescue W. N.Y., 799 F. Supp. 1417, 1434
(W.D.N.Y. 1992).
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of the courts that they are making an "extra effort," as Chief Justice
Rehnquist calls it, is very questionable.451
In many other contexts, the Court has afforded greater protections
and opportunities for groups to exercise their First Amendment rights
and express their opinions. For example, in Boos, the Court felt that
the fixed buffer zone infringed upon the protesters' free speech rights,
yet never claimed it was doing the protesters a favor. Thus in
Schenck, the Court, in light of this backdrop, should have considered
more carefully what the trial court was trying to do. As Justice Scalia
stated, "courts have an obligation to enhance speech rights.
' 452
The Court applied the test devised in Madsen to the Schenck
case. 453 While there were some similarities between the cases, such as
abortion protests and injunctions limiting demonstrations, there were
also vast differences. For example, one difference was that the injunc-
tion in Madsen applied to a single clinic, 454 while the injunction in
Schenck applied to every clinic in the Western District of New
York.455
A second difference was the government interests involved. The
basis for the injunction in Madsen was a number of different govern-
mental interests, including the rights and health of women who were
obtaining abortion services, public safety, and the free flow of traf-
fic. 456 In Schenck, many of the government interests from Madsen
were not applicable because the main government interest was public
safety.457
Besides the question of whether Madsen was inapplicable to
Schenck, another problem with the decision in Schenck is the reason-
ing behind the fixed buffer zone. As Justice Scalia's dissenting opin-
ion notes, the one purpose behind this provision of the injunction was
"to protect the right of people approaching and entering the facilities
to be left alone. '458 Taking this one step further, the reasoning behind
the cease and desist provision was also the right to be left alone.
Obtaining an abortion, as well as most other medical procedures, is
a stressful situation. However, out on the streets or on a sidewalk, the
Court has always recognized that people must shut their eyes and
451. Schenck, 519 U.S. at 381 n.11.
452. Id. at 390.
453. Id. at 371.
454. Madsen, 512 U.S. at 758.
455. Schenck, 519 U.S. at 366 n.2.
456. Madsen, 512 U.S. at 767-68.
457. Schenck, 519 U.S. at 376.
458. Id. at 387.
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close their ears.459 It is quite understandable that a woman entering
an abortion clinic would not want to be told what she should or should
not do. However, in a country that protects the free speech rights of
everyone, including those who have opposing opinions, these women
must accept the fact that there are people who strongly disagree with
what they are doing and have a right to voice their opinions about it.
The Court's acknowledgement of the "right to be left alone" is
something very different from anything the Court has done in past
cases. Relying on this reasoning in First Amendment cases is very
dangerous, especially when this right to be left alone is invoked in a
public forum. People do not want to be intimidated or annoyed by
people who want to impose their point of view on them. However,
this discomfort cannot supersede the right of free speech. Of course,
the scope of protected speech must be within reason, for any type of
unwanted touching or threats have no place in the First Amendment.
F. Hill v. Colorado
The final case analyzed is the most recent of the three abortion pro-
test cases. The majority opinion in Hill, upholding the one hundred-
foot buffer zone, was quick to point out the First Amendment rights
of the protesters at stake.460 The Court then went on to admit that the
constitutionally protected action of handing out leaflets was "unques-
tionably lessened by this statute. '' 461 Given those considerations, one
might think that the Court would have been more skeptical of the
restriction in question. For this was not a case of symbolic speech or
speech mixed with violence or lawlessness, it was purely "high value"
speech taking place in a public forum. Unfortunately, the majority
never acknowledged this point. While one could argue that areas sur-
rounding abortion clinics are a limited-public forum, rather than a
public forum, in either case, the Colorado legislature overstepped its
boundaries. There is, however, no argument over whether noise stat-
utes can and should be in place, a point the protesters do not chal-
lenge as silence is necessary at clinics and hospitals. However, trying
to distribute a pamphlet to someone is a far cry from violating a noise
statute.
459. Hill, 530 U.S. at 752-53 (quoting LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
948 (2d ed. 1988)).
460. Hill, 530 U.S. at 708.
461. Id. at 715.
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1. Applying the Ward Test
In determining whether the statute was content-neutral, the Court
applied the test from Ward v. Rock Against Racism,462 which stated
that "[t]he principal inquiry in determining content neutrality, in
speech cases generally and in time, place, or manner cases in particu-
lar, is whether the government has adopted a regulation of speech be-
cause of disagreement with the message it conveys. ' '463 The Court
concluded that the Colorado statute passed this test for three separate
reasons. 464 All three reasons found by the Court for determining the
content neutrality are subject to serious questions.
The first reason the statute passed the test from Ward was that it
was not a regulation of speech but "[r]ather, it [was] a regulation of
the places where some speech may occur." 465 However, the Court did
not consider that at some point, a regulation of the places where some
speech may occur becomes a regulation of speech itself.
For example, restricting protests within a one-mile radius of the Su-
preme Court does not restrict speech per se; it only restricts the places
where speech may occur. Yet, for all intents and purposes, it remains
a regulation of the speech itself since it has diffused the effect of the
speech. Thus, although the Court couches this restriction in terms of
being only a "regulation of the places where some speech may oc-
cur, '"466 the result is the same: infringement of First Amendment
rights. While it can be argued that this could be said for any place
restriction, the statute at hand restricted so much First Amendment
activity that it became a restriction of speech, rather than of a place
where it could occur.
The second reason the Colorado statute passed the Ward test was
that "it was not adopted 'because of disagreement with the message it
conveys."' 467 The Court believed the statute was content-neutral even
though it depended on the content of the message. The Court stated
that "it [was] common in the law to examine the content of a commu-
nication to determine the speaker's purpose. '468 It then gave a num-
ber of examples, such as "blackmail [or] an agreement to fix prices,"
462. 491 U.S. 781 (1989).
463. Id. at 791.
464. Hill, 530 U.S. at 719-20.
465. Id. at 719.
466. Id.
467. Id. (quoting Ward, 491 U.S. at 785).
468. Id. at 721.
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in which the Court looked at the content of a statement to see if a law
had been broken.469
These comparisons are suspect because each of the violations men-
tioned is a separate crime. Blackmail has no First Amendment pro-
tection and is a crime punished in and of itself.470 Speaking with a
woman entering an abortion clinic has First Amendment value and,
absent the statute, is not a crime by itself. Thus, the Court used a
faulty comparison to hide behind an even faultier rule of law; violating
the statute depends on the content of the speech within the restricted
area.
The third reason the statute passed the Ward test was because the
states' interests were unrelated to the content of the protesters'
speech.47 1 To consider whether this provision of the test was satisfied,
the interests of the state must be considered first. The governmental
interest which the Court relied on is protecting a person's "right to be
let alone. '472 This "state interest" is patently at odds with First
Amendment principles, but the reasoning the Court used to arrive at
the legitimacy of this interest is even more at odds with prior case law.
Relying on a right "to be let alone" on sidewalks and street corners is
a dangerous precedent for which the Court has laid the groundwork in
Hill.
Finding the Colorado statute content-neutral was the crucial factor
in upholding the law, because courts subject content-neutral regula-
tions to the less protective intermediate scrutiny standard. If the
Court found the statute to be content-based, it would then use the
more speech protective strict scrutiny. This distinction is often the de-
cisive factor in a free speech case, and a perfect example is the con-
flicting holdings of the lower courts in Madsen.473 The Florida
Supreme Court found the injunction was content-neutral, used inter-
mediate scrutiny, and upheld the constitutionality of the injunction.474
The Eleventh Circuit also considered the constitutionality of the same
injunction and found the injunction to be content-based. 475 It then
469. Id.
470. See e.g., Gresham v. Peterson, 225 F.3d 899, 909 (7th Cir. 2000); R.A.V. v. City of St.
Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 420 (1992) (Stevens, J., concurring) (quoting Frederick Schauer, Categories
and the First Amendment: A Play in Three Acts, 34 VAND. L. REV. 265, 270 (1981)) ("Although
the First Amendment broadly protects 'speech,' it does not protect the right to 'fix prices, breach
contracts, make false warranties, place bets with bookies, threaten, [or] extort.'").
471. Hill, 530 U.S. at 719-20.
472. Id. at 716.
473. Cheffer v. McGregor, 6 F.3d 705 (1 1th Cir. 1993); Operation Rescue v. Women's Health
Cir., 626 So. 2d 664 (Fla. 1993).
474. Madsen, 512 U.S. at 761-62.
475. Id.
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applied strict scrutiny, found the injunction was not narrowly tailored
to serve a compelling government interest, and held the injunction un-
constitutional. 476 This is a concrete example of what can occur when a
court finds a statute content-based. The Hill Court's ability to ignore
the plain language of the statute and the implications of the law on the
pro-life protesters and the First Amendment is simply amazing. The
Court in Hill made an illegitimate use of a legitimate doctrine, con-
tent-neutrality, but unlike in Madsen and Schenck, it had nowhere to
hide its convoluted approach.
2. Giving Abortion Clinics the Status of a Home
A disturbing factor in Justice Stevens' opinion was the application
of the Colorado statute to privacy standards upheld in previous cases
for residences. 477 For example, he stated, "protection afforded to of-
fensive messages does not always embrace offensive speech that is so
intrusive that the unwilling audience cannot avoid it. '' 47 While many
would agree with this point, it is difficult to extend this standard to
public locations, especially since the proposition alluded to came from
Frisby v. Schultz479 in which the home of a doctor had been the sub-
ject of repeated picketing.480
Justice Stevens went on to use the home analogy again, citing
Rowan v. U.S. Post Office Dep't.,48I a case involving unwanted offen-
sive material mailed to an individual's home, stating that "the right of
every person 'to be let alone' must be placed on the scales with the
right of others to communicate. ' 48 2 Thus, the Rowan case had a criti-
cally important factual distinction, which Justice Stevens failed to ac-
knowledge. It is interesting to note that when the respondent in
Organization for a Better Austin v. Keefe relied on Rowan, the Court
said "[Rowan] is not on point; the right of privacy involved in that case
is not shown here. '483 The Court then went on to distinguish Keefe
from Rowan by showing that "respondent is not attempting to stop
the flow of information into his own household, but to the public. '48 4
Yet the statute in Hill is doing exactly that, attempting to stop the flow
of information to the public. It is disheartening to see that when a
476. Id. at 762.
477. Hill, 530 U.S. at 716-17.
478. Id. at 716.
479. 487 U.S. 474 (1988).
480. Id. at 476.
481. 397 U.S. 728 (1970).
482. Hill, 530 U.S. at 718 (quoting Rowan v. U.S. Post Office Dep't., 397 U.S. 728, 736 (1970)).
483. Keefe, 402 U.S. at 420.
484. Id.
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party to a case relied on Rowan, it was strongly rejected in dicta, yet
thirty years later, the Court itself relied on the same case as the under-
lying reasoning for its holding.485
It is unclear whether Stevens was attempting to compare an abor-
tion clinic with a home, but if he were, it would be dangerous prece-
dent. This is especially relevant with regard to the statute in Hill
because the restricted area extended one hundred feet from clinics,
encompassing all of the public right-of-ways. 486 For if places other
than a home were subject to the same protections as a home, protes-
ters of all movements would be in a difficult predicament and so
would the First Amendment. The possibilities of further extension
would be endless. Businesses, government buildings, or any other
area could be protected under an elevated status. While this argu-
ment may seem far-fetched, it may not be because the issue is abor-
tion. For it is clear that the Court has already shown its willingness to
severely restrict speech in the area of abortion clinics.
3. Considering the Language of the Statute
Another problem with the majority's belief that the statute was con-
tent-neutral was that it failed to consider, or at least address, certain
language within the statute. As Justice Scalia noted, the first section
of the statute stated that "the right to protest or counsel against cer-
tain medical procedures. '487 Taken literally, it would be difficult to
consider this a content-neutral statute. However, the majority not
only refused to consider this but also acted as if this section were not
in the statute. Throughout the majority opinion, Justice Stevens made
a number of different arguments for upholding the statute, disregard-
ing the "against" language. Justice Stevens stated that anyone who
protested for abortion rights or handed out pamphlets praising Roe
would be in violation of the statute if these actions were done in the
restricted area.48a However, he failed to note that the legislature en-
acted the statute for those protesting "against certain medical proce-
dures. '489 It is also naive to think that abortion clinics and women
entering clinics themselves would not want protesters who support
485. This right to privacy was not advanced by the State, which noted that the statute ad-
dressed the problems of interference with access to medical services and the health and safety of
those entering the clinic. Brief for Respondents 15. Justice Scalia addressed this point in his
dissent. Hill, 530 U.S. at 749-50 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
486. Hill, 530 U.S. at 707-08.
487. Id. at 744 (emphasis added) (quoting CoLo. REV. STAT. § 18-9-122(1) (1999)).
488. Id. at 725.
489. CoLo. REV. STAT. § 18-9-122 (3) (1999).
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abortion to be present, giving them help and protection from un-
wanted advice of pro-life protesters.
It also appears that the statute singled out specific tactics used by
pro-life groups, "passing a leaflet[,] ... engaging in oral protest, edu-
cation, or counseling. ' 490 The last element, counseling, remains for
many pro-life groups the most important and most effective means of
discouraging women from getting abortions.491 Ignoring the "against
medical procedures" language for a moment, the types of methods
that the statute singled out were suspect. There is little doubt that the
pro-life, and not the pro-choice side, relies on these means to protest
abortion. Yet, the majority still claimed that the statute was content-
neutral because it applied to all protesters, regardless of viewpoint. 492
However, the chance that a supporter of abortion rights would chal-
lenge this statute is highly unlikely. It is apparent that this statute was
aimed at silencing the pro-life protesters because the statute is laden
with content-based restrictions. Thus, while the Court claimed the
statute is content-neutral, one need only consider the legislative intent
and the fact that the Colorado legislature was motivated to control the
speech of those protesting "against" medical procedures. 493 To think
that this statute was aimed at and applied equally to those in support
of abortion defies common sense.
4. Ample Alternatives
Free speech has its limits. However, the Court's rulings in the abor-
tion context leave pro-life protesters with inadequate methods of com-
munication. Handing a passerby a leaflet is impossible from eight feet
away unless that passerby makes an affirmative effort to step closer
and take the leaflet. Most people are unwilling to do this.494 The
eight-foot buffer zone prevents a sidewalk counselor from using
softer, more effective tones of voice because she has to deal with the
distance and other noise factors. The Court in the past has recognized
such a situation and noted that "a restriction on expressive activity
may be invalid if the remaining modes of communication are inade-
490. Id.
491. See JOSEPH SCHEIDLER, ARRESTING ABORTION 85-92 (John Whitehead ed., 1985) (not-
ing that sidewalk counseling is the most effective and important method in protesting against
abortion).
492. Hill, 530 U.S. at 725.
493. See generally LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 794 (2d ed. 1988)
(explaining that statutes may be considered content-neutral but are motivated by the intent to
restrict certain constitutionally protected speech).
494. Hill, 530 U.S. at 758 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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quate. ' '495 For example, in Bay Area Peace Navy v. United States,4 9 6 a
case dealing with anti-war protesters, the Ninth Circuit found that a
seventy-five-yard "security zone" rendered the protesters' demonstra-
tion "completely ineffective. '497 It further noted that "an alternative
is not ample if the speaker is not permitted to reach the 'intended
audience.' ' '498 It then cited to a number of cases, also in the non-
abortion context, in which courts have recognized that the intended
message was rendered useless, even though the court permitted the
speaker to communicate the message.4 99 Considering this concern in
the light of the warning by the Supreme Court in Riley v. National
Federation of the Blind50 0 that "[t]he First Amendment mandates that
we presume that speakers, not the government, know best both what
they want to say and how to say it"501 reveals serious deficiencies in
the protection of free speech when pro-life protesters are involved.
As noted earlier, sidewalk counselors who wish to dissuade individual
women from entering the clinic have no ample alternatives. Their
method is to approach women at a distance closer than eight feet.
This method is effective because it concentrates on quiet conversation
between two individuals, not a crowd of people yelling and chanting.
The decisions in the abortion protest cases not only disallow the mes-
sage from reaching the intended audience but also imply that there
are methods other than sidewalk counseling that the protesters may
use, violating the principles from Riley and Bay Area Peace Navy.
G. Summary
1. The Double Standard Question
There is clearly some difficulty in reconciling the abortion and non-
abortion protest cases. Stripping away all the language about buffer
zones, free speech, and a listener's right to be left alone, there is a
495. City Council of Los Angeles v. Taxpayers For Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 812 (1984).
496. 914 F.2d 1224 (1990).
497. Id. at 1229.
498. Id. (quoting Students Against Apartheid Coalition v. O'Neil, 660 F. Supp. 333, 339-40
(W.D. Va. 1987)).
499. Id. (citing Students Against Apartheid Coalition v. O'Neil, 660 F. Supp. 333, 339-40
(W.D. Va. 1987) (school regulation prohibiting protest shanties on lawn of building where Board
of Visitors meets is not rendered valid by permission to erect shanties in other places not visible
to members of Board, who were the intended audience); Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. Movement,
Inc. v. City of Chicago, 419 F. Supp. 667, 674 (N.D. II1. 1976) (permitting a parade route through
black neighborhood not a sufficient alternative to a route through white neighborhood when
white people were the intended audience).
500. 487 U.S. 781 (1988).
501. Id. at 790-91.
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double standard lurking beneath all of the Court's faulty reasoning
and illogical rhetoric.
Some might argue that it is difficult, if not impossible at times, to
reconcile Supreme Court case law, even from one year to the next.
They might also add that the First Amendment is a difficult area of
the law, often depending heavily upon the facts of the case. While
these points are true, they are a last ditch effort to cloud the real issue:
blatant double standards. The Court goes from a position of fervent
protection of speech to one of almost complete lack of protection.
What is worse is that this wavering approach depends on who the
speakers are and what their message is. Those espousing a pro-life
view, or worse, those who may air this view, are politically and judi-
cially expedient; however, the groups and their messages in the non-
abortion context were not expedient. The issue of whether the cases
analyzed can be viably compared is simple. These cases highlight the
double standards applied to pro-life groups because Claiborne Hard-
ware, Keefe, and Boos dealt with, respectively, violent protests, offen-
sive messages, and concerns for the listener, reasons used by those
willing to restrict the First Amendment rights of pro-life protesters.
Thus, the speech protective analyses used by the Court in the non-
abortion context cannot be reconciled with the speech abrasive analy-
ses used by the Court in the abortion context.
2. Balancing Rights
Traumatic and trying as an abortion is for a woman, the right to
choose does not trump another woman's right to explain other alter-
natives or that she herself was in that exact position and can help. On
the other hand, abortion providers or women seeking an abortion
must not be denied their constitutionally protected rights. There must
be a balance between the right of a woman to choose to have an abor-
tion and the freedom of others to voice their opinion on this right to
choose. The Court recognizes the two sets of rights at issue, but only
pays lip service to the free speech rights of the pro-life protesters.
Balancing the rights of both sides is difficult, but one thing is certain,
both groups' rights deserve protection. Women entering clinics
should not have to be subjected to threats or insults, while abortion
protesters should not have their message obstructed by overly broad
injunctions and statutes.
The First Amendment dates back to 1791, while a woman's right to
choose to have an abortion was made law by the Supreme Court in
1973. While the point of this article is not to argue the validity of Roe
or whether abortion is right or wrong, it must be remembered that this
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is the First Amendment that is being expounded. Burning crosses,
burning flags, offensive racial epithets, degrading religious art, and in-
sulting pornography are things Americans must tolerate in order to
maintain First Amendment freedoms. While it is a fact that at times a
small percentage of abortion protesters have gotten out of hand, ex-
cept for illegal behavior, this must be tolerated as well. As highly val-
ued as this right to choose is by many women, this does not
automatically mean that others in disagreement lose their right to crit-
icize it or to influence others about it.502
Since the founding of this nation, groups protesting for social
change have been met with harassment, opposition, and sometimes a
government that secretly or even explicitly opposed their movement
and what it stood for.50 3 The times have changed and the issue has
changed, but the scenario remains the same. The government has no
qualms about passing legislation or issuing injunctions restricting
someone's free speech rights when the movement is controversial. If
the courts are ready to defend the position that an injunction can be
based on one's right to be left alone, then protesters from whatever
interest group may as well stay home because it undermines the whole
idea of trying to affect change. The issue of abortion differs from
other protest subjects because it encompasses other important issues
such as the health of a woman, a doctor's job, and the safety of abor-
tion providers and patrons. However, the underlying theme is still the
same: a group fervently opposed to something it believes is wrong and
tries to affect change through constitutionally protected methods such
as leafleting, protesting, and educating. Unfortunately, extremists
have placed First Amendment rights in jeopardy and law-abiding citi-
zens suffer because of them. Both sides of the picket line need to
recognize and respect the interests and liberties of the other. Finding
a balance between both groups' rights remains elusive, but it is not an
unattainable goal.
After twenty-nine years of legalized abortion, many Americans are
still uncomfortable confronting this issue. The very thought of people
vocally telling a woman entering an abortion clinic that she is a "mur-
derer" or various other pro-life mantras is difficult to digest. Abor-
tion, like any other medical procedure, involves a certain degree of
502. Michael Stokes Paulsen & Michael W. McConnell, The Doubtful Constitutionality of the
Clinic Access Bill, 1 VA. J. Soc. PoL'Y & L. 261, 263 (1994) ("Those who seek abortions have no
constitutional right to be spared the indignity and distress of learning that many of their fellow
citizens consider the act of abortion tantamount to murder.").
503. For example, the anti-war movement or the abolitionists during the pre-Civil War period.
See supra notes 44-79 and accompanying text.
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risk and uncertainty. Therefore, there is an even higher degree of
anxiety when a woman enters an abortion clinic. It is easy to conclude
that any kind of embarrassment or anxiety felt when one encounters
protesters should account for some type of restriction on those protes-
ters. However, there is obvious danger to this "leaving people alone"
approach because the First Amendment would be, as Justice Scalia
said, "a dead letter."50 4 For if the feelings of anxiety or embarrass-
ment were more important than the First Amendment and the right to
express oneself, society would have difficulty remaining free and
democratic.
A person's feelings cannot be the gauge by which to determine
whether speech should be restricted. For if this becomes the test, it
would eliminate a vast number of Constitutionally protected activities.
At a time when experts and politicians tell us what we should and
should not say or do, the First Amendment must lend a voice of rea-
son to the fray. The First Amendment has gone through difficult
times, including slavery, world wars, and the turbulent 1960s; after 210
years, it must not be compromised solely because a person's speech
causes someone discomfort.
IV. IMPACT
The impact of the line of abortion cases dealing with the First
Amendment has been profound, both in the courts and the streets.
State legislators and courts have taken the Supreme Court's cue and
declared open season on the free speech rights of abortion protes-
ters.505 Some restrictions have been intolerable. Some of the reason-
ing behind restrictions has been absurd. Thus, it is important that
citizens, no matter what their feeling on abortion, put their prejudices
aside and consider the restrictions from a First Amendment stand-
point. Laws restricting the size or number of pro-life signs are unwar-
ranted and unconstitutional. Using anthropological studies and social
science experiments as the motivation for laws restricting pro-life
504. Hill, 530 U.S. at 748-49.
505. For example, in California, SB 780, which was passed into law on October 14, 2001, puts
the penalties of the Federal Access to Clinics Act into California law. 2001 CA S.B. 780. In
addition, the bill "would allow specified persons to use pseudonyms in civil actions related to
prohibited acts." Id. The bill also requires law enforcement agencies to address "hate crimes
motivated by hostility to real or perceived ethnic background or sexual orientation, commonly
committed by some of the same persons who commonly commit anti-reproductive-rights crimes
of violence." 2001 CA S.B. 780 (2). Not only does the bill single out anyone with a pro-life
viewpoint and subject them to harsher crimes than someone without a pro-life viewpoint, it adds
insult to injury by clearly accusing them of being hateful. Apparently, there is no end to what
some will resort to in order to dismantle the pro-life message. Katie Short, CALFACE Update,
at www.lldf.org, Summer 2001 (last visited November 1, 2001).
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protesters is disturbing. 50 6 These are not hypotheticals; these are real
life instances initiated and approved by entities of the United States
Government. 50 7 Only time will tell how devastating an effect these
cases will have on First Amendment jurisprudence.
A. Lower Courts and Abortion Protests
Lower courts are now using cases such as Madsen, Schenck, and Hill
to restrict the free speech rights of abortion protesters across the
country. It is likely that many courts will explicitly rely on the cases,
considering them licenses to suppress speech. This, of course, will
continue as long as the Supreme Court continues to apply a different
set of standards to pro-life protesters.
1. Foti v. City of Menlo Park508
One of the more blatant examples of the disregard for pro-life
protesters' free speech rights occurred in Foti v. City of Menlo Park.
In this case, two protesters were picketing on a public sidewalk in
front of a Menlo Park, California Planned Parenthood Facility. 50 9 The
sidewalk bordered a four-lane roadway. 510 The two people carried
signs displaying pictures of aborted fetuses and other pro-life
messages. 5t' One of the defendants also attached pro-life signs on his
legally parked car.512
Soon after receiving complaints from motorists about the two
protesters, the City of Menlo Park adopted an ordinance that limited
506. See Hearings on Motion for Preliminary Injunction at 173-74, at Buchanan v. Jorgensen,
No. 87-Z-213 (D. Colo 1987) (argument regarding the need for a city ordinance that created an
eight-foot buffer zone around clinic patrons who are within one hundred feet of the clinic). See
also, Note, Too Close for Comfort: Protesting Outside Medical Facilities, 101 HARv. L. REV.
1856, 1860 (1988).
507. For various lower courts treatment of pro-life protesters, see e.g., NOW, Inc. v. Scheidler,
267 F.3d 687 (7th Cir. 2001) (upholding a permanent, nationwide injunction prohibiting protes-
ters from interfering with the rights of the clinics to provide abortion services, by obstructing
access to the clinics or trespassing on clinic property); Gynecology Clinic, Inc. v. Cloer, 334 S.C.
555 (S.C. 1999), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1099 (2000) (affirming a lower court decision that ruled
pro-life protesters engaged in a civil conspiracy even though the protesters' activities were pro-
tected by the First Amendment); Sabelko v. City of Phoenix, 68 F.3d 1169 (9th Cir. 1995) (up-
holding city ordinance requiring demonstrators within one hundred feet of a health care facility
to honor the request of individuals in the area who ask them to withdraw a distance of at least
eight feet from the person); Horizon Health Ctr. v. Felicissimo, 135 N.J. 126 (N.J. Sup. Ct. 1994)
(upholding a permanent injunction for protesters picketing on sidewalks surrounding the clinic,
reasoning the restriction was content-neutral and served significant state interests).
508. 146 F.3d 629 (9th Cir. 1998).
509. Id. at 633.
510. Id.
511. Id.
512. Id.
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each picketer "to carrying a single sign no larger than three square
feet" and required that "the picketer must actually move while carry-
ing the sign. '51 3 The ordinance also restricted a protester from post-
ing signs on public property or in a public right of way.5 14 The two
protesters continued to picket, although one had his sign confiscated
by a police officer because it violated the size requirements. 515 The
police also warned the protester that they would confiscate his car if
he placed any signs on it.516
The two protesters filed suit, claiming the ordinance violated their
free speech rights, but the district court refused to grant a temporary
restraining order after finding the ordinance facially constitutional. 517
On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
affirmed in part and reversed in part. 518 The court upheld the
ordinance's restriction on the size and number of signs carried by a
protester, accepting the city's substantial interests in protecting
the aesthetic appearance of the town and the "pedestrian circulation
on the sidewalk. '' 51 9 The court reasoned this part of the regulation
was narrowly tailored and left open alternative means of
communication. 520
The Ninth Circuit struck down the second part of the ordinance,
which required protesters to actually be moving while demonstrat-
ing. 52' The court reasoned that it was not narrowly tailored to the
city's interest and remanded to the district court to issue a preliminary
injunction against the city ordinance because the plaintiffs prevailed
on some of their claims. 522
This case is the perfect example of how some courts are out of touch
with the First Amendment, at least when pro-life speech is involved.
The fact that a city council could, in light of absolutely no reports of
violence or intimidation by protesters, enact restrictions so illogical
and unrelated to anything except to harass and abridge the free
speech rights of pro-life protesters is troubling. However, what is
even worse is that a federal district and appellate court could uphold
some of these restrictions based on the important state interests of
513. Id. at 634 n.3.
514. Foti, 146 F.3d at 633-34.
515. Id. at 634.
516. Id.
517. Id.
518. Id. at 643.
519. Id. at 640-41.
520. Foti, 146 F.3d at 641.
521. Id. at 642.
522. Id. at 643.
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"pedestrian circulation" and the "aesthetic appearance" of the
town. 523 One can only hope that this case and the state interests relied
upon do not give the Supreme Court any ideas the next time it consid-
ers an abortion protest case.
2. Planned Parenthood Shasta-Diablo, Inc. v. Williams524
A second example of a lower court restricting free speech rights is
the California Supreme Court case, Planned Parenthood Shasta-
Diablo, Inc. v. Williams, in which the court upheld a permanent in-
junction against pro-life protesters.525 In Williams, a group of pro-life
protesters had picketed the respondent's abortion clinic with groups
of picketers ranging from six to one hundred people.5 26 They demon-
strated on the public sidewalk in front of the clinic and in the parking
lot and mainly focused on distributing literature and plastic replicas of
fetuses to clinic patients. 527
Based on the findings that the petitioners intimidated women enter-
ing the clinic, interfered with entrance to the clinic, and caused some
of the women to become emotionally distraught, the trial court
granted a permanent injunction against the petitioners. 528 After the
California Supreme Court affirmed this decision,529 the United States
Supreme Court vacated and remanded it in the light of the Madsen
case. 530 On remand, the California Supreme Court again upheld the
injunction.53 1 The California Supreme Court, applying Madsen, found
Madsen analogous to the case and held that the place restrictions were
content-neutral, they served significant state interests, and they bur-
dened no more speech than necessary. 532
The court, after concluding that the injunction restricting the pro-
life protesters was content-neutral, noted only two sentences later that
the purpose of the injunction "was to ameliorate the confrontational
tactics of petitioners and to prevent the physical intimidation that re-
523. Id. at 640-41.
524. 10 Cal. 4th 1009 (Cal. 1995).
525. Id. at 1012. For a more thorough analysis of this case, see Ronnie Beth Nadell, Com-
ment, Planned Parenthood Shasta-Diablo, Inc. v. Williams: Anti-Abortion Protesters, Injunctions,
And The Suffocation Of Free Speech In California, 28 Sw. U. L. REv. 627 (1999).
526. Williams, 10 Cal. 4th at 1012.
527. Id. at 1013.
528. Id. The injunction restricted the protesters' picketing and counseling activities to the
sidewalk across the street from the clinic. Id.
529. Planned Parenthood Shasta-Diablo, Inc. v. Williams, 7 Cal. 4th 860 (Cal. 1994).
530. Williams v. Planned Parenthood Shasta-Diablo, 513 U.S. 956 (1994).
531. Williams, 10 Cal. 4th at 1012.
532. Id. at 1019-24.
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sulted in higher stress and anxiety. ' 533 The court next stated that the
statute equally applied to pro-choice protesters. 534 The court based its
conclusion that the statute was content-neutral on the false premise
that the statute also applied to pro-choice protesters.535 This is diffi-
cult to comprehend because the basis for the injunction was the tactics
of the pro-life protesters that caused high stress and anxiety. It is
highly unlikely, and borders on the absurd, that the court could hon-
estly believe the clinic owners would enforce the injunction against
pro-choice protesters. There were no reports of any type of threats or
touching, and yet an injunction was still warranted because of high
stress and anxiety. The troubling aspect about this case was that a
permanent injunction banning all demonstrations by any pro-life pro-
tester was issued because of conduct that was absent of any physical
threats, violated no laws, and was based on the government interest of
preventing "heightened stress and anxiety. '536
Many critics like to point out that abortion protest involves the con-
flicting constitutional rights of two different groups: women seeking
abortions and protesters expressing their disagreement with this ac-
tion.537 However, as these last two cases illustrate, this is not always
the situation. It is difficult to explain how a woman's right to choose is
infringed when a peaceful protester carries a sign exceeding a certain
limit or carries multiple signs. There is no balance of rights necessary
because only one party, the protesters, and their free speech rights are
at issue. While there is no conflict of rights between the women and
the protesters in these instances, courts restrict free speech rights re-
gardless of this point.
3. McGuire v. Reilly 538
A little over one year after the Supreme Court handed down Hill v.
Colorado, the aftershocks are just beginning to be felt.539 In McGuire
533. Id. at 1020.
534. Id.
535. Id. at 1014, 1019.
536. Id. at 1020-24.
537. Alan E. Brownstein, Rules of Engagement for Cultural Wars: Regulating Conduct, Unpro-
tected Speech, and Protected Expression in Anti-Abortion Protests, 29 U.C. DAvis L. REv. 553,
553-54 (1996).
538. 260 F.3d 36 (1st Cir. 2001)
539. See e.g., MeGuire v. Reilly, 260 F.3d 36 (1st Cir. 2001), infra notes 540-552 and accompa-
nying text; Thorburn v. Austin, 231 F.3d 1114 (8th Cir. 2000) (relying on Hill to uphold an ordi-
nance challenged by pro-life protesters); Veneklase v. City of Fargo, 248 F.3d 738, 743 (8th Cir.
2001) (en banc) (using Hill to "expand [the] reasoning" of the panel opinion in rejecting all of
the pro-life protesters' claims). However, when the protesters are not pro-life, the Hill analysis
seems to become less attractive. See Coalition for Humane Immigrant Rights v. Burke, CV 98-
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v. Reilly, a group of pro-life protesters brought a facial challenge to a
Massachusetts law that was modeled after the Colorado statute up-
held in Hill v. Colorado.540 The plaintiffs challenged that the law vio-
lated their rights to free speech and free association.5 41 The law was
similar to the Colorado statute and prohibited, absent consent, anyone
to approach within six feet of a person "for the purpose of passing a
leaflet or handbill to, displaying a sign to, or engaging in oral protest,
education or counseling with such other person" within eighteen feet
from any entrance to an abortion clinic. 542 The district court struck
down the statute, determining it violated the First Amendment be-
cause it was content-based and discriminatory on the basis of
viewpoint.543
The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit re-
versed.544 The court, relying heavily on Hill, noted its influence and
similarities to the case at hand.545 The court found the statute was a
content-neutral regulation because it provided "a neutral justifica-
tion-unrelated to the content of speech-for differential treat-
ment. ' 546 The First Circuit then rejected the district court's finding
that the law's exemption for clinic employees constituted impermissi-
ble viewpoint-based discrimination.5 47 It held that the court's finding
that viewpoint-based discrimination existed was "wholly unsupported
and hence clearly erroneous. ' 548
The Massachusetts statute is in some ways less restrictive than the
Colorado statute, however, the ease in which the court upheld the
speech restrictions is troubling. The court itself admitted, which is
more than the Hill Court could do, that the law "clearly affects anti-
abortion protesters more than other groups. ' 549 It then stated that
this differential treatment does not result from a disagreement with
4863-GHK(CTx), 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16520, *27 (C.D. CA. 2000) (finding that Hill did not
apply because the targeted audience was not captive or unwilling). This is an interesting holding
seeing that people walking or driving past day laborers (those challenging the speech restriction)
are no more willing to listen than those entering abortion clinics. It is also interesting because
there were various complaints by residents concerning physical threats, obstruction of traffic,
and harassment of women by the day laborers. Coalition for Humane Immigrant Rights, 2000
U.S. Dist. LEXIS at *29.
540. Reilly, 260 F.3d at 40-41.
541. Id. at 41.
542. Id. at 40.
543. Id. at 41.
544. Id. at 42.
545. Id. at 40-41.
546. Reilly, 260 F.3d at 45.
547. Id.
548. Id.
549. Id. at 44.
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the protesters' message. 550 It ignored its earlier point that the Massa-
chusetts statute was enacted because of the "aggressive behavior"
outside abortion clinics.55 1 It also failed to give adequate considera-
tion to the fact that clinic employees are exempt from the ban and that
the statute applies only to "clinics that provide abortions. '552 The
court did not address why an exemption for clinic employees is neces-
sary if a buffer zone is already intact. Apparently, the court not only
approved of hindering a patient's access to the pro-life message, but
also simultaneously gave the pro-choice message an elevated position.
Yet, the court held this position and still claimed the law is not view-
point-based discrimination. It pointed out that the employee exemp-
tion has secondary effects, but this still does not answer the question
of why employees are needed to escort patients if pro-life protesters
are already prohibited by law from remaining inside the buffer zone.
The court's observation that clinic employees do not counsel women
to undergo an abortion defies common sense. The court ignored the
fact that abortion is a business, and businesses that hope to survive
encourage clients to partake in their goods or services.
As these examples show, lower courts around the country are re-
stricting free speech rights even in the absence of harassment or civil
disobedience tactics. These lower courts have taken the notion from
the Supreme Court that the free speech rights of abortion protesters
can be restricted, even for trivial concerns. If these stringent restric-
tions were placed on any other group, there would likely be civil law-
suits, national media attention, and finger pointing in Congress over
who is to blame. Instead, these restrictions continue unabated, and
worse, they continue to multiply. 553
4. United States v. Lynch
The judicial climate of hostility to pro-life protestors First Amend-
ment rights has even spilled over to other constitutional protections,
like the Fifth Amendment. One glaring example is United States v.
Lynch, 554 where a bishop and a monk were charged with violating the
Freedom of Access to Clinics Entrances Act for praying in front of a
550. Id.
551. Id. at 39.
552. Reilly, 260 F.3d at 41.
553. See Steve Korris, Judge Throws Cold Water on Abortion Protests, CHi. TRIB., Feb. 6, 2002,
at 1 (reporting how a judge issued a permanent injunction prohibiting two pro-life demonstrators
from protesting within 1,500 feet of an abortion clinic worker's other place of employment).
554. United States v. Lynch, 162 F.3d 732 (2d Cir. 1998), rehearing en banc denied, 181 F.3d
330 (2d Cir. 1999).
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New York abortion clinic. 55 5 The two pro-life protestors were acquit-
ted in a bench trial after Judge John E. Sprizzo found that the govern-
ment did not prove the necessary element of willfulness by the
protestors.5 56 But the government, likely confounded that it could
lose a sure thing, appealed the acquittal, in spite of the Fifth Amend-
ment's Double Jeopardy Clause which prohibits that no person shall
"be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or
limb. ' 557 It appealed not once, but twice to the Second Circuit Court
of Appeals, which narrowly denied the appeal both times. 558 While it
is troubling that the government would trample over the Constitution
to pursue two men who were merely trying to peacefully exercise their
First Amendment rights, it is more troubling how those judges willing
to hear the appeal tried to circumvent the Constitution.
The six dissenting judges in the en banc hearing relied heavily on
United States v. Jenkins,55 9 which held that an avenue of appeal might
be open if a trial judge prepares special findings of fact.560 The dis-
sent, which argued the appeal should be heard, relied on Jenkins, yet
had no precedent applying Jenkins in this manner in the Second Cir-
cuit.561 That is likely because the Second Circuit had not even cited
the case, let alone relied on it for anything, in over twenty years. One
judge noted that "there was only one case in this Circuit cited by the
parties in which the government sought to overturn an acquittal," and
this was almost thirty years ago. 562 Nevertheless, it is difficult to
fathom why six judges on the Second Circuit Court of Appeals, along
with the United States government would have no qualms about hi-
jacking the Double Jeopardy concerns of two men praying inside a
buffer zone. It would be difficult to argue that the fact the protestors
were pro-life had nothing to do with this, especially in light of the
language in the government's brief which stated, "The Court's ruling
would make it impossible for the Government to enforce court orders
in a variety of contexts, including the anti-abortion protests here. ' 563
555. United States v. Lynch, 952 F. Supp. 167, 168 (S.D.N.Y. 1997).
556. Id.
557. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
558. United States v. Lynch, 162 F.3d 732 (2d Cir. 1998), rehearing en bane denied, 181 F.3d
330 (2d Cir. 1999).
559. United States v. Jenkins, 420 U.S. 358 (1975).
560. Id. at 367.
561. Lynch, 181 F.3d at 332.
562. Id. (Sack, Circuit Judge concurring in the denial of rehearing in banc).
563. Brief for the United States of America at 31-2; Lynch 162 F.3d at 732. See also Christo-
pher J. Bellotti, Note: The Double Jeopardy Category Is ... Abortion Protest: United States v.
Lynch, The United States' Appeal From a Criminal Acquittal In The Southern District of New
York, 45 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REv. 235 (2001).
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Violent offenders who rape, steal, and murder are given the fullest
protections possible under the Double Jeopardy Clause, yet when it
comes to an elderly bishop and a young monk quietly praying the ro-
sary, the United States government strong arms the two men in a
"whatever it takes" approach to make the streets of New York safer.
This is quite simply unexplainable.
B. Are the Restrictions Warranted?
One must consider why these limitations are placed on pro-life
protesters, if they are warranted, and if the pro-life movement is actu-
ally different from any other protest group. It is unfair to judge a
group based on its fringe elements, yet many claim that anyone pick-
eting an abortion clinic is a dangerous person who advocates the use
of violence. 564 Participants in the anti-war movement of the 1960s
were rarely, if ever, labeled as murderers and arsonists even though
some groups like the Black Panthers engaged in these crimes. In-
stead, for many people, the anti-war movement evokes romantic
memories of taking an ideological stand against an oppressive
government.
Abortion is a personal decision that rests solely with a woman.
Some would contend that the intimacy of abortion makes it different
from other issues subject to protest. However, in reality, every free
speech issue is personal. A segregationist diner owner could person-
ally be opposed to a black patron sitting at his lunch counter. A vet-
eran who lost a leg in Vietnam could be personally opposed to flag
burning. These are forms of protest that have personal effects on indi-
viduals; however, the speaker's First Amendment protections should
not be superseded because of the intimate nature by which the speech
affects them. Abortion is a very emotional issue that many people on
both sides of the issue feel passionately about. However, a burning
cross or flag, degrading religious art, or messages of hate, while not
only personally offensive to many, also raise many people's emotional
level. Like the personal nature of an issue, the emotional effects that
speech may have on people cannot be the reason for restricting
speech.
564. Recently, much has been made concerning the evils of racial profiling by law enforce-
ment officials. John Clound, What's Race Got to Do with It?, TIME, July 30, 2001 at 42. But it
appears that the courts and legislatures engage in a kind of ideological profiling when dealing
with pro-life protesters. They are in effect reasoning that anyone with a pro-life view is immedi-
ately considered dangerous because some espousing the same viewpoint have acted violently in
the past.
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For those advocating restrictions on pro-life protesters, it appears
that to them free speech is relative. When they agree with it, it should
be protected; when they do not agree with the speech, it should not be
protected. All the concerns about the feelings of the listener and the
stress caused by protesters are just a smokescreen. They are the
means to the end, which is to suppress, or at the least severely restrict
the pro-life message. For it appears that these concerns only become
important if it is speech they do not agree with.
An example of this double standard is the anti-war protesters who
protested soldiers returning from Vietnam. Unlike abortion protest
cases, courts gave serious consideration and protection to the free
speech rights of anti-war protesters.565 It is doubtful that a court
would have upheld a buffer zone at airfields where soldiers were re-
turning in order to protect them from unwanted literature, counseling,
or protest against the war. 566 Returning soldiers experienced anxiety,
grief, and shock after what they had experienced in Vietnam. It is
obvious that the words of these protesters psychologically affected
many of the soldiers who experienced the protests and caused them
great stress and anxiety. It is also clear some of these men were al-
ready recuperating or still suffering from serious physical injuries.
This was likely an extremely vulnerable period for. some soldiers, as
one soldier who had been spit on aptly noted, "I was in a state of
shock. . . . My wounds were still raw.' ' 567 Another man, who had
stepped on a land mine and was mocked when he returned, remarked,
"it hurt as much as the wounds I sustained. ' 568 Yet, these anti-war
protesters were given free reign under the guise of the First Amend-
ment to express their disdain for the soldiers and the war. The point
here is not that anti-war protesters' free speech rights should have
been restricted, the point is to show the blatant double standard of
some who fervently support speech restrictions of pro-life protesters.
565. See e.g., United States v. Gourley, 502 F.2d 785, 788 (10th Cir. 1973) (permitting anti-war
protesters to demonstrate within Air Force base, including areas surrounding the Cadet Chapel
because of its "public nature"); A Quaker Action Group v. Morton, 362 F. Supp. 1161, 1172
(D.D.C. 1973) (striking down limitations upon the number of demonstrators in front of the
White House because it restricted more First Amendment freedoms than was "essential for the
furtherance of the following governmental interests: Protection of the President and/or White
House . . . [s]afety of citizens [using sidewalks and streets in front of White House]"); United
States v. Spock, 416 F.2d 165, 170 (1st Cir. 1969) (noting that protesters "were not to be pre-
vented from vigorous criticism of the government's program merely because the natural conse-
quences might be to interfere with it, or even to lead to unlawful action"); Bond v. Floyd, 385
U.S. 116 (1966); Women Strike for Peace v. Morton, 472 F.2d 1273 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
566. Id.
567. BOB GREENE, HOMECOMINc 76 (t989).
568. Id. at 75.
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It is ironic that those supporting restrictions on pro-life protesters'
free speech strongly object to terms used by pro-life demonstrators
such as "baby killer" and that they find the accusation of abortion
doctors as being "murderers" so offensive. 569 It is ironic that they ob-
ject to the very same words some of them used while protesting ser-
vicemen returning from Vietnam.5 70
What about the feelings or anxiety of men who had just returned
from the hellish experiences of the Vietnam War? The answers are
clear: the anti-war protesters and their free speech rights trump these
concerns. Nevertheless, when the tables are turned and pro-life peo-
ple demonstrate in front of abortion clinics, free speech rights are out
the window and the feelings of the listener are paramount. Thus, it
appears that those supporting restrictions on pro-life speech either
have a selective memory or just believe in free speech when it ad-
vances their goals.
Many argue that the pro-life movement is unlike other movements
because of its strong religious ties and charge that it is trying to im-
pose its morals or religious beliefs on others. However, many differ-
ent religious denominations were closely associated with Dr. Martin
Luther King and the civil rights movement.571 One constitutional
scholar, in considering the religious aspects behind different protest
movements, noted "[t]here is little about the civil rights movement,
other than the vital distinction in the ends that it sought, that makes it
very different from the right-wing religious movements of the present
day. ' 572 The Catholic Church, as well as other religions, was also an
outspoken opponent of the Vietnam War. 573 Many different religious
denominations have also consistently voiced their opposition to the
death penalty.574 But opponents of the pro-life movement like to fo-
cus on its ties to religion and the "religious zealots" 575 who oppose
abortion, insinuating that when the subject is abortion, the religion
569. See Orin v. Barclay, 272 F.3d 1207, 1211 (9th Cir. 2001).
570. GREENE, supra note 567, at 38.
571. STEPHEN L. CARTER, THE CULTURE OF DISBELIEF: How AMERICAN LAW AND POLITICS
TRIVIALIZE RELIGIOUS DEVOTION 227-29 (1993); A. JAMES REICHELY, RELIGION IN AMERICAN
PUBLIC LIFE 244-50 (1985); MORRIS, supra note 151, at 120-38.
572. CARTER, supra note 571, at 228-29.
573. ADAM GARFINKLE, TELLTALE HEARTS: THE ORIGINS OF THE VIETNAM ANTIWAR
MOVEMENT 254-55 (1995).
574. HERBERT H. HAINES, AGAINST CAPITAL PUNISHMENT: THE ANTI-DEATH PENALTY
MOVEMENT IN AMERICA, 1972-1994 104-105 (1996).
575. Lisa J. Banks, Bray v. Alexandria Women's Health Clinic: The Supreme Court's License
for Domestic Terrorism, 71 DENy. U. L. REV. 449, 449 (1994). See also Constance A. Morella,
Clinics Under Siege, WASHINGTON POST, Mar. 23, 1993, at A21.
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factor becomes an issue and that religion is being forced down their
throat.
Another often cited charge that supposedly differentiates pro-life
groups and other social movements is that some of its members have
resorted to violence. However, this accusation applies to many social
movements. Anti-war demonstrators bombed buildings, burned draft
centers, and shut down universities. 576 Even supporters of abortion
rights have resorted to violence. These instances include a firebomb-
ing of a Gainesville, Florida Right to Life Office.577 In another inci-
dent, a man was convicted under the Freedom of Access to Clinic Act
after warning a pro-life crisis pregnancy center that he would shoot
any protesters outside abortion clinics. 578
Other examples of protest movements with violent elements are
animal rights groups and environmentalists who have resorted to ar-
son and other acts of vandalism. 579 One environmental group, The
Earth Liberation Front, claimed responsibility for setting a ski resort
in Vail, Colorado on fire, causing 12 million dollars in damages. 580
The Oregonian documented "100 major acts of suspected ecoterror-
ism-including arsons, bombings and other vandalism-in eleven
576. See, e.g., TOM BATES, RADS 47-48 (1992) (describing the firebombing of various buildings
on the University of Madison campus and surrounding towns). PETER COLLIER & DAVID
HOROWITZ, DESTRUCTIVE GENERATION, SECOND THOUGHTS ABOUT THE SIXTIES 104 (1989)
(highlighting the extreme elements of 1960s radicals, quoting a communiqud issued by
Bernadine Dohrn, a leader of the leftist group, the Weathermen, "We chose only to become
guerrillas and to urge our people to prepare for war. But ... guard your colleges, guard your
banks, guard your children. Guard your doors!").
577. Darryl E. Owens, Abortion Foes' Office Hit By A Firebomb, ORLANDO SENTINEL TRIB-
IJNE, Feb. 15, 1993, at B6. See also Orin, 272 F.3d at 1213 (discussing how a crowd of students
became "agitated to the point of physical violence against the [pro-life] protesters").
578. David Johnston, Abortion Rights Advocate Is Accused of Threats, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 12,
1995, at A20. See also Bomb Threats To a Church By a Protester Are Charged, N.Y. TIMES, Jan.
17, 1995, at B5.
579. William W. Cason, Comment, Spiking The Spikers: The Use Of Civil Rico Against Envi-
ronmental Terrorists, 32 Hous. L. REV. 745 (1995). Some of these groups have resorted to tactics
as extreme as sinking ships. id. at 755.
580. Tom Detzel & Bryan Denson, House Panel Subpoenas Eco-Terrorists' Ex-Spokesman,
THE OREGONIAN, Oct. 4, 2001, at B05. See also John McCaslin, Inside The Beltway, THE WASH-
INGTON TIMES, Oct. 3, 2001, at A9.
ELF's web site boasts over 30 acts of ecoterrorism directed at agencies of federal and
state governments, universities, corporations and private individuals that they and ALF
have committed since 1996: On May 21 of this year, 13 trucks and research offices were
burned at the University of Washington and Jefferson Poplar Farms in Clatskanie, Ore.
On Dec. 29, 2000, four new homes on New York's Long Island were burned, while ELF
also takes credit for a Dec. 19 torching of a nearby condominium project. ELF took
credit for a 1999 fire at Michigan State University that destroyed years of crop-nutrition
research.
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Western states dating to 1980. Damages from those crimes totaled
nearly $43 million. ' 581 An animal rights group, the Animal Libera-
tion Front, firebombed a Tucson, Arizona McDonalds, causing
$500,000 worth of damage. 582 Researchers who use animals in their
experiments have "endured death threats, bomb scares and a torrent
of obscene phone calls from increasingly militant activists committed
to ending the use of laboratory animals in medical research." 583 The
FBI considers the Animal Liberation Front among the nation's lead-
ing domestic terrorist threats.584
Thus, there seem to be many similarities between the fringe ele-
ments of the environmental and pro-life movements. However, one
noteworthy distinction is hard to explain. Legislatures and courts
across the country, along with the media, have no difficulty separating
the extreme elements of a movement from the mainstream when the
group supports a leftist cause such as environmental concerns or
animal rights. 585 Nor do these entities brand anyone with the same
581. Bryan Denson, Eco-Terrorists On The Attack, THE OREGONIAN, Jan. 11, 2001, at A01.
See also Hal Bernton, Eco-Terrorists Release List of Targets in 2001, THE SEATTLE TIMES, Jan.
16, 2002, at 1 (The groups claimed 137 acts of violence in 2001, and noted that in the wake of the
September 11 terrorist attacks, "It would be irresponsible for animal and earth warriors to aban-
don their campaigns and actions at this time.").
582. M. Scot Skinner, Activists Claim Responsibility for Tucson, Ariz., McDonald's Torching,
THE ARIZONA DAILY STAR, Sept. 12, 2001, at A2. See also Scott Sunde & Paul Shukovsky,
Elusive Radicals Escalate Attacks In Nature's Name; While Targets Burn, FBI Searches For Way
To Strike Back, THE SEATTLE POST INTELLIGENCER, June 18, 2001, at Al ("Josh Harper, a Seat-
tle animal rights activist who was hauled before a federal grand jury in Portland this year ...
[said], 'When you see the loss of 9 billion (animal) lives each year, it's inappropriate to hold a
sign or pass out a petition. It's appropriate to go out and burn down the factory farm."').
583. Michael Specter, Animal-Research Labs Increasingly Besieged; Violence, Threats From
Activists Force Institutions to Tighten Security, THE WASHINGTON PosiT, May 30, 1989, at Al. See
also Dan Gabriel, Radical Environmental Groups Break Law To Make Their Points, THE WASH-
INGTON TIMES, April 19, 2001, at 12 ("Extremist animal rights and environmental groups have
targeted not only property and business, but also individuals. Rock star Ted Nugent, president
of United Sportsmen of America ... [and] his family have been threatened with murder, rape,
and destruction of their home for Mr. Nugent's pro-hunting stance.").
584. Congressional Statement - 2001 - Threat of Terrorism to the United States: Before the
Senate Comm.'s on Appropriations, Armed Services, and Senate Comm. on Intelligence (2001)
(Statement of Louis J. Freeh, Director Federal Bureau of Investigation on the Threat of Terror-
ism to the United States before the United States Senate Committees on Appropriations,
Armed Services, and Select Committee on Intelligence). "Some special interest extremists-
most notably within the animal rights and environmental movements-have turned increasingly
toward vandalism and terrorist activity in attempts to further their causes. In recent years, the
Animal Liberation Front (ALF)-an extremist animal rights movement-has become one of the
most active extremist elements in the United States." Id. See also Michelle Cottle, House Ar-
rest; The Terrorists Next Door, THE NEW REPUBLIC, Aug. 6, 2001, at 18; Sally Ruth Bourrie,
Oregon Takes Fight To Eco Terrorists, THE BOSTON GLOBE, July 22, 2001, at A7
585. For example, an HBO documentary entitled "Soldiers in the Army of God" focused
solely on the violent fringe of the movement. The director of the documentary stated that the
people he interviewed "[we]re all answering some psycho-pathological-spiritual-political call."
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viewpoint as a violent extremist when the issue is something other
than abortion. For example, the media viewed fringe elements of the
civil rights movement like Malcolm X as just that, fringe, and took
great pains to separate them from the mainstream movement.586 Yet,
somehow, when the issue is abortion, these same entities make the
blanket assumption that anyone against abortion is capable of resort-
ing to violence and destruction, a stereotypical insult to peaceful and
law abiding people opposed to abortion.587 There is little doubt that
the media has an important impact on the issue of abortion and the
free speech rights of pro-life protesters. There is also little doubt
about which side the "mainstream" media takes. One newspaper
study noted that "[m]ost major newspapers support abortion rights on
their editorial pages, and two major media studies have shown that
80% to 90% of U.S. journalists personally favor abortion rights. '588 It
also noted that "abortion-rights advocates are ... characterized more
favorably than are abortion opponents. '58 9 One veteran news corre-
spondent at CBS wondered, "Why did we give so much time on the
evening news to liberal feminist organizations, like NOW, and almost
no time to conservative women who opposed abortion?" 590 The me-
dia's knack for showing pro-life protesters in a bad light undoubtedly
adds fuel to the fire of opposition to them and their freedom of speech
in legislatures and courts.591
Ann Marsh, 'Soldiers' Follows Violent Opponents Of Abortion, L.A. TIMES, March 31, 2001, at
F12. See also, Cal Thomas, Media Persist in Featuring Extremists, THE DES MOINES REGISTER,
Apr. 6, 2001 at 21 ("The HBO script followed the usual line: Pick the most extreme form of
behavior, do a documentary on it and leave the impression that all pro-lifers are just a hair-
trigger away from snuffing out the life of their local abortionist.").
586. See Thomas, supra note 585, at 21. Consider, for example, militant elements of the civil
rights movement, such as Malcolm X, who once noted that the struggle for racial equality "is a
real revolution.... And revolutions are never waged singing 'We Shall Overcome.' Revolutions
are based on bloodshed." MALCOLM X, The Black Revolution, in THE BLACK MAN AND THE
PROMISE OF AMERICA 490, 493 (Lettie J. Austin et al. eds., 1970).
587. Michelle Malkin, Ecoterrorists on the Loose, WASHINGTON TIMES, Apr. 26, 2000, at A15
(When "abortion-clinic workers [are] threatened, the public embraces a zero-tolerance policy.
When ecoterrorists run wild, the message is clear: Go soft on politically correct crimes, and let
the victims burn."). For a look at media coverage on abortion and abortion clinic violence, see
Tim Graham & Clay Waters, Roe's Warriors: The Media's Pro-Abortion Bias, at www.media
research.org/specialreports/news/sr19980722html (last visited February 2, 2002).
588. David Shaw, Abortion Bias Seeps Into News, L.A. TIMES, July 1, 1990, at Al.
589. Id. The study also differentiated between the terms pro-choice and anti-abortion. One
newspaper writer noted "In making one side 'pro' and the other 'anti,' we inevitably cast one in
a positive light and the other in a negative." Id. A Washington Post writer stated, "to use the
perferred terminology of one side and not the other ... seems manifestly ... unfair." Id.
590. BERNARD GOLDBERG, BIAS: A CBS INSIDER ExPOSEs HOW THE MEDIA DISTORT THE
NEWS 22 (2001).
591. Id. at 190. ("You don't see an articulate spokesman who's pro-life on the network eve-
ning newscasts. They'd rather show someone who just shot up an abortion clinic.").
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It would be hard to believe that continuously showing pro-life
protestors as violent extremists does not affect the public's views of
pro-life protestors. Insinuating that a whole movement is violent or
extreme because of a small fringe element goes against anything that
the media has ever done in the past with regard to other protest move-
ments. Highlighting the violent elements of the pro-life movement
has severely hindered the movement's chances of any sympathy or
support in the court of law or public opinion. Instead, the pro-life
movement has two strikes against it every time it steps into court.
Judges do not live in a vacuum; they, like anyone else, are susceptible
to repeated reports sensationalizing the fringe elements of the pro-life
movement. This is not to say that extremists and their actions should
be ignored, however it is difficult to reconcile why other movements
with fringe elements are not portrayed in such a negative light as the
pro-life movement.
The last consideration is the most serious and damaging element
that has supposedly set the pro-life movement apart from other
groups. This concerns the murders that a few extremists have commit-
ted for the cause of "life. '592 However, fringe elements of other
groups have also on occasion resorted to murder. Extreme elements
of the anti-war movement and other leftist groups took part in vio-
lence that resulted in deaths.593 Offshoots of the mainstream civil
rights movement advocated violence and shootings. 594 The animal
rights group, Animal Liberation Front, killed two people in an arson
at a USDA Research Facility in 1992.595 Finally, the Ku Klux Klan has
also participated in many murders and lynchings during its history.
Despite this, the Ku Klux Klan still has its free speech rights protected
by the Supreme Court.596
592. See supra notes 205-209 and accompanying text.
593. PETER COLLIER & DAVID HOROWITZ, supra note 576, at 242. See also BATES, supra
note 576, at 13; Robert Hanley, State Jury Finds 3 Radicals Guilty in Brink's Killings, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 15, 1983, at Al; Robert D. McFadden, Brink's Holdup Spurs U.S. Inquiry On Links
Among Terrorist Groups, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 25, 1981 at Al. See also KENNETH J. HEINEMAN,
CAMPUS WARS 245 (1993) (discussing student firebombing of the ROTC buildings at Maryland
University, Michigan State, Washington University, Wisconsin, and Yale).
594. Nina J. Easton, America The Enemy, L.A. TIMES, June 18, 1995, at 8. Black militant
leader H. Rap Brown was quoted as once saying, "Do what John Brown did, pick up a gun and
go out and shoot our enemy." Id.
595. KATHLEEN MARQUARDT, ANIMAL SCAM 161 (1993). This same group also caused
$100,000 in damages after firebombing a Swanson Meats facility and $5.1 million in damages
after committing arson at an Animal Diagnostic Clinic at University of California at Davis. Id.
at 164.
596. See, e.g., Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969) (reversing the conviction of a Ku
Klux Klan leader because the statute impermissibly restricted speed protected by the First
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Thus, while the pro-life movement has many similarities to other
groups, many still relegate this movement to a fringe status more radi-
cal than any other group. Yet, violence and death have been tied to
several protest movements, and they were not branded as fanatics and
suppressed like abortion protesters. The only differences between the
pro-life movement and other social groups are that the issue and the
times have changed; the First Amendment has not.
In light of these considerations, it is difficult to advance the argu-
ment that the First Amendment rights of abortion protesters should
be restricted solely because some members have acted violently. If
increased penalties for vandalism or destruction of health clinics is a
strong deterrent to clinic violence, then this is definitely justified.
There is also no question that individuals opposed to abortion who
engage in any kind of illegal behavior should be punished to the ful-
lest extent of the law. However, floating and fixed buffer zones only
harm law-abiding citizens and, hence, are not warranted.
C. The Effects on Pro-Life Protesters
To better understand how Madsen, Schenck, and Hill will affect
abortion clinic protests and the pro-life movement, the protesters'
methods must be considered. While not every protest is the same, the
general purpose of pro-life activists is to dissuade women from having
abortions. Speaking with women entering the clinic, informing the
general public that abortions are taking place at that site, expressing
disagreement with abortion, or pressuring the clinics are some of the
ways pro-life people protest abortion. Various methods of protest in-
clude silent vigils or prayer services, sit-ins, mass demonstrations,
pickets, or sidewalk counseling.597 While one may argue that protes-
ters mingle threats and harassment with these practices, this can hap-
pen in the heat of any picket line.
The method of sidewalk counseling is especially important for two
reasons. First, it can be very effective and is often the most peaceful
way of persuading a woman to consider other alternatives to abortion.
Amid all the arguments about abortion itself, clinic violence, free
speech, and Roe, one must remember that abortion is a business run
by people trying to make a profit. Sidewalk counselors prevent their
business from running smoothly and sometimes cause potential cus-
tomers not to go through with the abortion. Mass demonstrations and
sit-ins will often cause some women to return to the clinic at another
Amendment); R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992) (striking down a statute which
criminalized the burning of a cross because it violated the First Amendment).
597. See infra note 602 and accompanying text.
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less hostile time, but sidewalk counseling can result in a woman never
coming back, a point which may concern some abortion providers.
Second, the issue of sidewalk counseling is important because it has
been hurt most by the three abortion protest cases. As Justice Scalia
has noted, a floating buffer zone would not affect loud screams with
bullhorns, but it does affect a sidewalk counselor from speaking with a
woman entering the clinic.598 Sidewalk counselors will be unable to
use their persuasion once a patron of the clinic gets within a certain
distance of the clinic. If the Court wanted to prevent reasonable con-
versation, its decision is sufficient, but if the Court was concerned
about women being yelled at, threatened, or bothered by images or
signs, the Court failed greatly.
When distributing leaflets, whether it is for a political candidate, a
labor union, or a business, location is key. One needs to be able to
move around quickly and get as close as possible to a passerby. This is
no different when the issue is abortion, and it may take on even
greater importance because of the nature of the subject and the sur-
roundings. Again, the Court severely damaged this element of pro-
test, another fairly peaceful way of dissuading a woman to reconsider
her actions.
The underlying theory should be that if a message is wrong, unpop-
ular, or hateful, then let it be heard so it can be exposed for what it
really is. Bringing issues out into the open promotes discussion and
progress, and as a country we can advance ourselves with the free-
doms of thought and expression. Keeping a message suppressed can
often produce adverse effects. 599
Another important consideration of how the Supreme Court's three
decisions will affect pro-life protesters is a point that surprisingly it
does not address. These cases create a chilling effect on anyone who
may want to validly exercise their First Amendment rights. In short,
the Court's message to anyone who is interested in voicing her opposi-
tion to abortion, yet is concerned about not breaking the law, is sim-
ple: "Stay Home." Some may argue that this is a beneficial
consequence to rulings of the Court. Yet, this is essentially the chilling
of free speech in its most blatant form and it infringes on one of the
most fundamental civil rights. Others may claim that this chilling ar-
gument is blown out of proportion. However, consider some of the
restrictions upheld by the Supreme Court and lower courts previously
598. Hill, 530 U.S. at 757.
599. See THOMAS I. EMERSON, TOWARD A GENERAL THEORY OF THE FIRst AMENDMENT 12
(1963) ("Suppression drives opposition underground, leaving those suppressed either apathetic
or desperate. It thus saps the vitality of the society and makes resort to force more likely.").
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discussed. These laws do not inhibit obvious crimes, such as trespass-
ing or assault, rather they incriminate actions such as being within cer-
tain buffer zones or carrying signs that are too large. In Madsen, for
example, trial transcripts showed individuals arrested for violating the
injunction who were only exercising their free speech rights, were not
acting in concert with those groups who had been enjoined, and were
unaware that their actions were illegal. 60 0 It is unfortunate that the
Court did not take into consideration the effects on other pro-life
protesters, for these effects are so serious they are more aptly de-
scribed as freezing rather than chilling.
D. The Effects on First Amendment Jurisprudence
Throughout the three cases, the Court has struggled with citing pre-
cedent for many of its innovative ideas for justifying new restrictions
on speech. When the Court decided Schenck, it used Madsen for pre-
cedent. Likewise, in Hill, the Court relied predominantly on Madsen
and Schenck to show prior case law that was similar to how the Court
was deciding the case. While these three cases are factually similar,
the point is that the Court has never had any case law during the last
forty years that it could use in restricting speech so easily and severely.
Unfortunately, in future cases involving not only pro-life protesters
but also protesters for any issue, the Court now has a solid block of
precedent in Madsen, Schenck, and Hill to use when it decides to cur-
tail what was formerly viewed as constitutionally protected activity. 60'
Restrictions on free speech take into consideration a number of
things: whether the restriction is constitutional, whether there is a
valid state interest, and other factors. In supporting a restriction on
free speech, people often look at the effects of the speech on its audi-
ence, the message itself, the location where the speech occurs, and the
language of First Amendment. A valid analysis will balance all of
these factors. Some sidewalk counselors, in their zeal to persuade pa-
tients, utilize extremely controversial materials. Many will complain
about the methods used by sidewalk counselors, which include
presenting women with plastic replicas of fetuses, displaying pictures
of aborted babies, or warning them of the possible side effects of abor-
600. Madsen, 512 U.S. at 795.
601. For example, during the recent World Trade Organization protests in Seattle, the City
cited Madsen v. Women's Health Center in its argument against an injunction filed by the ACLU.
Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion for Temporary Restraining Order, ACLU v.
City of Seattle (W.D. Wash. Dec. 1, 1999) (No. C99-1938). See also Aaron Perrine, The First
Amendment Versus The World Trade Organization: Emergency Powers and the Battle in Seattle,
76 WASH. L. REV. 635, 640 (2001).
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tions.602 According to these critics, these types of actions are uncon-
stitutional because patients who enter the clinics are often "visibly
shaken, crying, and nervous... [and] sidewalk counseling clearly has a
detrimental effect on the health of women entering abortion clin-
ics. ' '603 The problem is that these people only consider the situation in
which the listener finds herself. Communication is a two way street;
there is both a speaker and a potential listener. To consider the situa-
tion from only one party's viewpoint is not a complete analysis, yet
many would use this approach by only considering the feelings or po-
sition of a woman entering the clinic. However, First Amendment
doctrine should not be viewed in this light. The situation of the
speaker and her First Amendment rights must be considered and, in
some ways, given more weight because free speech and the right to
express oneself are so important in this country. Using the analysis of
primarily contemplating only the audience's feelings or reactions to
the speech in question would wreak havoc for anyone with a contro-
versial message or an idea that was not in line with the status quo.
Thus, analyzing free speech issues with regard to abortion protest
mainly in terms of the recipient and the effect on her feelings is not
only at odds with the basic principles of freedom but also very danger-
ous for civilization.
During the pre-Civil War period, slavery supporters, concerned
about the effects of abolitionist speech on the slaves, made laws to
restrict their speech. 604 Slavery owners feared the effects of these
messages on slaves because it could have caused insubordination
among the slaves. 60 5 Thus, restricting speech because of its effects on
someone is nothing new. Women entering an abortion clinic are not
always resolute in their decision to obtain an abortion; there may be
some doubts in what they are about to do. Abortion protesters hope
to seize on that hesitation and persuade them of the alternatives.
Merely because this issue is extremely confrontational, emotional, di-
visive, and of the utmost importance to both sides of the picket line,
does not mean that free speech restrictions can be implemented.
602. See Jennifer Bullock, Note, National Organization for Women v. Scheidler: RICO and
the Economic Motive Requirement, 26 CONN. L. REV. 1533, 1550 (1994) (noting a woman's testi-
mony who was told by pro-life protesters that abortions could cause her to die, bleed internally,
or go into a coma).
603. Lolita Youmans, Note, Operation Rescue v. Planned Parenthood, Inc.: A Judicial Show-
down Over Sidewalk Counselors and First Amendment Rights, 37 Hous. L. REV. 603, 623-24
(2000).
604. See supra notes 36-43 and accompanying text.
605. Id.
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Abortion protesters have many critics, some of whom would sacri-
fice First Amendment rights in order to suppress their free speech.
Taking a cue from the Supreme Court and its line of abortion protest
cases, some legal scholars are attempting to devise new approaches to
silencing the voices against abortion. One such example is using the
theory of constitutional libel law to restrict pro-life speech. They ar-
gue that because pro-life speech causes significant emotional harm,
the appropriate doctrine would be the libel law theory.60 6 However,
members of other protest groups would not have to be concerned be-
cause this theory conveniently suppresses only pro-life speech.607 This
idea would work under the assumption that because of the severe
emotional impact on women entering the clinic, the government,
through statutes and injunctions, would be able to dictate how the
pro-life message is conveyed. 60 8 While leafleting would likely still be
permitted, courts could restrict other things, such as pictures of
aborted fetuses.60 9
Besides this analysis being unwarranted and unconstitutional, it has
a basic flaw that strikes at the heart of the theory. Contrary to what
some might believe, the pro-life message is not laden with lies and
defamatory statements. The features of plastic replicas of fetuses are
scientifically proven and pictures of aborted fetuses, although gro-
tesque, are accurate. While the libel theory is unworkable, it is ad-
dressed to show how far some are willing to go to sacrifice the First
Amendment in order to dismantle the pro-life message.
Another example of using the law to suppress the free speech of
those opposing abortion is the use of antitrust law. It is argued that
"anti-abortion protests corrupt the natural functioning of the market-
place" and therefore antitrust laws should be used to remedy this pro-
test movement. 610 One author focuses the liability to antitrust claims
based on violent protest and some non-violent yet illegal protest activ-
ity.6t 1 Again, the author fails to grasp the fundamental point that a
small fringe element causes the destruction. The author also notes
that pregnancy centers run by pro-life organizations that offer alterna-
606. See Laurence J. Eisenstein & Steven Semeraro, Abortion Clinic Protest and The First
Amendment, 13 ST. Louis U. PUB. L. REV. 221 (1993). See also Angela Christina Couch,
Wanted: Privacy Protection for Doctors Who Perform Abortions, 4 AM. U. J. GENDER & LAW,
361, 363 (1996) (arguing that doctors who perform abortions deserve the protection of various
privacy torts to ensure the availability of abortion).
607. Eisenstein & Semeraro, supra note 606, at 239.
608. Id. at 240.
609. Id.
610. Melanie K. Nelson, Comment, The Anticompetitive Effects of Anti-Abortion Protest, 2000
U. CI. LEGAL F. 327, 328 (2000).
611. Id. at 328-29.
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tives to abortion are a restraint on competition. 612 It appears that an-
ything that might make a woman think twice about getting an
abortion is a restraint on competition. The author does not address
whether churches that object to abortion are also engaging in an-
ticompetitive actions.
The author also argues that these restrictions on speech are unre-
lated to the purpose of the law, which is to further "an important gov-
ernmental interest by assuring a fair and competitive marketplace.
' 613
Suddenly, profits take precedence over our most basic fundamental
freedoms. For if this analysis is extended, almost any type of protest
that adversely effects a business could be slapped with an antitrust suit
because the importance of a competitive marketplace is vaulted above
all else, even the right to freedom of expression. The author herself
admits that the antitrust theory would apply to non-violent, direct ac-
tion types of protest: "Though civil disobedience may be an important
method of addressing sociopolitical concerns, victims should not be
required to shoulder the damages. '614
If the use of antitrust law against organizations whose members are
engaging in unlawful behavior were accepted, the chilling effect on
free speech would be devastating. However, free speech advocates
need not be concerned, because it appears that the application of this
analysis would only be aimed at pro-life groups. 615 Nevertheless, if
this analysis were applied to other issues, much of the civil rights and
anti-war movements of the 1960s would have been severely hindered
by antitrust suits. Thankfully, Southern restaurant owners refusing to
serve blacks in the 1960s did not have the foresight and ingenuity that
some legal scholars display today.
Another weapon in the arsenal of those in opposition to pro-life
protesters is a novel concept of using state attorneys general to shut
down any pro-life pregnancy crisis centers. These pregnancy centers
do not stage mass blockades in front of abortion clinics or pass out
pamphlets showing aborted fetuses. Instead, these centers were de-
signed to advise pregnant women who choose to seek out information
612. Id. at 349.
613. Id. at 363.
614. Id.
615. Nowhere in the article does the author mention animal rights advocates and their effect
on the fur or meat industries. While the author acknowledges some environmental protesters
engage in anticompetitive conduct, she buries this concern in a footnote. Id. at 346 n.143. She
notes protesters of abortion are "a prime example of the devastating economic consequences
these activities can pose to consumers and businesses." Nelson, supra note 610, at 346-47.
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on their options.616 Thus, the usual rhetoric of a listener's right to be
left alone cannot be used as a shield to those hoping to suppress the
pro-life speech in this situation. The logic behind this move by abor-
tion rights groups and the Attorney General of New York is that the
pregnancy centers are "practicing medicine without a license. ' 617 One
crisis pregnancy center founder noted, the move by the state of New
York "is a triple attack on the First Amendment-on our freedom of
assembly, religion, and speech. ' 618 Apparently, the National Abor-
tion Rights Action League (NARAL), the group spearheading the
push behind these restrictions is concerned not about the pro-life rhet-
oric of these pregnancy centers but the harsh reality that the centers'
free ultrasound service shows.
If the line of reasoning used by New York was taken to its next
logical step, "anything that touches on medical ethics could become
the province of physicians, with everyone else gagged. ' 619 Examples
of this kind of strong arm tactic by those supporting abortion prove
that at some point the real motivation behind these restrictions was
not due to fear of the messenger, but the message. The Supreme
Court, in Roe v. Wade, never gave those opposing abortion any kind
of say in the matter. Through the various abortion protest cases that
have reached the Court, it has severely undermined protesters' ability
to have any say on the subject. Despite these facts, pro-life groups
attempt alternative methods of getting their messages across, such as
crisis pregnancy centers, where they are met by states attempting to
force them to be silent. This type of Gestapo tactic used by New York
could only be bred in an environment hostile to anything pro-life, such
as the one created by the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court, along
with a multitude of lower courts throughout the nation, have gone so
far astray from the true values of the First Amendment that ideas like
the New York Attorney General's would even be possible.
Those supporting speech restrictions on pro-life protesters would
claim that abortion is not only intimate, but also point out that abor-
tion protest is directed at private decision makers and thus less deserv-
ing of First Amendment protection.620 However, protests directed at
616. Marvin Olasky, Fighting for life and informed choice, at http://www.townhalI.com/column
ists/marvinolasky/mo20020122.shtml (Jan. 22, 2002).
617. Id.
618. See Michelle Malkin, The Abortion Empire Strikes Back, WASHINGFrON TIMES, Jan 14,
2002, at A15.
619. Olasky, supra note 616.
620. Alan E. Brownstein, Rules of Engagement for Cultural Wars: Regulating Conduct, Unpro-
tected Speech, and Protected Expression in Anti-Abortion Protests - Section 11, 29 U.C. DAVIs L.
REV. 1163, 1176-77 (1996).
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private decision makers encompass almost any protest movement.
Every demonstration is aimed at someone, whether it is private indi-
viduals or government policy makers. Animal rights activists address
their protest at those who eat meat or wear certain clothing in order to
raise awareness about the rights of animals. In the 1960s, civil rights
advocates used lunch counter sit-ins directed at not only the govern-
ment but also segregationists in the South. Thus, to isolate pro-life
protesters as directing their message at private decision makers proves
little, if anything, because almost every movement tries to influence
the thoughts and actions of other people.
Another mistake people who wish to restrict pro-life speech make
concerns the consideration of the message of the protesters. Gener-
ally, abortion protesters oppose the Supreme Court decision Roe v.
Wade and abortion itself; they do not oppose or hate women entering
an abortion clinic. Protesters in front of an abortion clinic mainly
serve the purpose of trying to persuade women entering the clinic to
consider alternatives to abortion. People hoping to get someone to
agree with them do not hate that individual or oppose her personally,
rather they oppose her actions. There is a significant difference, and
accusing pro-life protesters of being people who hate women who get
abortions621 is not only baseless but also defies common sense.622 Pro-
life protesters, and sidewalk counselors in particular, are trying to ex-
plain to women the truthful facts surrounding abortion. A plastic rep-
lica of a fetus showing the size and distinctiveness of the unborn child
is a scientific fact, and if it emotionally affects women, that is a human
reaction that cannot be helped. Abortion is a medical procedure, and
like any other medical procedures, there are dangers and possible side
effects. While no one likely wants to be reminded of possible adverse
consequences before undergoing a medical operation, the speaker can
exercise her right to remind people. Again, these are not lies, but
graphic, yet truthful descriptions of what may happen, expressed by
counselors in hopes of getting a woman to change her mind. Informed
consent, even if that information comes from sidewalk counselors, is
an important factor that any patient should have before going into a
medical procedure.
621. See Marlene Gerber Fried, The Mainstream Anti-Abortion Movement Must Be Held Ac-
countable, in ABORTION VIOLENCE & EXTREMISM 29, 32 (1997) (calling Operation Rescue dem-
onstrations "hate rhetoric").
622. However, some states, in an effort to inhibit pro-life protesters in any way possible have
included anti-discrimination statutes to their abortion clinic access laws, with the approval of the
judiciary. See New York v. Kraeger, 160 F. Supp 2d 360, 376-77 (N.D.N.Y. 2001).
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The first two abortion protest cases, Madsen and Schenck, had some
disturbing analytical elements. To compound the previous two cases,
the Court's decision in Hill contained even more flaws that under-
mined First Amendment jurisprudence. However, the Court must
stop the bleeding by first taking the First Amendment claims of the
protesters more seriously. The Court's attempts at striking a balance
between recognizing both groups' rights are indefensible. It must
honestly consider the chilling effect these restrictions have on protes-
ters. The Court also must reinstate the prior restraint doctrine and
step back from the notion that abortion clinics deserve the same level
of protection as a residence.
In the three abortion cases, the Court applied brand new concepts
within First Amendment jurisprudence to restrict pro-life speech. It is
one thing to severely restrict free speech in a public forum, but it is
quite another to do so with ad hoc applications. The Court must dis-
continue this standard and actually apply standard First Amendment
doctrine to the cases. It may be, however, that doing so would result
in striking down the restrictions, something the Court will not do,
even if that means sacrificing First Amendment principles in the
process.
In the Hill case, the four lower court opinions determining that the
Colorado statute was content-neutral applied the test from Ward v.
Rock Against Racism.623 If a statute that is subtly, or not so subtly,
directed at a particular group and its viewpoint is still believed to be
content-neutral, the Court must reconsider this test. This analysis
seems to lend itself to outcome determinative charges because it ap-
pears to allow courts to choose what language within the statute it
wants to consider.
This result is not acceptable. The statute must be read as a whole,
and a court must consider the real life consequences it might have on
the free speech rights of the protesters. If these simple considerations
were made, a court would likely comprehend that the statute is actu-
ally not content-neutral. Considering whether a statute is based on a
particular group's viewpoint is very important and cannot be left in
the hands of an analysis that does not consider the real world implica-
tions on the First Amendment and does not contemplate the underly-
ing reason behind the statute.
Finally, if the Court continues to give serious weight to how the
listener feels about speech, all protest movements are in jeopardy.
The whole idea behind demonstrating is to express displeasure with
623. See supra notes 333-336 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 51:825
DOUBLE STANDARDS
something to certain persons. This will frequently entail recipients of
the speech becoming angry, embarrassed, or flustered. If the Supreme
Court had always used the approach of considering how listeners feel
or the effects of the speech on them, many cases would have been
decided differently. Certain persons object to pornography because
of social or religious beliefs. Others take offense to protected forms
of expression such as flag desecration or cross burning. All of these
examples have disturbing effects on people and yet, these actions were
not restricted because of it.
Anyone can support free speech, especially when it is something
one likes, agrees with, or supports. The true stalwarts are those who
defend and protect speech when it is speech that they adamantly op-
pose, disagree with, or find offensive. This is very difficult to do; in
fact, it is something most people have trouble doing. However, if indi-
viduals consider the importance and the effects the First Amendment
has had throughout the history of this nation, one can better appreci-
ate this great freedom and may hesitate before restricting speech.
Those who agree with the outcomes in Madsen, Schenck, and Hill
should not rejoice too much because one day, a change in the Court's
composition may cause them to find their views being heavily sup-
pressed through this same line of case law.
V. CONCLUSION
As shown by various elections for political candidates and confirma-
tion hearings of various governmental appointees, the issue of abor-
tion has not gone away and probably never will. As both sides of the
issue continue to lobby government officials and the public to con-
vince them that their side is "right," free speech will continue to be an
important part of this debate. The First Amendment is the means by
which these groups try to achieve their desired end. While the First
Amendment can be looked at as a means to an end, we must remem-
ber it is a powerful end in and of itself. For the First Amendment
gives ordinary citizens the ability to assemble and speak about neces-
sary change or to protest the government.
The noble aspirations of freedom of speech, equal treatment under
the law, and tolerance of other peoples' views get tossed quicker than
spoiled milk when the issue is the First Amendment rights of pro-life
protesters. But standards such as these cannot be applied only when it
is expedient or convenient. Not upholding the principles of freedom
of speech, equality, and tolerance of all people, regardless of their be-
liefs or viewpoints, shows how fickle these ideals really are to some
people.
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While pro-life and pro-choice groups disagree vehemently with one
another, the only way to make any progress on the issue is to promote
discussion and increase awareness of what is at stake. Silencing the
opposition, whether through threats, violence, or buffer zones, does
no one any good. The real victim of these types of actions is not only
the group on the receiving end but also the First Amendment.
The cornerstone of any legal system is consistency. Inconsistency
tends to breed disrespect, contempt, and lack of faith in the arbiter of
justice. Following and administering the rule of law in a consistent
fashion avoids chaos, creates equality, and promotes efficiency. No-
where else is this principle more crucial than in First Amendment ju-
risprudence. For inconsistent application of these laws leads to a
dangerous power that can be arbitrarily wielded against anyone. This
has been evident from the very beginning of this nation. Through the
years, many unpopular groups have been harassed and silenced
through a system of laws whose purpose was to protect and defend the
constitutional rights of all citizens. Letting the government decide
what speech should be suppressed has been a tempting idea, dating
back to the infancy of this nation. Time does not bode well for those
advocating restrictions on free speech. The United States Supreme
Court and this country have made too many advances since these
early days to return to a time of suppressing speech because one dis-
agrees with it. Justice Clarence Thomas once noted that the best way
to have justice for all "is to apply one set of rules for everybody ... to
use one set of rulebooks. ''624
Christopher P. Keleher
624. Justice Clarence Thomas, Address at University of Louisville (Sep. 11, 2000).
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